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ABSTRACT:  
“Judicial Rhetoric and Radical Politics: Sexuality, Race, and the Fourteenth Amendment” 
takes up U.S. judicial opinions as performances of sovereignty over the boundaries of legitimate 
subjectivity. The argumentative choices jurists make in producing judicial opinion delimit the 
grounds upon which persons and groups can claim existence as legal subjects in the United 
States. I combine doctrinal, rhetorical, and queer methods of legal analysis to examine how 
judicial arguments about due process and equal protection produce different possibilities for the 
articulation of queer of color identity in, through, and in response to judicial speech.  
The dissertation includes three case studies of opinions in state, federal and Supreme 
Court cases (including Lawrence v. Texas, Parents Involved in Community Schools vs. Seattle 
School District No. 1, & Perry v. Brown) that implicate U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s development and application of a particular form of Fourteenth Amendment rhetoric 
that I argue has liberatory potential from the perspective of radical (anti-establishmentarian and 
statist) queer politics. I read this queer potential in Kennedy’s substantive due process and equal 
protection arguments about gay and lesbian civil rights as a component part of his broader 
rhetorical constitution of a newly legitimated and politically regressive post-racial queer subject 
position within the U.S. constitutional state. My queer rhetorical analysis of judicial speech 
contributes to the project of bridging post-structural philosophy with everyday material relations. 
By theorizing queer politics in terms of institutional legal rhetoric, I offer a method for 
evaluating judicial argumentative choice in terms of radical queer of color political goals. 
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INTRODUCTION: JUDICIAL RHETORIC AND LEGAL SUBJECTS 
Jon Stewart: “We were talking about the Supreme Court, and they seem very protective over their process,” 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor: “yes” 
 Stewart: “and you were saying one of the reasons you thought that might be.”   
O’Connor: “Well, the Supreme Court is the one branch of government that has written explanations for 
everything it decides and does.  That’s pretty impressive.  No other branch of government, 
no member of Congress, has to write some written explanation of everything.” 
[Laughter] 
Stewart: “But that is such a good point.”  
O’Connor: “Yes.  Not bad.”   
Stewart: “But it is [such a good point]...things happen that seem inexplicable on the legislative side...” 
O’Connor: “That’s right.”  
Stewart: “...or on the executive side, and you ask, and no one seems to know how it happened or went 
down...they just show up and they vote on it, and you don’t know why.” 
O’Connor: “But every member of the Court has to have a written explanation...every Justice has signed on 
to some explanation.  That’s pretty impressive, I think.”1 
 
––Excerpt from comedian Jon Stewart’s interview with Retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor on The Daily Show With Jon Stewart, March 5, 2013 
... 
A judicial speech act is a sovereign event.2  In the United States, the Justices of the 
Supreme Court can exercise sovereign power through rhetorical utterance by at once: 
determining who is a person and who is not; and making a claim for the right and power of their 
judicial speech to make that determination.  Other U.S. judges and (as Barack Obama has 
recently insisted) legitimate representatives of the sovereign authority of the U.S. state can 
exercise this power, but the Supreme Court is unique as the putative and in many cases still the 
actual final arbiter of any such decision.  Of course it is true that human existence does not flow 
from the Supreme Court, and so by “determining who is a person and who is not,” I mean that 
the Court has the authority to decide whether a person is legible as a subject of the sovereign 
power of the law, and if so, in what way will that power characterize the nature of that subject.   
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This is the power not to decide existence itself, but rather the nature of existence as a 
legal entity in and in relation to the United States of America.  In other words, the Supreme 
Court is the final arbiter in most decisions about the range of possible subjectivities a person can 
perform or inhabit in those situations when they choose or are forced to engage the law as 
subjects of legal sovereignty. Such a decision, of course, can have the effect of life and death, as 
well as any number of other consequences for the nature of both.  This dissertation combines 
queer, argumentative, and queer of color3 approaches to law to examine how public arguments 
constitute legitimate forms of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans*, and queer (LGBTQ), and LGBTQ of 
color life in relation to U.S. national culture.4  It is about certain U.S. state, federal, but especially 
Supreme Court jurists’ rhetorical production of certain possible forms of queered and racialized 
ways of being subject to the U.S. Constitution, and the concomitant production of future 
possibilities for these subjectivities.  In this introduction, I offer a preliminary theorization of the 
power politics of judicial rhetorical criticism, before discussing the details of my current project.  
I hope that my work in these pages can contribute a rhetorical perspective to a project others 
have started—the construction of a radical politics of practical legal recourse.   
I.  The Rhetorical Performance of Judicial Sovereignty 
The philosopher and logician Chaïm Perleman says that the judge, “in giving his 
decision,” “performs an act of sovereignty...by declaring what is in conformity with the law.”5  
Judicial declaration is therefore a form of argument as Perelman understands it, wherein the goal 
of making an argument is to bring a desired conclusion in line with what is already accepted as a 
given among argumentative interlocutors.6  The role of the judge in a democratic society is not 
only to arbitrate what is legal and what is not, but also to use argument as a means of bringing 
competing visions of law into accord: the judge “shows that the decisions which he is led to take 
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are not only legal, but are acceptable because they are reasonable.”7  Marouf Hasian, Jr., Celeste 
Michelle Condit, and John Louis Lucaites call for a rhetorical study of U.S.8 law that situates 
jurists as participants in a “rhetorical culture,” where judicial rhetoric should be understood in 
terms of the judiciary’s struggle to not only make sound legal decisions, but also to legitimate 
those decisions in public.9  Judicial speech is sovereign speech in the sense that its primary 
function in a democracy is to legitimize the exercise of legal power by the representatives of the 
state.10  The arguments judges make in support of their decisions are significant independent 
from the conclusion itself.  They are the technique by which the jurist establishes her own 
legitimacy as a sovereign entity; in so doing, she enacts an argument for the sovereignty of law.11  
A juxtaposition of Perelman’s study of the rhetorical evolution of the judiciary with his 
earlier writing on judicial argument and “juridical proof”12 suggests an interesting distinction 
between the public and courtroom functions of judicial speech.  In this distinction, a judge’s 
argumentative justification for her decision, or conclusion of law, is a public rhetorical act, but in 
the courtroom, it is the “conclusions that matter to the parties.”13  For those who stand before the 
bench, all other components of the speech of judicial decision are “little more than a basis from 
which legal consequences flow.”14  This distinction parses the power of judicial speech into a 
thing of immediate, material power directed at parties (and especially at the “defendant or 
accused”) to a legal dispute, and a rhetorical act directed at the public whose consent is required 
for democratic governance, for the purpose of legitimizing and retaining the judicial power to 
determine “legal consequences.”   
I propose a modification of Perelman’s distinction through a conceptual expansion of the 
space of the courtroom and of the law.15  Not only a judge’s decisions, but also the particular 
argumentative choices she makes in support of those decisions, are at once legitimations and 
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exercises of sovereign power.  This power may be felt most immediately by the “parties” to 
whom the judge directs her ruling, but it also affects any person who may be similarly situated in 
a similar dispute.  The arguments in support of a ruling form rhetorical frameworks of possibility 
for future conclusions of law that might affect parties to disputes, where neither the party nor the 
dispute has yet to be conceived.  The argumentative framework of judicial decisions matters to 
the life of each person within the reach of the various manifestations of U.S. law—its “long 
arm”—whether every such person perceives the effect or not.           
In a series of lectures in 1955, J.L. Austin answers the ancient question “can saying make 
it so?” with the figure of the “performative”—found where the issue “of an utterance is the 
performing of an action.”16  Austin’s systematic discussion of performative utterance has become 
influential in the cultural study of legal rhetoric, including Judith Butler’s examination of the 
relationships between legal performatives and political subjectivity in Excitable Speech.  Butler 
grounds a critique of Mari J. Matsuda and Catherine McKinnon’s arguments for the regulation of 
speech—specifically of “hate speech” and “pornography”17––in the proposal that “the state 
produces hate speech,” a “formulation”18 that amounts to a reframing of Perelman’s notion of 
the relationship between law and rhetoric.  Perelman—writing in Cold War Europe—assumes a 
democratic state of sovereign law that requires argumentative legitimation of legal sovereignty as 
an alternative to the anti-democratic and unethical modes of legitimation through force and 
coercion.19  Butler instead posits the decentering of dominant power from the person of the state, 
replaced in a democratic state of laws with a fantasy of legal sovereignty that is at once grounded 
in and produced by the notion that the law may be petitioned as protection from dominance.20  
For Butler, appeals to sovereign law—in other words, the act of petitioning the law as a 
subject of legal sovereignty—are actually appeals to the law as sovereign.  Such petitions both 
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create and legitimize the sovereign power of (in this case) national law; they also continually 
provide conditions of possibility for judicial representatives of the law, to, as Perelman says they 
are bound, re-argue for that sovereignty themselves:21 “the one who waits for the law, sits before 
the door of the law, attributes a certain force to the law for which one waits...the anticipation 
conjures its object.”22  Political projects—including projects of rhetorical criticism—that focus 
on either the legal sovereign or the “subjects” of law do not respond to the way in which power 
exists and operates.23  Rather, they shore up the idea of sovereign power as a bulwark against a 
more radical and potentially liberatory understanding of the (following Michel Foucault) 
“‘constitution [and domination] of subjects’”24 through the multiple, distributed and almost 
entirely extra-sovereign processes of power that move through our present society.25  Butler 
argues that this Foucaultian understanding of power can be the basis for more effective 
opposition to “domination”26 than that found through politics that assume the necessity of 
“recourse to the law.”27   
The fantasy of legal sovereignty produced through appeals to judicial protection has the 
particular effect of obscuring both the rhetoricity and power of judicial speech (or simply, the 
power of legal rhetoric), wherein “we set ourselves free...to seek recourse to the law—now set 
against power and imagined as neutral,” in order to “control” the “onslaught” of the effects of 
legal sovereignty itself, effects produced in part by the very action of seeking recourse.28  This 
process can be collapsed into the figure of the “sovereign performative”29 that at once calls to, 
argues for, and produces the sovereignty of law.  In her demand for rejecting the fantasy of law-
as-sovereign as the basis of progressive politics, Butler is one of many publicly inspirational 
figures for politics of resistance to the present popular cultural domination of the (anti-rhetorical) 
idea that the legal sovereign has a monopoly on the constitution of subjects, a monopolgy 
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(re)produced perversely through legal institutional control over political projects designed to 
protect those legal subjects most vulnerable to the law itself.  I will use the word “radical” 
frequently in this dissertation, and by “radical” I will most often mean such politics of 
resistance30—politics that I admire, often support, and occasionally participate in.  
But—following Matsuda—I think that Butler seems to miss an important point.  Given 
the material force of the fantasy of legal sovereignty in the margins, “‘at the point[s]’” where 
power is “‘completely invested in its real and effective practices,’”31 I argue that resistance to the 
idea of legal sovereignty must not preclude what Cathy Cohen might call a “practical”32 
understanding of the presently inevitable reality of the sovereign rhetorical operations of the law.  
The political project of resistance to the performative sovereignty of judicial rhetoric in the 
United States must not deny (as Matsuda and Richard Delgado said in 1987 to the “crits” of 
Critical Legal Studies) the need to construct strategically informed and tactically sound 
responses to those “formal” structures of law that already act as and with the material power of 
sovereign authority––authority over the constraints that legal forms of subjectivity already 
impose on personhood.33  As Butler herself acknowledges in 2004,34 the absolute critique of 
legal sovereign performatives does not adequately consider how the effects of the fantasy of 
legal sovereignty are most often (and most often most terribly) felt by “those who have” actually 
“seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise”35 of the U.S. judiciary as a shield against 
domination.    
My experience of the law has occurred through my own participation in and observation 
of judicial sovereignty––both from a majoritarian perspective.  I teach argumentation in a prison, 
a setting that emphasizes the paradoxical and simultaneous vitality and uselessness of rhetorical 
and argumentative interaction with those persons charged with enforcing the reasoned 
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justification of judicial decision through coercive violence.  In our present democratic state of 
laws, the production of legitimacy for judicial sovereignty through argument, and the production 
of legitimacy through force, work together in explicit and mutually supportive fashion.      
More happily, I was recently invited by two friends to officiate their wedding, at a 
ceremony in Rehoboth, Massachusetts.  I agreed, and asked whether I should purchase an 
ordination online, so that I could legally perform the ceremony.  There was no need—
Massachusetts is unusual among U.S. states in maintaining a category of officiant called a 
“solemnizer.”  Any person, with little qualification, can apply to be a solemnizer.  The 
dichotomy between the “republican style”36 of the application process, and the quotidian ease 
with which I was granted the certificate made me think about the “sovereign performative”37 that 
I would stage in Rehoboth.  The “I do” statement in a marriage ceremony is one of Austin’s core 
examples38 of an “illocutionary” performative, an utterance which “has a certain force” in the 
“saying” of it,39 but this example itself performs an interesting elision of the role of a state 
representative in a civil marriage ceremony.  In Rehoboth, my friends would not be married until 
I pronounced them so publicly.  That pronouncement would of course require other performative 
statements (“I do”) from my friends as a pre-requisite to its validity.40  But on the date and in the 
location specified by the solemnization certificate, I had, as a feature of the designation 
“solemnizer” bestowed on me by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, absolute power over 
whether they would be married or not—on that date and in that location.  In the narrow context 
of the two possible realities of my friends becoming married or not on that day and in that 
location, my role was to exercise the sovereign performative power of the Commonwealth as its 
judge-like representative.   
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But in that exercise, I would also be performing two arguments: one for the sovereign 
legitimacy (and successful performativity)41 of my utterances and the illegitimacy of any others; 
and one for the value and significance of “married” as a position of legal subjectivity in 
Massachusetts and the United States.  I bring up this example to emphasize the specifically 
illocutionary power of the judicial rhetorical constitution of subjects before law.  Austin 
describes illocution as “‘in saying x I was doing y’ or ‘I did y,’”42 but judicial illocution might 
more accurately be described as “in saying x I did x.”  When I said that these people were 
married, I made them married.  The statement and the doing were one and the same.  If a judge 
sentences a person to death, she does not depress the needle; the pronouncement of sentence is 
an illocutionary act in the first sense (x and y).  But in pronouncing the sentence, the judge does 
redefine the convicted (of a death-eligible crime) person’s subjectivity before law from 
“convicted” and/or “criminal” and/or “felon” and/or “murderer” and/or “traitor” to, more 
primarily, “condemned.”  This is an illocutionary act in the second sense (x and x).   
If a judge rules that it is unconstitutional to require a trans* person’s passport to list their 
gender contrary to that person’s “self-understanding,”43 this is a “perlocutionary” act (where the 
utterance effectively causes something to happen)44 in that the ruling enables the person who is 
trans* to change the official designation of their gender.  But it is also an x and x illocutionary 
act in the context of the petitioner’s subjectivity before law—the utterance of the ruling has 
changed their self-understanding of their own identity from “not real” to “real” in the eyes of the 
law.  This would be even more evident if the ruling did not merely realize the truth of a trans* 
person’s self-understanding as male or female, but went so far as to create, in the moment of the 
utterance itself, a legally recognized trans* identity category.       
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All of these examples are performatives enabled by the fantasy of the sovereign location 
of power in law.  When asked, I considered (given my own views on marriage as an institution) 
declining to perform the ceremony—even in Massachusetts, whose marriage laws mean that the 
sexual orientation identity of the two people I married cannot be discerned from this story.  I 
understood that my performative and the discourse of the ceremony surrounding it would 
contribute in a small way to the sovereign power of the state over human relational and sexual 
legitimacy.  But this refusal would not have made the present sovereignty of the state over the 
determination of legally legitimate and illegitimate forms of relation any less inevitable.   
Petitions to the law are inevitable; they will be made, often by people with no other 
recourse to save their life, or to preserve their life's basic quality.  As Butler demonstrates, any 
such petition will have performative effect.  I do not offer this brief critique of Butler’s theory of 
“sovereign performatives” to dispute the facticity of her arguments.  I begin this project with the 
stipulation that politics of resistance to the “sovereign performative” must include actions of 
resistance to statist law itself—that is, the specific articulation of opposition, within progressive 
social movements, to strategies that privilege appeals for help from judges.  But these politics 
must also acknowledge that those who undertake such strategies do not always do so without 
knowledge of the sovereign performative function of their actions—“recourse to the law” does 
not always or even usually “imagine” the law “as neutral.”45  These radical politics must also be 
undertaken with knowledge of the effects of the petitions to law-as-sovereign that will inevitably 
be made—and particularly with knowledge of the effects that flow from the (also performative 
and also inevitable) judicial rhetorical responses to these inevitable petitions.   
Austin teaches us that it is in the nature of performatives to not always work, and to 
produce effects in excess of their explicit ones.  The judicial rhetorical constitution of subject and 
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abject forms of being-in-relation to law operates through legal performatives that contain the 
possibilities for their own future “infelicity.”46  My project is an attempt to explore some future 
possibilities for the counter-sovereign articulation of subjectivity before U.S. law—possibilities 
that are both foreclosed and engendered in the argumentative justifications for judicial decisions.  
Specifically, I examine some key Supreme Court cases relating to sexual practice, race in 
education policy, and marriage.  I perform a legal rhetorical criticism of critic-constructed 
“meta”-texts47 that form argumentative frameworks through which judges apply various legal 
doctrines to questions of sexual, racial, educational, and relational freedom.   
Following Perelman, I understand judicial argument to be the explanatory justifications 
offered for judges’ authoritative interpretive application of legal doctrine to problems of public 
concern––problems that have been framed as legal, either by jurists themselves, petitioners to the 
courts, or both.  In the United States, judicial arguments about constitutional interpretation have 
the privileged function of delimiting the grounds on which the authority of all other statist legal 
argument is based.  Given the overwhelming salience of constitutional legal discourse in U.S. 
everyday life,48 this means that the judicial rhetoric of constitutional law plays a significant role 
in delimiting the grounds on which a person can base their claim—literally49––to existence and 
legitimacy in the U.S. polity.50  Jurists’ arguments from and about the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution in particular 
perform a final arbitration function in the ongoing and generally contentious process of the statist 
determination of what forms of racialized queer identity and relation will be eligible for 
recognized and legitimated status in U.S. public life.   
In this dissertation, I focus on the Fourteenth Amendment—due process and equal 
protection—rhetoric of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.  I read this rhetoric in 
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terms of “genealogies of precedent,” or the argumentative possibilities for queer subjectivity 
before law that are brought into being by the doctrinal frameworks Kennedy and other judicial 
rhetors use in a given opinion.  Each chapter offers a case study of opinions in several Federal 
and Supreme Court cases that are foundational to Kennedy’s development of a new 
constitutional jurisprudence of substantive due process and equality.  I demonstrate that this 
jurisprudence is both productive of and violent to possibilities for practical and strategic sexually 
“progressive”51 interactions with U.S. constitutional law.  These interactions, despite their 
practical or strategic formulation, can be undertaken and/or framed in terms of anti-statist and 
institutional radical queer political goals.  Possibilities for the success of such radical framing of 
practical interaction are partially delimited in the argumentative choice of U.S. judicial opinions.      
II.  A Short History of Due Process    
The language of “due process” in particular has been salient in English legal discourse 
from at least the ratification of the Magna Carta in the fourteenth century,52 and while the 
specific legal language used to describe the concept has remained remarkably consistent, its 
meaning and application have undergone significant change.  One example of this evolution is 
the distinction between “substantive” and “procedural” due process of law, a distinction that 
plays a central role for the Court’s Justices in determining the processes they should undertake 
for adjudicating particular cases, as well as for more generally determining whether or not all 
people can be treated equally under the law.  I pay particular attention to due process as the 
Court has recently commented on it, because due process plays a crucial role in determining how 
marginalized subjects will be treated within U.S. society.  Before entering the U.S. judicial 
system, due process rhetoric was fundamental to negotiations of power and resistance in English 
polities.  The role of due process in these negotiations has been and continues to be to legitimize 
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political structures predicated on the normalization of identity-based “hierarchies of value”53 in 
cultural life, even as due process simultaneously serves as a primary rhetorical and conceptual 
resource for those who seek to challenge or dismantle those hierarchies.     
“Procedural” due process concerns the means by which a person can be punished under 
the law. It is a procedural check against a sovereign’s attempts to violate the fundamental rights 
of its subjects, deriving from the Magna Carta requirement that “judgment must precede 
execution.”  A person cannot be subject to punishment or other deprivation of “life, liberty, or 
property,” except through the application of the appropriate legal procedures a person facing 
punishment is due (such as trial by combat or a properly carried out arrest that includes a 
Miranda warning).54  In antebellum U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, due process began55 to be 
applied in a “substantive” as well as “procedural” manner.  Contrary to the 1856 ruling in 
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Company, where “the Court emphasized that 
due process is met so long as the government’s procedures are in accordance with the law,”56 
“substantive” due process means that persons protected by the Constitution may not be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property except by force of law that at minimum57 is “fair and reasonable” and 
in furtherance of a “legitimate governmental objective.”58   
Substantive due process recognizes that there are times when the “government’s 
procedures” for the deprivation of liberty are unjust even though they may be wholly “in 
accordance with the law.”59  One of the more important early articulations60 of substantive due 
process in U.S. judicial rhetoric is the Dred Scott v. Sandford decision, in which Chief Justice 
Taney, in addition to his more famous holding that Scott as a black man and slave was not a 
constitutional subject,61 also held that the procedure of depriving the respondent Sandford of his 
“property” (Scott) was unjust even though it was in accordance with the law at the time.62  Just 
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prior to his ultimate judgment in Scott, Taney notes at the end of an extended aside that if the 
Missouri Compromise means that a person like Sandford will face loss of property (slaves) 
merely because “he…brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States,” and 
even though he “had committed no offence against the laws,” then a law such as that “could 
hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.”63  This is the essence of the difference 
between procedural and substantive due process.  Substantive due process insists that a sovereign 
authority may deprive a person of life, liberty, or property through what is universally agreed to 
be right legal procedure—a trial before the King’s Council, or compliance with the dictates of a 
legitimately enacted federal statute such as the Missouri Compromise—and still treat that person 
wrongly because what has been done justly is not always just.64  
III.  Case Studies of Judicial Opinion and the Queer Study of Judicial Argument      
  In the United States, judicial arguments about substantive due process and the 
legitimacy of governmental intrusions on freedom participate in what the Scott decision 
demonstrates is a parallel construction of the possible conditions of freedom from oppressive 
power, and the delimitation of the range of subjectivities that are granted access to those possible 
freedoms.  In the status quo, this parallel constitution of freedom from and legitimation of 
oppressive power through due process rhetoric continues to be implicated in questions of identity 
and personhood.  As I will demonstrate, the recent relationship between due process, equality, 
and sexuality in judicial rhetoric is fundamental to the status and future of LGBTQ and person of 
color dis/enfranchisement in the United States.  The Fourteenth Amendment is simultaneously a 
great (and often necessary) resource and a great impediment to social movements attempting to 
use U.S. law as a means for achieving racial and LGBTQ progressive political goals.  Successful 
attempts at petitioning federal courts to use the Fourteenth Amendment as the justification for the 
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judicial proscription of racist and heterosexist laws, or judicial demands for municipal actions to 
correct structures of racist and heterosexist inequality, have also helped to create frameworks of 
argumentative possibility for subsequent court decisions that have had the opposite effect.  
The political relevance of the statements produced by the United States Supreme Court 
should not be taken as a given.  The utility of political projects that focus on U.S. judicial 
rhetoric, constitutional rhetoric, and/or the judicial rhetoric of constitutional law are frequently 
called into question by scholars of U.S. political discourse and contemporary social 
movements.65  Such questions are underscored by recent actions of the Obama administration, 
which has been working to undermine not the significance of constitutional law, but rather the 
significance of judicial rhetoric per se (the primary role of the judiciary in deciding questions of 
constitutional interpretation).66  The President’s project of undermining the judiciary’s review 
power (a phrase synonymous with ‘the power of U.S. judicial rhetoric’) has occurred specifically 
in terms of the question of what branch-manifestations of the federal government should be 
empowered to determine questions of how to determine if agents of the U.S. state are acting in 
accordance with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment requirements of procedural and 
substantive due process when they deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.67 
But the Justice Department’s recent efforts to undermine judicial review only highlight 
the fact that in the U.S., the terms on which any legal negotiation takes place are heavily 
implicated in the contemporary status of the U.S. Constitution.  A lawyer may only very rarely 
directly discuss questions of constitutional interpretation, but the authority of their legal 
arguments in any context rests ultimately on both the Constitution, and on the English tradition 
of judicial rights and procedures on which much of the Constitution is based.  Drone 
assassinations aside, the Court, as the ultimate authority not only on the constitutional legitimacy 
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of given laws or policies, but on the question of the status of a person, is still the primary entity 
that decides whether or not persons are eligible for protection under U.S. law.   If a person or 
group eschews the courts and pursues legislative or even extra-legal avenues for social or 
cultural enfranchisement, the Supreme Court, however ploddingly, will have some ultimate 
authority as to the effectiveness of that pursuit.  Constitutional rhetoric is thus constitutive of 
subjectivities before the law—possibilities for identification in, through, and under the primary 
rhetorical instrument of U.S. sovereignty.  The particular subset of constitutional rhetoric I am 
interested in is the set of arguments made by jurists about the manner in which constitutional 
doctrine should be applied to particular petitions to the state for justice––that is, the rhetoric of 
judicial opinion.   
The performative arguments of U.S. constitutional law are a form of “constitutive” 
rhetoric.  As with performatives, a key feature of “constitutive” rhetoric is the success of the 
project of constitution.  Successful constitutive rhetorics, as Maurice Charland argues in his 
study of the rhetorical constitution of the “peuple québécois”68 in and through the Parti 
Québécois’ 1979 “White Paper,”69 have often been physically generated from a document 
functioning literally as a constitution.70  Legal processes function productively in the rhetorical 
constitution of culture, and every United States legal process is explicitly or implicitly grounded 
in the United States Constitution.  The rhetoric of U.S. constitutional judicial opinion is 
disseminated in two primary ways: first, as written legal documents ostensibly authored by 
judges (but often in fact by clerks, working with judges) that are copied, scanned and 
disseminated electronically, through proprietary databases, free websites designed to promote 
access to judicial opinion, and some court websites that publish all of their decisions; and second, 
through journalistic summaries of these opinions.  Each judicial opinion becomes part of the 
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constantly evolving set of revisions to the Constitution as a living, constitutive text, as do as 
judges’ attempts at editorial control over those revisions (amendments, statements of 
constitutional interpretation from outside the judiciary, etc.) to the Constitution produced by 
legislators, the President, and other extra-judicial figures.   
If the United States is a society constituted in a piece of paper, that paper is not only the 
literal document of the United States Constitution, but also the total set of published judicial 
arguments about how the original text should be interpreted in any number of different situations.  
It is not what the Constitution says, but rather judicial arguments about what the Constitution 
says, about legitimate forms of being and relating in the United States that matters most to the 
rhetorical production of legitimate and illegitimate forms of U.S. legal subjectivity.   
The significance of the procedural and philosophical statements that judges make about 
constitutional doctrine, sexuality, and race is therefore not only in those statements’ immediate 
and often limited effect on what actions political and cultural agents take in response to judicial 
pronouncement.  It is rather in a judge’s rhetorical power to do two things.  First, a judge has the 
power to participate in delimiting the range of subjectivities that are recognized as legitimate to 
stand before the law of the Constitution, and thus to participate as actors in U.S. public life,  
and/or to petition for redress of wrong in U.S. state and federal courts.  I say “range of 
subjectivities,” because these subjectivities include categories of persons that are not eligible to 
stand before U.S. law at all (except to be killed or imprisoned as subjects to the literal violence 
of the state’s sovereign force), categories of persons who may petition U.S. courts for redress of 
certain wrongs, but who are banned from legitimate participation in U.S. public life, and 
categories of persons who may petition the law more or less as full members of the U.S. polity.  
Second, a judge has the power to participate in delimiting what future laws will and will not be 
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able to proscribe and enable certain actions by individuals and groups, thus helping to determine 
ranges of rhetorical possibility for (following Lauren Berlant, Michael Warner, and Charles E. 
Morris III) efforts those individuals and groups might take to effect projects of anti-
establishmentarian and statist queer/of color “‘world making’”71 in and against the U.S. polity. 
In the following case studies, I examine the relationship among arguments that Kennedy 
and other federal and state judges make about the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (and their 
state equivalents), as they apply to laws and policies implicated in current sites of contestation 
over racial and sexual identity in the United States.  The primary cases I examine include: Brown 
v. Board of Education (347 U.S. 483, 1954), the 1950s public secondary school racial integration 
case; Bowers v. Hardwick, (468 U.S. 186, 1986), a case in which the Court upheld a Georgia law 
criminalizing sodomy as any form of non-heterosexual vaginal sex; Romer v. Evans (517 U.S. 
620, 1996), Kennedy’s determination that Colorado’s popularly enacted Amendment II to the 
state constitution violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause; Lawrence v. 
Texas (539 U.S. 558, 2003), in which the Court reversed its ruling in Bowers to hold both a 
Texas and the previous Georgia anti-sodomy law unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process; Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1, (551 U.S. 701, Nos. 05-908, 05-915, 2007), a twin case taking up 
equal protection challenges to voluntary school integration policies in Seattle, Washington and 
Jefferson County, Kentucky; and finally In re Marriage Cases (43 Cal.4th 757, California 
Supreme Court S147999, 2008), Perry v. Schwarzenegger (704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 2010), and 
Perry v. Brown (9th Cir., Case No. 16696, 2012), the California Supreme Court and U.S. district 
and appellate court decisions that (in the former) led to and (in the latter two) address the state 
and federal constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8. 
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There are at least hundreds of examples of U.S. judicial rhetoric that would provide for a 
fascinating examination of the relationship between substantive and procedural justice, and the 
rhetorical constitution of racialized queer subjectivities before the law.  The particular cases I 
have selected for examination in this project have received little attention in rhetorical criticism 
of law,72 but they are especially salient to the argument of my thesis, in part because of their 
publicly recognized role in U.S. public debates concerning sexuality, race, equality, and process.  
Indeed, each is precedent setting, in addition to being salient within public discourse.  
I also examine these cases because of their common doctrinal and rhetorical connection 
to the jurisprudence of the enigmatic U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. 
Kennedy’s longstanding position as a “moderate” conservative on the Court has given him the 
opportunity73 to write majority or significant concurring and dissenting opinions in several 
controversial cases concerning sexuality and race.74  The recent history of judicial rhetorics of 
process and equality is defined by significant shifts in how jurisprudence involving the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses has operated––in particular, judicial rhetorics of due 
process and equal protection have been central in responding to and thus framing and delimiting 
the ongoing debate over demands for full enfranchisement of lesbian and gay subjects in the 
major institutions of U.S. public life.  Kennedy’s arguments about due process and equal 
protection in particular have had significant impact on the nature of those LGBT, queer, 
racialized, and queerly racialized identities recently granted legibility before the law; these 
arguments are thus of specifically rhetorical interest to my work.  Kennedy’s opinions are 
notable as well for their primary role in determining how the Court interprets and applies due 
process in relationship to a new and peculiarly substantive framing of equal protection.  
Kennedy’s judicial arguments—and those from other doctrinally related opinions—are thus an 
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ideal location to study the role of constitutional rhetoric in the production of newly legitimate 
and racialized LGBT and queer ways of being, living, and relating in U.S. public life. 
In each of my case studies, I take up judicial arguments about due process in 
juxtaposition to arguments from equal protection.  The Due Process Clauses are generally 
applied to limit the scope and power both of specific laws challenged in particular cases, and of 
the power of law, generally, to interfere restrictively in the lives of autonomous subjects.  If a 
person in the United States is denied a right codified in law (whether constitutional or statutory), 
their petition for redress would be procedural.  If a person lacks a right that is either absent from 
or specifically denied in law—for example, the right to publicly define and live their identity as 
they see fit, or to gain access to an institution, such as marriage and the military, from which they 
are legally excluded––their primary legal recourse as an individual is a petition to law involving 
substantive due process.  If a person seeks redress for being treated differently under an existing 
state law or policy, they may seek redress through the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which reads “nor shall any state…deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”75  The Equal Protection Clause is on its face procedural––it is 
ostensibly designed to ensure that the law in any given situation applies equally to all legitimate 
persons, without necessarily demanding a finding of whether the law, while equitable, is 
otherwise just.  The dual history of equal protection and due process jurisprudence is thus key to 
understand the contemporary nature of the tension and contradiction over the relationship 
between substantive and procedural justice.   
Judicial rhetorics of substantive due process have some queer potential76 as a corrective 
to what I and others (including Reva Siegell, Russel K. Robinson, and Derrick A. Bell) argue77 
are the problematically essentialist tendencies of equal protection jurisprudence.  By examining 
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examples of judicial rhetoric that differentially take up questions of both equality and process––
in terms of the substantive and procedural versions of both legal principles––I provide a 
rhetorical avenue for the exploration of radical78 queer potentials and limitations in constitutional 
law.  This exploration is particularly important for the present moment of constitutional rhetoric, 
which features a dual renaissance in both substantive due process and equal protection 
jurisprudence, a renaissance exemplified in Kennedy’s recent Fourteenth Amendment arguments.  
Three of the more visible cases before the Court at the time of this writing—Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, United States v. Windsor, and Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin—have the potential 
to be decided based on Fourteenth Amendment precedent established in recent Kennedy opinions.   
The first two (Hollingsworth and Windsor) are the current iterations of the “marriage 
cases” discussed in Chapter Three.  In these, equal protection and due process doctrines merge in 
the articulation of a racialized (where “racialized” in this case means the abjection of racial 
difference toward the normativity of racial Whiteness79) “right to marry” that has been 
differentially denied to same-sex couples.  In Fisher, the Court has the opportunity to continue 
its nearly thirty-year tradition of using the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down anti-racist 
municipal and public university educational policies as unconstitutional.80  As I argue in Chapter 
Two, the relationships between equal protection and due process on the one hand, and sexuality 
and race on the other, are most often considered separately or analogically in both popular and 
academic discussions of these cases.  My juxtaposition of due process and equal protection 
doctrines instead approaches the antecedent opinions of these cases now before the Court as 
judicial arguments that are about the legal constitution of concomitantly raced and sexualized—
“queer of color”81—constitutional subjects.  This analysis is important for a consideration of how 
a case like Fisher might not only be related to a case like Windsor (in that both, for example, are 
  21 
about equal protection), but might actually form part of the same, implicit judicial “meta”82-
argument about possibilities for queer of color legal subjectivities.     
For example, the constitutional law scholar and queer legal theorist Janet E. Halley 
argues that Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Romer v. Evans (a case in which, “for reasons 
known only to themselves, a majority of the Supreme Court...issued a favorable gay rights 
decision”) “adopts an extreme form” of queer “nominalist” politics.83  The “nominalist view” of 
“sexual orientation identities”84 accords with “queer theory’s” “strong constructi[vist]” approach 
to identity politics,85 in that identity categories are constructions rather than descriptions of 
identities as they exist in the world.  The nominalism of Kennedy’s Romer opinion stems from 
his particular and rather surprising application of the Equal Protection Clause, in which the 
Justice “refused to base” his “decision on any social description of the group harmed by the 
challenged law.”86  In other words, Kennedy found a way to declare an anti-gay policy 
unconstitutional without any need to define and delimit the nature of the legally legitimate and 
constitutionally protected gay legal subject, effectively creating a doctrinal basis for possible 
future subjectless petitions to U.S. law.   
A major part of Chapter One is devoted to the manner in which Kennedy enables a 
similarly nominalist politics of legal identity in his argumentative framing of “loose 
construction”87 due process jurisprudence in Lawrence v. Texas.  But, when Kennedy’s framing 
of substantive due process in Lawrence (a case concerned explicitly with sexuality, but not race) 
is read in Chapter Two alongside his similarly substantive framing of equal protection in both 
Romer v. Evans and Parents Involved (a case concerned explicitly with race, but not sexuality),  
the problematic racial implications of the queer nominalist potential of Kennedy’s Fourteenth 
Amendment arguments are made more clear.  Rather than creating a future potential for radical 
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queer social movements to craft strategic relationships with U.S. legal institutions, the “meta”88-
text of Kennedy’s Fourteenth Amendment doctrine instead demands that radically nominalist 
subject positions be articulated in the context of “post-racial” demands to leave behind difference 
as a significant site of political organization in the United States––demands that promote a 
resuscitated politics of white supremacy under the guise of a benevolent multiculturalism.   
This is not an optimistic conclusion, but my goal is not to seek optimism in the law.  I do 
see—particularly in Lawrence, as well as in some of the opinions I take up in Chapter Three—
some potential in recent judicial rhetoric for a radical queer praxis of institutional legal relation, 
but it is a highly conceptual, vague, and futurist potential set against a powerfully repressive 
status quo.  Judicial rhetoric in the United States has little to offer radical politics.   
IV.  Radical Queer Methods of the Rhetorical Critique of Judicial Argument 
I began my discussion with Butler’s dual challenge to critical race and radical feminist 
theories of legal praxis, because I take the politics that ground this work from both positions 
simultaneously.  They are not so incommensurate as Butler (in 1997) seems to think.  As Halley 
says, “critical race theorists” who call for petitions to the law-as-sovereign do not do so because 
they wish to invest in the sovereign’s claim to legitimacy, but rather because of a position of 
“rhetorically alert pragmatism” that seeks to recognize those situations in which oppressive legal 
sovereignty is inescapable and so must be dealt with as best it can.89   
I want to animate the utility of rhetoric for this alertness.  I share the great anxiety in the 
question of, what does rhetorical criticism do?90  I am fond of the tautology (a version of which 
is offered by Aristotle to open the Rhetoric)91 that rhetorical criticism helps show how we 
already do things, rhetorically.  To practice criticism of argument as rhetoric’s corollary92 is thus 
to study how we already argue, argumentatively. 93   Marianne Constable—an important 
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American champion of rhetorical legal study—argues that the “rhetoric of law” particularly 
“turns to the way that law answers questions and claims to solve problems...but not in order to 
solve the problems itself or to stand for better answers.  Rather, rhetoric looks at how law makes 
its claims.”94  I do not do much in this dissertation to offer solutions or alternatives.  Rather, I 
explore a method of critique that may be useful as one, primarily conceptual, component of a 
radical queer of color rhetorical praxis.  Rather than argue for a queer valuation of certain 
examples of judicial public address, I call for and attempt to demonstrate a radical queer 
perspective on U.S. judicial rhetoric.  I hope this perspective can make a small contribution to an 
“alertness” of how certain judicial opinions work to constitute forms of intersectionally raced 
and queered LBGT subjectivities before law. These forms of subjectivity provide almost entirely 
negative, but nonetheless substantively and importantly different, possibilities for petitions to the 
U.S. constitutional state.95  
More specifically, I call for a radical perspective on judicial argument—a perspective on 
the differential value of judicial arguments to certain anti-statist and establishmentarian queer of 
color political goals.  In Perelman’s terms, much of the recent queer of color and queer legal 
theory commentary on Anthony Kennedy’s judicial rhetoric is more interested in legal 
conclusions, than in the processes through which those conclusions were drawn.  Here I need to 
distinguish “conclusions” from “decisions” (terms Perelman-in-translation conflates) in that the 
recent work of, in particular, Jasbir K. Puar, David L. Eng, and Lynne Huffer looks beyond the 
ostensibly progressive decisions of Kennedy’s opinions (Lawrence v. Texas might be described 
simply as the welcome statement that laws forbidding two men from having sex are not welcome 
in our Republic) to examine the political implications of the Justice’s doctrinal logic—such as 
his reliance on the right to privacy, or on an oddly depoliticized deployment of the Equal 
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Protection Clause which obscures that document’s particular racialized history.  This form of 
analysis looks beyond Kennedy’s judicial decision to the political content of his opinions.  But it 
still does not often amount to a consideration of Kennedy’s judicial arguments.   
A study of judicial argument considers the “techniques”96 through which jurists not only 
defend the validity of their conclusions of law, but also explicitly and implicitly construct and 
defend as valid structures of decision-making—what I call “frameworks”—through which other 
decisions might be made.  Judicial decisions are performatives in that their utterance effects an 
immediate change in the status of the petitioners before the Court.  Judicial conclusions are 
performatives, because they establish a temporary reality about what a given portion of the living 
meta-text of the U.S. Constitution means in a given situation.  Judicial argumentative choices 
about what “techniques” to employ in using “language to persuade and convince” (for example 
to include broad statements of constitutional theory, or to choose instead to limit an opinion’s 
arguments to what is strictly necessary to support a given decision) are also performatives, 
because their significance is not in whether a person hears them, or is actually persuaded or 
actually convinced.97  They are performatives because of their simultaneously illocutionary and 
perlocutionary effects on future conditions of possibility for political constructions of different 
forms of being and relating, in accordance with or opposition to (or both) the sovereign 
Constitution of the United States.   
A given example of judicial rhetoric is therefore at once “text” and “context.”  My study 
in Chapter Two of a given set of judicial arguments as simultaneously queered and racialized 
constitutions of possibility for legal subjectivity (following Siobhan B. Somerville’s analysis of 
Loving v. Virginia) is, I think, one possible example of the type of rhetorical criticism John 
Angus Campbell and Celeste Michelle Condit called for in their attempts to resolve the Michael 
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Leff/Michael Calvin McGee debates over “icon” and “fragment,” “text” and “context.”98  
Judicial rhetoric is conveyed primarily through ostensibly individual rhetor-produced “specific 
discursive products”—judicial opinions—wherein jurists attempt to instantiate constitutional 
legal realities in response to the “rhetorical situation”99 of a legal dispute, and within the 
(contested) relations of constitutional text and prior judicial precedent from which the ability to 
pass judgment arises (and to which the opinion will add).100  On the Supreme Court, judicial 
opinions are never discrete texts.  They are always constructions of an argumentative interplay 
between the Justices, the advocates, the petitioners, the recognized “friends of the Court,” the 
opinions that came before, and the possibilities for opinions and legislation that might come 
after—and it is this argumentative exchange that actually forms what is typically received and 
disseminated as a quickly explainable, single-text judicial decision.  
The rhetorical criticism of judicial opinion in the service of a queerly intersectional, 
radical politics of identity and relation therefore demands an approach to judicial opinions as 
simultaneously discretely effective performative utterances, and also as a set of arguments that 
form the contributory fragments of critic constituted “meta”101-texts.102  The internal justification 
for these texts’ critical composition can be located both in the “tissue of connectives that the 
[single] text constructs,”103 and also through shared constitutional and political implication 
“sideways”104 across various articulations of judicial argument that may or may not be self-
evidently connected.105  In the queer of color rhetorical critical practice I attempt in this 
dissertation, the ties binding these arguments together into coherent and performative “meta”-
texts of judicial rhetoric are those that bind arguments about due process and equal protection in 
multiple judicial opinions—some explicitly considerate only of race, some only of sexuality, 
some of both in analogic relation to one another—into single examples of judicial opinion (now 
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“opinion” in the sense of critically-revealed position) that are at once and always already racially 
queer.  If the “aim of argumentation is not to deduce consequences from given premises,” but 
“rather to elicit or increase the adherence of the members of an audience to theses that are 
presented for their consent,”106 my rhetorical criticism of judicial argument will attempt to 
explore how sets of disparate judicial arguments delimit possibilities for subjective adherence to 
those forms of being human that are constructed as legible and valid under the Constitution.   
This dissertation’s articulation of a radical queer political perspective on U.S. judicial 
rhetoric is a particularly nominalist mode of what I call queer rhetorical legal criticism.  My 
invocation of “nominalist” here is not meant as a position per se on the strong constructivist 
approach to identity politics—it is again a method of perspective on, rather than a political 
endorsement of, judicial argumentative frameworks that invite petitioners to self-constitute the 
nature of the subject position through which they speak to the law.107  Following Cathy Cohen, I 
invoke “queer” much more in terms of anti-heterosexist and racist political goals than in terms of 
boundaries of identity.108  I believe—and argue here—that forms of subjectivity before law are 
constituted in judicial arguments about the constitutional text, but as I note above, forms of legal 
subjectivity are not often the same thing as identity itself—particularly in the case of persons 
whose “self-understandings”109 are conceptually impossible or explicitly or implicitly repudiated 
within the space of U.S. constitutional rhetoric.110  A major limitation of my project is therefore 
that it is less concerned with actual persons than with ranges of possibility for legal subjectivity.  
In her defense of the utility of a rhetorical perspective on law, Constable goes on to say that   
“what count as both questions and answers at law today presume a particular background of 
activity—of utterances, of actions, of events—and of institutions—of education, of lawyering, of 
judging—that constitute law.”111  In these terms, one assumption of this thesis is that what count 
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as legal subjects presumes a particular background of judicial argument, and this is a background 
that should be known and understood.  The rhetorical resources through which a subject may 
speak a legal “I,”112 and be legible as that which she spoke to the judicial interlocutors at whom 
she directs her appeal, are not exhaustive of possibilities for subjectivity, identification, self-
understanding, or being. But they do function to delimit the practical ways in which a person can 
exist within the powerful fantasy of U.S. legal sovereignty.   
A critical understanding of these limits is helpful to radical queer of color political goals, 
even if the latter are foundationally opposed to any form of legitimation of U.S. legal 
institution’s claims to sovereign power.  I hope to participate in the queer rhetorical and 
historical critic Charles E. Morris III’s rhetorical practice of “queering” as a form of 
exercising113 “queer politics,”114 which “expose and present alternatives to institutionalized 
heteronormativity, embrace difference, resist assimilation and institutionalization, and combat 
‘disciplining, normalizing social forces’ in whatever form these might be encountered”115 
(although the major focus of my participation here is the part that “exposes”).  As a project of 
queer rhetorical legal criticism, “queering” is in part futurist, wherein part of the function of 
queer rhetorical criticism is to locate and evaluate future queer potentials latent116 in the 
formulation of judicial argument in recent decisions.  Given the status quo of U.S. judicial 
rhetorical culture, these potentials are latent in legal argument that in its contemporary context is 
not only “straight” from a “heterocentrist”117 perspective, but also directly contrary to queer 
politics.  Thus in Chapter Three, I suggest counterfactually that there are more productive 
subjective resources for radical queer politics in a dissenting opinion against same-sex marriage, 
than in the majority opinion that defends at length the California Supreme Court’s order that 
employees of the state issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.   
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In the first two chapters, I argue that the queer potentials latent in the formulation of 
Kennedy’s Fourteenth Amendment via a nominalist argumentative framing of due process are 
enabled and delimited by the (post)-racialization118 inherent to Kennedy’s meta-argumentative 
judicial rhetorical constitution of legitimate queer legal subjectivity before U.S. law.  This idea 
of the post-racial queer legal subject that I argue is carried through Kennedy’s Fourteenth 
Amendment rhetoric parallels the process of “racialization” (or occlusion/evacuation of race119) 
common to a range of queer academic and political rhetorics, whose refusal of exclusive terms of 
identification can obfuscate (in terms of race, class, sexuality, gender, and sex) differences and 
diversity among those persons and politics understood as “queer.”120  In an attempt at queer of 
color scholarly resistance, I participate in “queering” also as the “radical”121 or “critical”122 
exploration of the ways that choices between different heterocentrist judicial arguments matter to 
anti-structuralist and -positivist “queer of color” politics.123   
An approach to rhetorical queering through analysis of elite judicial texts runs counter to 
methods currently dominant, as I discuss below, in both critical legal rhetorical and queer legal 
criticism.  It is problematic to describe even a limited sense of radical queer potential in judicial 
argument, when those arguments (as an inherent feature of their primary function to 
(re)legitimize the sovereignty of U.S. judicial institutions) are vital to the rhetorical construction 
and maintenance of institutional regimes of violent disciplinary and biopolitical control 
(including marriage and other regimes of distinction between illegitimate and legitimate forms of 
sexual intercourse and relation).124  An over-valuation of the differences between the various 
argumentative choices of a group of federal judges obscures the ways in which contrasting legal 
arguments in judicial uptakes of racial and sexual politics represent “shifts”125 in, rather than 
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affirmations or repudiations of, the oppressive organization of public life through the state and 
institutional articulation and maintenance of racial, (hetero)sexual, and other normativities.126   
This dissertation is a defense of the productive value and normative significance of these 
“shifts.”  “Mainstream legal” culture is constrained by the foundationally racist assumptions and 
goals of the U.S. Constitution, and activists appear to have the choice of divestment or 
participation at the expense of accepting the basic constraint of participation in the rhetorical 
process of legitimizing the judiciary’s sovereign authority to determine who can be and who 
cannot.127  I offer a third way: a practical exploration of possibilities for the rhetorical/political 
exploitation of queer potentials in “mainstream legal” argument in the service of radical queer of 
color political agendas.  Chapter Four (the conclusion) is accordingly devoted to an exploration 
of how canonical rhetorical method and theory as the value and practice of contingent 
identification can be a significant component of anti-establishmentarian and poststructuralist 
queer of color politics. 
V.  Some More About Argument as Method in Queer Rhetorical Criticism  
My call for a “perspective” on judicial rhetoric is indebted to the lawyer and rhetorical 
critic Francis J. Mootz III’s notion of the law as a practice of “rhetorical knowledge.”  Mootz 
argues that the law’s constitutive nature derives from and is defined by the phronetic (as I discuss 
at length in Chapter Four)128 processes of rhetorical engagement at play in a given case.129  The 
procedural arguments of jurists are significant not only for the literal implications of a court’s 
ultimate judgment (Perelman’s “decision”), but for the way in which a jurist’s legal procedural 
argumentative choices set the frame through which ultimate judgment will be made on the statute 
or practice in question.130  Mootz is particularly enamored of judicial rhetors who “openly 
construct their arguments as arguments,”131 because this practice is a rare jurisprudential 
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recognition of the fact that “legal practice is grounded in rhetorical knowledge and is not a matter 
of providing a dialectical132 elaboration of fixed principles.”133   
While Mootz dissociates argument from dialectic, placing argument in the accordingly 
anti-dialectical realm of rhetoric, the argument scholar Joseph W. Wenzel proposes that it is 
better to think of arguments as having a variety of different (and often simultaneous) modes and 
functions, which can be parsed depending on the “perspective” through which arguments are 
made and interpreted.134  In Wenzel’s perspective typology of argument,135 “dialectic” can be 
distinguished from “rhetorical” arguments partly through the situations in which they are 
articulated; “dialectical situations are often institutionalized by the creation of specific forums, 
e.g., courtrooms.”136  In this “dialectic” perspective, “good argumentation consists in the 
systematic organization of interaction...so as to produce the best possible outcomes”137—
certainly a description of the manner in which a courtroom is supposed to operate.  Judicial 
opinion is not argument literally within the systematized “interaction” of the courtroom (picture 
lawyers or debaters arguing with each other not directly, but rather through the procedures of the 
law and the intermediary of the judge).  But it is still the case, as Mootz points out, that Supreme 
Court Justices do not publish interactive argumentative dialogues, but rather ‘speak’ to each 
other in disputes over the outcome of a case through the systematized interaction of their 
published opinions.  In Wenzel’s typology, arguments in judicial opinions might therefore be 
more properly dialectic, and not rhetorical, arguments.   
In this study, however, I am less interested in what does or should distinguish “rhetorical” 
vs. “dialectical” modes of reasoning,138 and more in the question of how argument functions as a 
rhetorical mode of communication even within the formally dialectic space of the Court.  
Wenzel’s typology describes dialectic as “a method, a system, or a procedure for regulating 
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discussions among people”; this certainly does not preclude those discussions from being 
articulated primarily through rhetorical argument.139  Here, I follow Perelman and Wayne C. 
Booth in holding that it is more useful to understand Aristotle’s opening statement that “rhetoric 
is an antistrophos to dialectic,” and therefore that the practice of argument is antistrophos to the 
practice of rhetoric, in terms of argumentative reasoning as a difficult-to-distinguish corollary, 
rather than “converse” or “counterpart,” to rhetorical persuasion.140        
Rather than distinguish between rhetoric and dialectic, Perelman’s “new rhetoric” defines 
argument as a rhetorical practice through a juxtaposition of Aristotle’s theories of “analytic” and 
dialectical modes of reasoning.”141  In an analytic syllogism, “truth is a property of the 
proposition and is independent of personal opinion,” rendering “analytical 
reasoning...demonstrative and impersonal,” free from interference from “personal opinion,” and 
therefore from the necessity of persuasion.142  “Dialectical” as opposed to analytical reasoning 
works through “persuasive argument” instead of logical inference.  What Wenzel calls the 
“logical” perspective on argument, Perelman argues, derives from the European Enlightenment 
conflation143 of Aristotle’s theories of dialectical and analytical “judgments,” a move that 
consigned any form of argument that is not logical inference to the mere “‘garnishing of speech,’” 
and so sought the “death of rhetoric” itself as a form of legitimate philosophical study.144  
Against this trend, Perelman calls for a rhetorical study of argumentation as the attempt to 
achieve an audience’s—“any sort of audience”—“acceptance or rejection of a debatable thesis”: 
“the object of the new rhetoric, which amplifies as well as extends Aristotle’s work, is thus to 
study these arguments and the conditions of their presentation.”145 
As I read it, Wenzel’s distinction between the rhetorical perspective on argument “as a 
natural process of persuasive communication,” and the dialectical as arguments made within a 
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communication situation organized systematically in order to achieve a common truth, functions 
to conceptually underwrite what Mootz identifies as the tendency of both judges and critics of 
legal discourse to present judicial argument in analytic terms.  It is as if judges debate about the 
correct result of proceeding through a series of “valid...inferences,”146 as if to frame their 
disagreements as over points of logic in their colleagues’ “demonstration.”147  In other words, 
judicial arguments are: delivered through a dialectical form; framed as logical (analytic) 
inferences; but in fact work rhetorically as “persuasive communication.”   
As rhetors, judges attempt to achieve consensus over the desirability of their conclusions 
of constitutional and statutory interpretation through “arguments [that] are more or less strong, 
more or less convincing,” that are “never purely formal,” and that “derive [their] value 
from...action upon the mind of some person.”148  “Arguments as arguments” do not show, they 
tell (they do not demonstrate, but seek to persuade) through the strategic and error-prone rather 
than logical selection of warrants so as to “increase the adherence of the members of an audience 
to theses that are presented for their consent.”149  Mootz takes delight in those rare examples of 
judicial opinion that present “arguments as arguments” (in these examples, some of which I take 
up throughout this project, judges are open about their persuasive intent, as well as the frustration 
they feel from their colleagues’ lack of adherence to the conclusions they urge as the most 
doctrinally accurate, and most desirable from a prudential150 standpoint).  But it is also therefore 
the responsibility of the rhetorical critic of judicial opinion to consider arguments as arguments, 
even when they are not initially presented or typically treated as such.  I go one step beyond 
Mootz to read judicial argumentative framing as a form of public policy-making.151  Judges are 
not legislators, but they are state-policymakers in a limited sense.  The argumentative framework 
through which a judicial rhetor frames her opinion has material effect beyond the decision itself.  
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The argumentative frames that influence and constrain a conclusion of law—the obvious 
statement of policy in an opinion—both influence future policy, and, in the context of particular 
legal situations, are extant policies themselves.  Judicial argumentative frames function as 
performative utterances.     
The analytically framed production of legal argument depends on an understanding of the 
linear development of precedent through the application of the doctrine of stare decisis (“things 
decided”), or adhering to past precedent.152  This is how judicial argument works; it is, again, 
almost never presented as argument.  As the late James Arnt Aune—a pioneering practitioner of 
rhetorical legal criticism in U.S. communication studies—argues, it should be possible to 
perform rhetorical legal criticism that is cognizant of the analytic epistemology of doctrinal law, 
while simultaneously approaching judicial claims rhetorically, as arguments produced by 
individual rhetors who are elite participants in a complex and varied rhetorical culture.153  The 
fact that judges frame their arguments from precedent in analytic terms does not make them 
“arbiters of a kind of machine logic.”154  Rather, judicial rhetors “are in the business of definition 
and argumentation, crafting meaning within…culturally determined realms.”155  I ground my 
close reading of judicial opinion in an understanding of how precedent and other key legal 
doctrines function in judicial argumentation, but I also draw on the argumentative frames set 
forth in the opinions I examine to critically reveal meta-arguments about the nature of those 
identities and political possibilities that are constituted as real and legitimate in the Constitution.     
I call these frames “genealogies of precedent.”156  An effective judicial rhetor must 
ground157 her conclusions of law in a credible genealogy of “things decided”—where the 
genealogy is the warrant for the conclusions of law.  While both popular and academic legal 
critics and jurists frame doctrinal disputes as historical examinations of truth (although they will 
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explicitly disagree as to the appropriate methods through which to arrive at the truth of doctrinal 
history),158 doctrinal argument can be more accurately described as a process of “veridiction,” or 
the judicial argumentative construction and normative defense of a “regime of [doctrinal] 
historical truth” within which certain doctrinal conclusions are true and others false.159  Judges 
often frame the data for their doctrinal claims in terms of objective and linear histories of 
precedent, when in fact doctrinal argument involves the contingent articulation of particular 
precedential histories that are appropriate to a given context.160  Judges cite putatively objective 
histories of precedent.   These citations are in fact constructions of precedential genealogies as 
argumentative technique in support of judicial conclusions.   
A judge writing an opinion—particularly a Justice on the Court—is free to make almost 
any argument she wants, but this is because the total set of “things decided” in Anglo-American 
legal history is so large.  The doctrinal history appropriate to a given case is a set of available 
argumentative resources, and a judicial rhetor’s decisions about how to use those resources in 
response to a given judicial rhetorical situation has normative implications.161  If judicial 
argument can be understood in terms of the rhetorical and historiographical construction of 
competing precedential genealogies, then the rhetorical criticism of judicial argument should also 
be genealogical, allowing the critic to respond to the jurist constructed precedential history 
underlying a given opinion as the rhetorical frame through which a judge is able to articulate 
normative claims about how the Constitution should be applied in a particular case.   
  Such an approach is necessary for any intersectional consideration of racialized 
subjectivities before the law: that is, for the effective practice of queer of color legal rhetorical 
criticism.  Legal discourse generally, and judicial rhetorics of equality and anti-discrimination 
particularly, frame identity insistently in terms of what Kimberlé Crenshaw calls a “single-axis” 
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framework (one axis—race, gender, etc.––per case).162  The queer legal theorist Siobhan B. 
Somerville offers a methodological corrective to the “single-axis” frame for queer of color legal 
scholarship: as an alternative to examining relations of precedent between cases taken up in 
linear comparative histories of stare decisis, Somerville looks “‘sideways’ to consider how” 
ostensibly separate legal “categories” of race and sexuality “were produced simultaneously.”163  
In Somerville’s example, Loving v. Virginia (388 U.S. 1, 1967) should not be read only as a case 
about miscegenation that is precedentially related to future cases about same-sex marriage.  The 
opinion in Loving is also part of a meta-judicial text that takes up questions of racial and sexual 
relation and identity as not similar, but part and parcel of the same—fundamentally intersecting 
and mutually implicated issues of racialized queer identity and legal subjectivity.164   
I take up Somerville’s corrective rhetorically, by positing what G. Thomas Goodnight 
might call a “meta”165-argumentative analysis of judicial opinion.  Another way of putting this 
might be in terms of paratexts of judicial opinion, texts that circulate around and among actual, 
discrete judicial opinion.  These texts have “real” existence only as the theoretical construction 
of a legal critic.  But, given a consideration of any judicial opinion as at once text and context—
as both a discrete entity and a collection of argumentative fragments that disparately form the 
pieces of implicit meta-arguments of judicial interpretation—they have independent 
performative force.  I therefore consider legal “rhetorical action” in two ways: first, as it operates 
in specific judicial opinions as discrete rhetor-produced texts;166 and second, in terms of these 
critic-constituted texts composed of “meta”-arguments brought together by shared constitutional 
and political implication across relations of precedent and doctrine that may or may not be self-
evidently connected.167  For example, rather than ask “what are the radical queer political 
potentials in Kennedy’s Fourteenth Amendment arguments” in various important opinions, I ask 
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“how does Kennedy’s meta-argument about the Fourteenth Amendment that I have reconstructed 
from and across multiple opinions frame possibilities for racialized queer legal subjectivity?” 
How do these judicial arguments frame and delimit possibilities for radical, contra-sovereign, 
anti-establishmentarian queer of color politics in the United States?  
VI.  Radical Praxis Through Queer Rhetoric, Queer Legal Theory, and Queer of Color 
Politics 
 
In this dissertation, I address questions more often addressed in queer legal studies and 
cultural studies through rhetorical methods, following in part the example of “critical legal 
rhetorical studies.”168  In keeping with critical legal rhetorical studies,169 I am interested less in 
an appraisal of the forensic rhetoric of Kennedy’s opinion in terms of argumentative skill, and 
more in the relationship between judicial argumentative choices and the constitutive legitimation 
and abjection of LGBT/Q and person of color subjectivities in U.S. public life.  I propose a 
synthesis of the critical legal rhetorical practice of studying judicial arguments as arguments, and 
a more radical (contra-establishmentarian) mode of juridical critique.  In the “End of Innocence,” 
the postmodern feminist theorist Jane Flax calls for a theory of argument as a power-seeking 
exercise that rejects “a belief in the connections between truth and knowledge.”170  Instead, the 
telos of justice requires recognition of the “desire” for achieving “power in the world” as a 
means of resisting domination.  Flax argues that where argument is a form of resistance to 
domination, argument as appeal to truth (what Perelman calls analytic demonstration): risks 
ineffectiveness, because “arguments can lack [political] force...no matter how well grounded in 
some epistemological scheme”;171 and precludes what Cohen might call a “queer” politics 
grounded in contingent understandings of privilege across the gender, sexual, racial, and class 
identifications that form parts of movements for radical change.172  A radical queer of color 
understanding of judicial “argument as argument” is a proposal for a certain rhetorical praxis of 
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the critique of judicial opinion, a praxis grounded in an empathetic ethic of selfishness that seeks 
to find resources in the power-seeking arguments of judges for the often mutually exclusive 
power-seeking goals of queer of color politics.                            
My contribution to queer and queer of color legal theory is both simple and important—I 
see this dissertation as a modest addition to, rather than a significant departure from, existing 
work.  Chandan Reddy argues that a truly “critical” queer of color legal scholarship should 
attend to the abjected social and cultural “forces and relations” that constitute the law and the 
legal “archive,” and that “bourgeois law cites...but cannot comprehend.”173  Kennedy’s opinion 
in Lawrence v. Texas is an excellent example of Reddy’s point about citation—in Lawrence, the 
Justice situates his legal arguments within an historical, social, and cultural context about which 
he claims but in fact has no apparent knowledge.174  Reddy calls for critics to contend “with the 
law as an active archive,” enabling a fuller understanding of legal discourse as an ideological 
force of subjugation and erasure.  This critical practice requires that we “not simply accept [the 
legal archive’s] narrative and framework,” asking “instead” how “regulation marks [the law’s] 
interest in difference.”175 I insist that a necessary component of not accepting the law’s 
“narrative and framework” is precisely the development of a practical knowledge of how that 
narrative and framework operate through the specific construction of judicial argument.  Such a 
development requires a close reading of judicial arguments themselves, within the context of 
their construction within the rhetorical constraints of judicial rhetorical culture.  The legal 
archive is the “technique by which the modern US state promotes the citizen as a universal agent,” 
thereby “demanding that we take up its framework for difference as a prerequisite for a validated 
agency.”176  I contend that one component of what Reddy calls “critical” and I call “radical” 
queer of color praxis should be an insistent close reading of (as Constable says) “how” specific 
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judicial argumentative techniques form the components of that broader technique that 
performatively forces the constitution of a universalized subject-before-law.  
 There is accordingly a significant difference of methodological emphasis between the 
work of my dissertation, and much of critical legal rhetorical studies and queer rhetorical studies.  
My insistent focus is on the judicial text itself; the claims I make derive from readings of 
arguments authored by judges, and the contexts in which I locate these readings are primarily 
other arguments authored by other judges.177  This approach runs contrary to calls from both 
critical legal rhetoricians and queer legal theorists 178  to de-emphasize legal scholarship’s 
hegemonic focus on written texts authored by judicial elites.  For Marouf Hasian, Jr. and Isaac 
West,179 critical legal rhetorical criticism—and for West, queer rhetorical legal criticism in 
particular—should be separate and in some ways opposed to traditional rhetorical analyses of 
law.180  This mode of critical legal rhetoric argues that we must at least assign the same 
importance that I give to jurisprudence181 to quotidian and other speech that implicates but is not 
explicitly concerned with judicial instituions.182  I agree, but argue that the distinction between 
jurisprudence and quotidian law is useful more as a means of insisting that radical legal 
scholarship continue to focus on both, rather than as a project of delineating “where the most 
important site of legal change may” or may not be.183  I take it as a given starting point of this 
project that the “most important site of legal change” for radical politics is not only external, but 
opposed, to the fantastic sovereign space of the Court.  My position is that the Court should be 
attended to as a productive discursive site of significant and primarily negative effectiveness on 
these external “most important” sites of productive radical politics.     
 Hasian and West’s position is echoed in much of “queer legal theory.”  The queer legal 
scholar Leslie J. Moran argues that while the self-referential methods of “black letter lawyers” 
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and law professors have excluded queer perspectives,184 the goal of queer legal studies cannot 
simply be inclusion.  The “‘queer’ in legal scholarship” is opposed to consigning meaning to the 
law through reference only to legal texts, thus obscuring the heteronormative and other 
oppressive processes that provide the conditions of possibility for the production of institutional 
legal discourse.  “The law,” as the queer legal feminist Lynne Huffer concludes in her analysis of 
Lawrence v. Texas, is “severely limited in its capacity to address wrongs and carry out 
justice,”185 and it should be treated as such.  There are few studies in the field of communication 
and/or rhetoric that are explicitly critical, legal, rhetorical, and queer; Isaac West’s work 
constitutes an early alignment of a queer critical legal rhetoric with the particular form of queer 
legal theory represented by Moran and Huffer, suggesting that part of what might make a queer 
critical legal rhetoric “queer” is a repudiation of the forensic (more accurately, judicial)186 
matters that pervade so much of both “traditional” and critical legal rhetorical studies.  
Nonetheless, it is my contention that queer legal theory’s wholly justified antipathy (or animus) 
toward “black letter” law should not preclude the development of a critical queer of color legal 
rhetorical praxis that includes a specific concern with the jurisprudential arguments in “great 
cases.”187   
Franz Kafka’s man “before the law” arrived at the gate thinking that “the Law...should 
surely be accessible at all times and to everyone,” but the gate at the entrance, which he comes to 
find has been “made” only for him, remains barred by the gatekeeper for his entire life, and shut 
at the apparent moment of his death.188  In his study of rhetoric, style, and power, Robert 
Hariman takes up Kafka’s related story in the Trial of “an individual...failing to comprehend and 
influence” the “bureaucratic apparatus” of the law such that it eventually “destroys him.”  
Hariman argues that as bureaucracy is not only a space of “alienation,” but also inevitably a 
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collection of commonly shared “everyday experiences” of our inescapably bureaucratic social 
order, we might, “by identifying the elements of a bureaucratic style of political action...learn 
what forever eluded Kafka’s K.: the knowledge of how to live well within a bureaucratic 
world.”189  I make a similar claim, that while there is a need for radical queer legal praxis to 
include both rejection of the value and sovereign force of the U.S. judicial apparatus, there is 
also a need for interrogation of judicial speech that might effect, as Butler suggests vis-à-vis the 
“social order” of gendered life, an “opening [of] possibilities” for the “field” of legal subjectivity 
even to those whose identifications are constituted as “unrealizable” within that same field.190   
The difference between my position toward judicial rhetoric and Hariman’s toward 
bureaucratic style is that if K. is read as the “man from the country” “before the law,” it is not 
accurate to say that K. (unlike the other people in Hariman’s opening example who pay bills and 
inhabit corporate offices) lived within a bureaucratic legal world, and simply did not know how 
to live it well.  K.’s destruction in the Trial was perhaps an exemplary condition of necessity for 
his life.  Standing before the gate of the law, Kafka’s “man from the country” is at once wholly 
defined and wholly de-realized by the “radiance that streams inextinguishably from” the law’s 
gateway; there is no indication that a critical practice which succeeded in describing to the man 
the composition and nature and origin of that radiance will help him to get past the gatekeeper.  
Writing as a white, bourgeois, heterosexual person who does not “understand what it is to live in 
the social world as what is ‘impossible,’”191 I am inspired by but do not presume to wholly cross-
apply Butler’s necessary optimism about the critical praxis of “opening up possibilities.”  I hope 
that some of the criticism in the following chapters can suggest some such openings, but I intend 
these chapters less as contributions to the “knowledge of how to live well within” the fantasy of 
U.S. constitutional legal sovereignty, and more as contributions to the practical “knowledge of” 
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the implications of some of the judicial argumentative self-constructions of that fantasy to those 
who feel its effects most violently.              
Here I note Morris’ study of the “Trial of Leopold and Loeb” as an important basis for 
my work on these case studies.  Morris takes up the whole mis-en-scène of a major court trial—
including the arguments of the lawyers and judge—as his critical object because of he recognizes 
the “muscle and materiality” that “jurisprudence” provides toward heteronormativity.192  While 
“the most important site of legal change may not be in the courtroom,” courts, and arguably the 
Court in particular, retain centrally important roles in determining the particular manner in which 
discursive and material relations of domination will be reinforced against those attempts at 
change.   
Radical queer politics’ general rejection of liberal desires for inclusion into mainstream 
institutions does not preclude the value of institutionality to those same politics.  Lauren Berlant 
and Michael Warner lament the fact that while heteronormativity enjoys near total institutional 
support, “queer culture . . . has almost no institutional matrix for its counterintimacies.”193  
Similarly, Matsuda argues that, given the racism of the law, it is necessary to combine an 
“outsider jurisprudence”194 (the focus of much of queer legal theory) with specific “calls for 
doctrinal change” against racist laws that function as a “psychic tax imposed on those least able 
to pay.” 195   The mechanism of legal resistance to radical change is judicial argument.  
Conversely, it is in the range of possible arguments that can be made within the space of legal 
institutional culture that possibilities for queer of color rhetorical/political exploitation of legal 
discourse in the service of anti- or contra- or alternative to- judicial institutional politics exist.196  
This dissertation temporarily brackets analysis of such “outsider jurisprudence” as one means of 
considering the import of “black letter” legal argument to queer of color world-making goals.  
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VII.  Summary of Chapters 
In Chapter One, I focus on the due process and equal protection arguments in the 
majority, minority, and concurring opinions in Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas. I 
argue, as I do in QJS, that Kennedy’s choice to foreground the Due Process rather than the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for his majority opinion in 
Lawrence speaks to the potential in substantive due process rhetoric for a constitutional legal 
doctrine that is more consistent with radical queer politics than equal protection.  It is not 
Kennedy’s doctrinal arguments with respect to his findings in the case, however, that are the 
most interesting to me.  Rather, I locate a latent radical queer possibility in Kennedy’s meta-
arguments about how the Due Process Clauses should be broadly interpreted.  
Kennedy’s due process rhetoric allows for a partial constitutional recognition of the 
mutable and political nature of identity—a recognition productive of the potential for a 
constitutionally recognized queer “nominalist” legal subjectivity.197  But this same Fourteenth 
Amendment rhetoric, which is also present in Kennedy’s framing of equal protection in Romer v. 
Evans,198 also underwrites the perniciously racist rhetoric of a “color-blind”199 and “post-
racial” 200  Constitution present throughout recent US Federal and Supreme Court cases 
concerning higher education admissions and K-12 school integration policies.  Chapter Two 
undertakes a close analysis of equal protection arguments in some of these cases, in particular 
Chief Justice John Roberts’ plurality and Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.  I argue that Kennedy’s “gratis dicta” 
framing arguments about due process and equal protection in Romer, Lawrence, and Parents 
Involved should be read together, as a meta-argument about the possibility for a nominalist legal 
subjectivity that is dependent on the idea of what I call the post-racial queer subject-before-law.   
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Chapter Three offers a reading of recent state and federal judicial opinions concerning 
same-sex marriage, in particular the majority and dissenting opinions for the Supreme Court of 
California in In re Marriage Cases, and the federal judicial opinions that are doctrinally 
descended from these cases in Perry v. Schwarzenegger and Perry v. Brown.  In Schwarzenegger, 
U.S. District Chief Judge Vaughn R. Walker’s equal protection arguments frame gay and lesbian 
identity itself through desire for entrance into the institution of marriage––and do so in a manner 
that reflects a broader rhetorical constitution in constitutional law of queer relational being in 
terms of normative relationships.  In the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of Walker’s opinion in Perry 
v. Brown, Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt does not issue a due process finding.  Reinhardt also 
does not issue a finding with respect to the “rights of same-sex couples to marry” under any 
constitutional principle.  Rather, he confines his ruling to the narrow conclusion that a removal 
of a right previously granted a class of persons––as the right to marry had been granted same-sex 
couples in California prior to Proposition 8 in In re Marriage Cases––is a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause as defined by the precedent of Kennedy’s opinion in Romer v. Evans. 
Reinhardt’s opinion can be read as doing less than Walker to affect a substantive increase in gay 
and lesbian civil rights.  I suggest instead that the Ninth Circuit’s more narrow equal protection 
ruling actually re-opens some possibilities for a radical queer subject of the Fourteenth 
Amendment without marriage.    
My arguments in the first three chapters highlight the theoretical and conceptual dilemma 
of a project that a radical queer political perspective on foundationally anti-radical judicial 
speech.  To hold radical queer politics together with institutional legal rhetoric is to hold together 
establishment and disestablishment, subject and abject.  Chapter Four, my conclusion, addresses 
this question through rhetorical theory, specifically through a radical queer of color reading of 
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the Gadamerian concept of the Aristotelian rhetorical virtue of phronēsis as Vernünftigkeit, or 
“the practical knowledge of practical reason” that “teaches us the conditions under which reason 
becomes practical.”201  I propose that a queer of color “knowledge of practical reason” may not 
“teach us” such “conditions” as they are currently taken to be extant in heteronormative ideology, 
but rather will seek to destabilize the assumptive nature of such conditions productively as it 
provides the basis for asking the question “those conditions under which reason becomes 
practical” to whom.  In other words, I articulate a practical/radical queer epistemology202 of legal 
rhetoric that can provide a means of provisional queer identification with jurisprudential 
rhetorics that matter differently to, even as they abjectify, queer of color subjects before law.  
Radical queer politics should not surrender to the inevitable power of heteronormative 
institutions like the Supreme Court, but they should allow room for practically radical queer 
considerations of the relative value of the different actions that will, inevitably, be taken by those 
institutions. 
Notes to Introduction:      
                                                
1  The Daily Show With Jon Stewart, “March 5, 2013: Sandra Day O’Connor Pt. 2” (March 5, 2013), 
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/tue-march-5-2013/sandra-day-o-connor-pt—2. 
2 Chaïm Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, trans. John Petrie (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1963), 103.   
3 Chandan Reddy, Freedom with Violence: Race, Sexuality, and the U.S. State (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2011), 17-18.  
4 As I note elsewhere, “the non-pejorative ‘queer’ of everyday U.S. speech has come to denote an identity category 
grounded in sexual difference, dissidence, and ‘dishomogeneity’ that may be inclusive of, but also different from, 
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CHAPTER ONE: DUE PROCESS ARGUMENTS IN BOWERS V. HARDWICK AND 
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS1 
 
“As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own 
search for greater freedom.”1 
 
––Anthony M. Kennedy, Lawrence v. Texas 
 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s 2003 opinion for the Court in 
Lawrence v. Texas declared the criminalization of sodomy unconstitutional under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2  Taken together, Kennedy’s majority and the 
concurring and dissenting opinions in Lawrence offer an example of how U.S. judicial 
pronouncements on sexuality can be framed and understood in ways that matter for radical queer 
politics, even as such pronouncements originate within, are circumscribed by, and reproduce the 
logic of heteronormative institutions. The procedural arguments about the relationship between 
sexuality and constitutional law in Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion have the consequence of 
shifting the boundaries of acceptable sexual life and relation in the United States.3  The 
argumentative choices of judicial rhetors are both enabled by, and represent rhetorical conditions 
of possibility for, “genealogies of precedent,” or ostensibly analytical rhetorically constructed 
histories of precedent that form the warrants for conclusions of law.   
Kennedy’s choice to foreground the Due Process rather than the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for the Court’s decision in Lawrence4 is both enabled 
by and productive of a particular precedential genealogy of substantive due process, one that is 
more consistent with a “nominalist”5 queer politics—wherein subjects are free to engage in self-
definition—than the foregrounding of the Equal Protection Clause in other recent decisions in 
gay and lesbian civil rights cases.  Much of the arguments in Kennedy’s opinion interpellate an 
                                                
1 This chapter is partially composed of material previously published in Peter Odell Campbell, “The Procedural 
Queer: Substantive Due Process, Lawrence v. Texas, and Queer Rhetorical Futures,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 98, 
2 (May 2012): 203-229.  The copyright owner has provided permission to reprint.   
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anti-radical form of sexual subjectivity, whose legibility before the law is primarily dependent on 
its analogic relationship to heterosexual marital intimacy.  In this chapter, I offer an analysis of 
what I argue is Kennedy’s separately relevant “meta”-argumentative framing of the Fourteenth 
and Fifth Amendments’ guarantees of substantive due process.  This argumentative frame, in 
contradiction to the regressive politics of much of the decision, is inclusive of a latent future 
possibility for a radical queer subject of U.S. constitutional law.  
Kennedy’s doctrinal arguments in Lawrence are celebrated and maligned: a contradiction 
born in part from Kennedy’s simultaneous challenge to6 and “heterocentrist”7 legitimation of8 the 
controlling ideology of the heterosexual family in U.S. political and vernacular discourse.9  
Kennedy takes up queer sex as analogic to marital intimacy, and thus a component of the right to 
privacy implicit in and protected by the constitutional guarantee of due process.  Lawrence is 
accordingly an important basis for the recent “consolidation” of “queer,” “marriage,” and “rights” 
in what David L. Eng calls “queer liberal discourse,”10 a set of political arguments that works in 
part to re-consolidate dominant state power over queer life through the valuation of some and the 
denigration of other forms of queer life and relation under the sign of constitutionally and 
political acceptable “intimacy.”   
It is nonetheless the case that there is a significant difference—from the perspective of 
radical queer political goals—between Kennedy’s Lawrence and other recent examples of 
judicial rhetoric on sexuality.  As the litigator and constitutional law professor Laurence H. Tribe 
argues, Lawrence is a juxtaposition of the interest of the state in regulating sexual intercourse, 
with the interest of persons who are the targets of state-regulation to decide for themselves how 
and with whom they engage in intimate relationships.11  In his decision, Kennedy chooses to 
compare these competing interests through an argumentative framework of freedom and due 
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process.  This is a substantively different doctrinal approach than the one taken in most of the 
marriage cases working their way through state and federal courts.  When these cases are decided 
in favor of gay and lesbian petitioners or respondents, the majority opinions tend to eschew any 
concern with sex itself12 in favor of focusing on the question of equal rights of access to the 
marriage institution.   
The difference between due process and equal protection rhetoric in constitutional 
arguments about sex and sexual identity is vital to the question of what conditions of possibility 
remain and can yet be realized for future forms of U.S. constitutional recognition of queer forms 
of identification, life, and relation.  The inevitable reach of judicial pronouncements on sexuality 
to the everyday life of persons subject to the effective sovereignty of the U.S. Constitution 
demands the question of what are, if any, the various future radical queer potentials latent in the 
formulation of anti-radical queer judicial arguments from due process and equality, and what are 
the normative differences among these potentials?  Given the limited vocabulary of 
constitutional argument, the procedural queer13 on the United States Supreme Court will be 
understood either through equal protection14 or substantive due process15 doctrine.16  This 
chapter offers a radical queer perspective on some of the possible implications of this binary.   
I.  Lawrence v. Texas: A Brief Sodomitic History  
On June 26th, 2003, the Court decided Lawrence v. Texas (539 U.S. 558, 2003) 5-317 in 
favor of the petitioners, John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner, who were arrested and 
prosecuted after “Texas police,” “responding to a false report of a ‘weapons disturbance’ at a 
private residence,” claimed to find18 “Lawrence and . . . Garner engaged in anal sexual 
intercourse in Lawrence’s apartment.”19  The Lawrence decision reversed and remanded a lower 
court ruling upholding the so-called “Texas ‘Homosexual Conduct’ law”20 criminalizing sodomy, 
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defined as “‘deviate21 sexual intercourse’” between two persons of the same sex.22  In doing so, 
the Court also overruled its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick that refused to find Georgia 
statute § 16-6-2 (1984, defining and criminalizing “sodomy” and “aggravated sodomy”) 
unconstitutional.23  Writing for the Lawrence majority, Kennedy argued that the “Texas statute,” 
along with the Court’s previous decision in Bowers, “violated” the “petitioner’s rights under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”24  Kennedy was joined by Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer, and opposed by Justice Antonin Scalia (who wrote the dissenting 
opinion), Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas.25   
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor agreed with the judgment of the majority in rendering the 
“Homosexual Conduct” law unconstitutional but not in overturning Bowers; she rejected the 
majority’s application of substantive due process26 and filed a concurring opinion holding the 
“Texas statute” invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 
Lawrence should not be considered apart from Bowers; indeed, Kennedy’s opinion appears more 
concerned with the Court’s previous decision in Bowers than it is with the Texas statute at 
hand—and thus with the particular and significant history of sodomy in Georgia law.28  The 
juxtaposition between Kennedy and O’Connor’s positions on Bowers makes Lawrence a 
doctrinal laboratory for comparing an ostensibly pro-gay and lesbian example of judicial rhetoric 
that repudiates the statutory tradition upheld in Bowers, and an ostensibly pro-gay and lesbian 
example of judicial rhetoric that accepts this tradition as constitutionally valid.  Both the Texas 
and Georgia sodomy statutes are still on the books in 2012.29  Both Kennedy’s majority opinion 
and O’Connor’s concurrence have had a significant and varied influence on future case law, and 
on the manner in which extant sodomy laws are interpreted and enforced as a question both of 
law, and law enforcement policy.  The material implications of Lawrence and Bowers for queer 
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life in the United States are constituted in the relationship between—on the one hand—the 
doctrinal arguments in each opinion and dissent, and—on the other—the manner in which queer 
existence may or may not be criminalized in a post-Lawrence world.  
Whatever else Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion might be, it is a specific chastisement30 to 
the doctrinal history of § 16-6-2—that is, a chastisement of those who would use the state’s 
inevitable (as the Court continues to see it) interest in regulating certain kinds of sexual 
interaction as a justification for the legal harassment of gay and lesbian residents of the United 
States.  Kennedy’s opinion is a legal argumentative response to Justice Byron White’s majority 
opinion in Bowers; it is also a statement about the doctrinal history of the Bowers decision, and a 
legal historiographical argument about how that history should be interpreted.  Bowers’ doctrinal 
history thus functions as a useful primer for how the state’s interest in regulating and 
criminalizing sex and intimacy is protected and kept up to date through adaptive judicial rhetoric.  
The particular history of state and federal judicial rhetorical responses to § 16-6-2 is rarely 
discussed in analyses of Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence.  I find, however, that this history of 
competing argumentative framings of the Georgia law in both the Georgia courts, and by the 
Supreme Court in Bowers, provides an introduction to the delimited possibilities for queer 
subjectivity before law constituted in Kennedy’s precedential genealogy of sodomy and due 
process in Lawrence.  I will therefore begin with a short discussion of this history before turning 
to the Lawrence decision specifically.     
II.  From § 16-6-2 to Lawrence v. Texas  
The ostensible purpose of sodomy laws is to “classify non-procreative sexual activity as 
inferior.”31  These laws are actually deployed most often not (as Scalia points out in his 
Lawrence dissent32) as a regulatory device directed at gays and lesbians, but rather as cover for 
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U.S. federal and state governments’ unwillingness and inability to punish white male 
heterosexual perpetrators of sexual violence.33  Georgia Statute § 16-6-2 (the statutory focus of 
Bowers v. Hardwick and the latest iteration of a venerable Georgia tradition of sex 
criminalization) is representative of how the genre of sodomy law accomplishes this broader 
purpose through the demonizing34 exemplification of gay and lesbian sex as the exemplary form 
of non-procreative sexual deviance.  As such, § 16-6-2 demonstrates the importance of judicial 
rhetoric to the manner in which a given piece of legislation can affect the social and material 
politics of everyday life.  § 16-6-2 (1984) is a reformulation of a previous law (Ga. Code § 26-
5901, 1933), which defined and criminalized sodomy as “the carnal knowledge and connection 
against the order of nature by man with man, or in the same unnatural manner with woman.”35  
This wording could of course allow the criminalization of any sexual act framed in a criminal 
indictment as nonnormative, a flaw in the statute that led to legislative rewriting with the 
intention of more specifically criminalizing sex between two men or two women.  This update to 
the 1933 statute was spurred specifically by a series of contradictory judicial reviews of its 
meaning and scope that threatened to leave Georgia unprotected from a variety of apparently 
unanticipated forms of deviant sexuality.   
In 1939 (six years after the nearly identical 1845 version of § 26-5901 had been updated 
to reflect the modern spelling of “connection”36), the Georgia Supreme Court offered a potential 
answer to a then-extant doctrinal debate37 as to whether the 1845/1933 law (§ 26-5901) defines 
sodomy in such a way as to require “the participation of a man.”38  When two women charged 
with sodomy for consensual oral sex challenged § 26-5901 on the grounds that the statute could 
not be violated with no male participation, the Georgia Court reluctantly held in Thompson v. 
Aldredge that while “the act here alleged to have been committed is just as loathsome when 
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participated in by two women [as by two men],” the court did not have the authority to interpret 
the statute as criminalizing something the legislature did not include: that is, carnal “connection” 
not limited to “the same unnatural manner” as “man by man;” or sex involving a penis.39  
Before Thompson, Georgia state precedent had held, following Presiding Judge Nash 
Rose Broyles’ 1917 opinion for the Georgia Court of Appeals in Comer v. State, that sodomy 
could (and should) be construed “‘broadly to include cunnilingus.’”40  But following the 1939 
decision in Thompson, Georgia state precedent also held that § 26-5901 could not be construed 
to include oral sex between two women—because, as Judge Oliver Hazzard Bartow Bloodworth 
declared in the dissent to Broyles’ opinion in Comer, “sodomy” cannot “be committed under our 
statute without the use of the virile organ of the man.”41  The warrant to Thompson Court’s 
conclusion of law (that the phallic focus of the sodomy statute is the best representation of the 
1933 legislator’s intent, regardless of Georgia’s broader need to regulate sodomy) is thus 
opposed to the warrant in Broyles’ conclusion in the Comer majority.  For Broyles, because the 
statute concerns sodomy (fundamentally a phenomenon of sex against nature) it would be 
contrary to precedent and statutory intent to exclude certain forms of sex against nature, 
regardless of the phallospecific examples suggested in the language of the statute.42   
The Comer dissent and Thompson majority, both of which argue for a limited judicial 
construal of § 26-5901’s scope, share near-identical declarations of disgust at the conduct of the 
plaintiffs as a preamble to those same plaintiff’s lack of criminal liability under the wording of 
the statute.  Bloodworth (dissenting in Comer) and the Georgia Court in Thompson agree with 
Presiding Judge Broyles and the Comer majority that unnatural sex should be regulated, but 
conclude that not all forms of unnatural sex can be regulated as sodomy per se under the law as 
written.  The statutory precedent laid down in Comer and Thompson is thus contradictory, but 
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not mutually exclusive.  The strident qualifications in Bloodworth’s dissent and the Thompson 
majority are dicta43—language in the opinion not necessary to decide the case.  But as I will 
argue in more detail in my analysis of Lawrence, dicta-claims can help form a judge’s 
argumentative framework for her opinions’ conclusions of law; and so these argumentative 
qualifications nonetheless participate in constructing a genealogy of sodomy law that supports as 
broad a construal of definition of sodomy as possible.  This argumentative framework—through 
which Bloodworth and the Thompson court urge a limited and deferential interpretation of the 
specific language of § 26-5901—is significant independently from Bloodworth’s and the 
Thompson court’s more limited legal conclusions.  From a rhetorical, meta-argumentative 
perspective, the Comer and Thompson Courts can thus be read together as arguing that Georgia 
has a legal imperative and a constitutional basis for the broad regulation of sodomy for the public 
good—even as they differ in their specific legal conclusions about the scope of § 26-5901.   
Bloodworth’s opening statement in his Comer dissent that “especially on account of the 
loathsomeness of the charge in this indictment...do I regret that I can not agree with my brethren 
in the conclusion reached by them”44 establishes a legal argumentative framework in which 
future judicial limitations of § 26-5901’s scope on the one hand, and future judicial support for 
an amended law that construes sodomy more broadly on the other, would not be at odds but 
rather be part and parcel of Bloodworth’s desired judicial political future.  Bloodworth’s 
conclusions of law are framed—bookended—by this opening qualification, and by his closing 
statement that “whether [I am] right or wrong [in his construal of § 26-5901], the members of our 
legislature could easily make the matter clear by a short statute making unlawful such practices 
as are alleged in the indictment of this case.”45  In the argumentative framework of Bloodworth’s 
opinion, both judicial restrictions on what § 26-5901 may be construed to proscribe, and judicial 
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support of the constitutionality of legislative expansion of those proscriptions, are mutually 
derivative and productive of the same precedential genealogy of sex criminalization.   
For both the Comer and Thompson courts, because Anglo-American historical-legal 
precedent generally demands the proscription of non-procreative sex, the doctrinally appropriate 
guiding question in reviewing challenges to statutes like § 26-5901 is not, “should this law apply,” 
but rather “does this law apply in this case, and if not, what might be done about that?”  Within 
this judicial argumentative framework, judicial actors should, in the context of appropriate 
deference to the wording of statutes, maintain a constant vigilance against the various 
permutations of perversion citizens will employ in attempts to circumvent the statutory defense 
of (in the words of Mary Jane Comer’s indictment for sodomy) “the good order, peace, and 
dignity” of the State.46  Nearly one hundred years later, Kennedy would qualify his decision in 
Lawrence with assurance that the Court’s determination that sex between men was legal did not 
extend to sex acts that should still be criminalized—acts about which the Justice was, of course, 
rather vague.47  Comer and Thompson form part of the precedential history of Lawrence v. Texas, 
even though they are not cited as such (as state decisions, they are not controlling precedents the 
Supreme Court would be concerned with).  A juxtaposition of Comer and Thompson with 
Lawrence suggests that it might be more accurate to talk about the shifting boundaries of sex 
criminalization from Comer to Lawrence, rather than Lawrence’s sex de-criminalization as an 
implicit repudiation of Comer.    
The statutory future suggested in Bloodworth’s precedential framework for Georgia 
judicial sodomy rhetoric came precisely to pass.  In 1963, the Georgia Supreme Court held in 
Riley v. Garrett that “§ 26-5901 did not prohibit heterosexual cunnilingus,”48 reconciling 
Thompson and Comer by elevating Bloodworth’s Comer dissent as the controlling doctrine 
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regarding the reach of § 26-5901’s proscription.49  Five years later, the Georgia legislature (as if 
finally heeding50 Bloodworth’s call for a simple legislative fix to Georgia’s sodomy definition) 
enacted statute § 16-6-2 (1968).51  § 16-6-2 (1968/1984) solves the “virile organ of a man” 
problem by providing that “a person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or 
submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of 
another,” an offense that—to this day—carries the penalty of one to twenty years in prison.52 
This is the law under which Michael Hardwick was charged in Fulton County, Georgia, in 1982.  
Michael Hardwick’s story is superficially similar to Lawrence and Garner’s—he was 
arrested for having sex in his house by a police officer with a dubious claim to legitimate entry.53  
The chances that a police officer—who is not herself engaging in sodomy––would legitimately 
witness a sodomitic act in a private residence are quite small.  The dual assumption of sodomy 
laws like those in Georgia and Texas is thus that they will be primarily directed at “sex in 
public,”54 and that in situations where they are directed at sex in “private,” the excuse a police 
officer provides for the home entry that allowed their witnessing will be presumed to be valid—
even though the unlikeliness of such a coincidence would simultaneously suggest that the reason 
for entry is not valid and thus a violation of privacy.  Like Lawrence and Garner’s, Hardwick’s 
arrest is the effect of the law’s need for an identifiable, describable material act in order to 
establish the necessary grounds for judicial interference. 
Hardwick was charged with “consensual sodomy” under § 16-6-2, and decided to take on 
the substantial risk of acting as a test case for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
which had been seeking an opportunity to bring suit against the Georgia statute in federal 
courts.55  Hardwick and John and Mary Doe (“a married [heterosexual] couple acquainted with 
Hardwick” who were recruited by the ACLU lawyer Kathleen Wilde56) filed suit against Georgia 
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Attorney General Michael Bowers57 in district court, contending that § 16-6-2 as “applied to 
private sexual conduct between consenting adults”58 represented an unconstitutional abrogation 
of their “fundamental right of privacy” protected through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and violated their right of “freedom of expression and association” 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 59   The Supreme Court rejected Hardwick’s 
contention.  Four years later, Halley would refer to Justice White’s particular treatment of 
Bowers’ due process claims as not only a “disastrous...defeat” for “pro-gay legalism,” but also an 
“ominous” signal for the future of “women’s rights to reproductive freedom,” because the 
“privacy theory...depended on cases that women’s rights lawyers had won in their decades-long 
effort to establish rights to reproductive autonomy.”60  Nonetheless, Hardwick and his legal 
team’s (led in later stages of the case by Laurence Tribe)61 doctrinal argumentative framing of 
his case specifically in terms of privacy and the Due Process Clause would give Kennedy the 
opportunity to use the same framing as the means of overturning White’s decision in Lawrence.  
Whether or not it would have been feasible62 for Wilde, Tribe and Hardwick to articulate a non-
privacy based due process appeal (based on, perhaps, the argument that there could simply be no 
legitimate governmental purpose at all in the regulation of consensual sexual activity, under any 
circumstances), their decision to do so gave Kennedy a wider variety of argumentative 
possibilities to turn to in his choice to write a due process opinion instead of joining O’Connor’s 
equal protection arguments as the Lawrence majority.       
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Hardwick v. 
Bowers (Bowers I) reversed the Northern District of Georgia’s summary dismissal of Hardwick’s 
claim (while affirming the Northern District’s “dismissal of the Does’ complaint for lack of 
standing”63) and remanded the case for trial.64  In his opinion for the Court of Appeals, Circuit 
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Judge Frank Minis Johnson agreed with Hardwick’s contention that certain of the actions 
proscribed by § 16-6-2 are protected by a fundamental right to privacy.  Accordingly, Johnson 
argued, enforcement of the sodomy statute would violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee 
of substantive due process unless Georgia could prove at trial that “the State...has a compelling 
interest” in proscribing private and consensual sodomy, and that the sodomy statute “is the most 
narrowly drawn means of safeguarding that interest”65 (on the one hand, this was a remarkable 
victory for Hardwick; on the other, there is a sense here in the Eleventh Circuit’s willing 
application of the “privacy theory” set in the “women’s rights” cases of what Jasbir K. Puar 
would later call, describing Lawrence v. Texas, “a sanitizing of image” by ensuring that gay 
sexuality remain “out of view” of both the public and the law66).  
The U.S. Supreme Court granted Bowers’ petition for certiorari (judicial review).67 In the 
hierarchical procedure of judicial review, this made Bowers—the man responsible for enforcing 
§ 16-6-2 on queer lives and bodies—the aggrieved party, and made the question before the Court 
not the constitutionality of the Georgia sodomy statute per se, but rather the constitutional 
validity of Circuit Judge Johnson’s claim on behalf of the Eleventh Circuit that “the Georgia 
Sodomy Statute implicates a fundamental right of Michael Hardwick.”68  On June 30, 1986, the 
Court decided Bowers v. Hardwick (Bowers II) 5-4 in favor of the petitioners.  Justice Byron 
White wrote the opinion for the majority, with Justices Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens 
filing separate dissents.69  Johnson’s 1985 opinion for the Eleventh Circuit in Bowers I is the first 
definitive statement in favor of an individual’s right—regardless of their sexual identity—to non-
interference in cases of “private consensual sexual behavior among adults” in the history of U.S. 
federal judicial rhetoric.  The Supreme Court took exception to Johnson’s views, and White’s 
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opinion to that effect would remain the law of the land for just over seventeen years, until 
Lawrence v. Texas.  
III.  Two Stories About Lawrence v. Texas 
There are two common stories about Lawrence in the popular and gay and lesbian press, 
legal scholarship, and queer theory.  I call them the “unlikely watershed”70 and “critical queer” 
Lawrence narratives.  In the “unlikely watershed” narrative, Kennedy’s opinion offers the 
country an (in the minds of some) awkwardly written but nonetheless long overdue and welcome 
repudiation of White’s opinion in Bowers:71 “to be sure, the criminalization of consensual 
sodomy was unjust; overturning Bowers in Lawrence can therefore be read, from a certain liberal 
perspective, as the just outcome of a long struggle for sexual freedom.”72  The catholic73 
Justice’s declaration of the unconstitutionality of sodomy is a marker, in the words of the popular 
historian and critic Kirk Davis Swinehart, of the gay and lesbian civil right’s movements newly 
“acquired...powerful aura of inevitability.”  This new aura of inevitability was “inconceivable as 
few as 10 years ago, when sodomy laws remained in effect in thirteen states,”74 a time when it 
was easier to “imagine” that “gay men could be arrested for having sex behind closed doors, in 
the privacy of their own bedrooms.”75   
The unlikely watershed narrative (echoed in the subtitle “How a Bedroom Arrest 
Decriminalized Gay Americans” to Dale Carpenter’s excellent new book Flagrant Conduct: The 
Story of Lawrence v. Texas) obscures the complex rhetorical relationship between, on the one 
hand, a performative judicial declaration that a statute is unconstitutional, and, on the other hand, 
the actual effect of that declaration on the statute itself.  That is, the Court’s declaration that a 
law is unconstitutional is an illocutionary change in the constitutional legitimacy of that statute 
within the U.S. republic, but that change may or may not lead to the perlocutionary effect of the 
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statute being taken off the books.  Lawrence and Garner’s arrest did not foment the 
decriminalization of gay Americans—sodomy laws remain on the books in eighteen states 
(Figure 1) and in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.76   
Rather, the arrest and ultimate Court decision led to a reduction in state and federal 
governments’ available practical means of persecuting gay Americans via those sodomy statutes, 
because—as Atlanta police had tried unsuccessfully prior to Hardwick’s arrest—police and 
prosecutors have to be careful with how they apply these statutes, lest they create the opportunity 
for a test case that will establish the law unconstitutional under the Lawrence precedent.  This 
means that the question of whether and in what ways these laws are in effect in U.S. queer lives 
has more to do with how, if at all, the argumentative framework of Kennedy’s opinion delimits 
the range of possibilities for governmental, organizational, and local policies with respect to 
these laws, than it does with the basic fact of the opinion’s conclusion that consensual sodomy 
laws are unconstitutional.  While the decision itself failed to change the law, the argumentative 
framework through which the decision is articulated will be influential, in the doctrinal modality 
of constitutional argument,77 on future cases that take up challenges to § 16-6-2, the Texas 
“Homosexual Conduct Law,” and the laws on the books in UCMJ and the other sixteen states.     
In the critical queer narrative, Kennedy’s opinion should be acknowledged for what it 
is—a judicial decriminalization of consensual sodomy78—but not celebrated as removing a 
barrier to queer freedom.  The opinion is certainly not, in the Berlantian sense, an example of 
“queer world making.”79  Rather, Kennedy effects a narrow expansion of the boundaries of 
acceptable intimacy on the basis of the continued political, social, and cultural abjection of most 
forms of queer relational practice and being.80  For David Eng, Kennedy’s decision is exemplary 
of a queer-liberalist politics—one that operates in conjunction with what Cathy J. Cohen calls a 
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politics of “secondary marginalization”81—that updates and re-centers the U.S. national project 
of intimacy regulation through the heteronormative tactic of identification through negation.82  
Those queer subjects granted legitimacy before the law in performative legal rhetoric like 
Kennedy’s in Lawrence are defined in terms of the abject “constitutive outside”83 that they are 
not.  Legitimate queer subjects are not not-married, not-citizen, not-productive, not-white.   
The Lawrence decision is rightly impugned in critical queer legal scholarship for its 
particular invocation of the precedential genealogy articulated in Bowers I and the dissents to the 
majority in Bowers II—one within which privacy, marriage, and procreation are the core issues 
in terms of which constitutional questions regarding intimacy and relationship should be decided.  
This critical queer narrative reflects the need to look beyond a jurist’s ultimate judgment on the 
question of law in a given case, and examine as well the framework for decision-making implicit 
in the arguments a judicial rhetor makes in support of their decision.84  But it does not fully 
consider how the argumentative evolution of constitutional doctrine (while a political and 
externally influenced process) is delimited by the phronetic85 constraints of precedent that are at 
play in a given case.86  The Lawrence majority was written by a rhetor, a human actor in a 
particular (judicial legal) culture87 responding to a particular and highly constrained rhetorical 
situation.  There should be a distinction between critical queer responses to the fact and effect of 
Kennedy’s arguments, and the articulation of a critical queer response to the normative and 
doctrinal implications of the argumentative choices Kennedy and his clerks made when they 
wrote the opinion.  I offer the latter.        
I do not claim that decisions such as Lawrence and Bowers are devoid of effect beyond 
that created through popularly accessible discourses about them.  Nor do I dispute the major 
conclusions of the critical queer legal critiques of the hetero-, white-, homo-, and 
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“domestinormative”88 politics of Lawrence v. Texas.  These critiques are most interested in 
taking up Kennedy’s opinion as exemplary of the liberal and racialized heteronormativity of U.S. 
judicial rhetoric, and this is vital work in the project of producing radical queer legal praxis in 
scholarly, activist, and everyday contexts.  But the critical queer story of Lawrence mostly omits 
a consideration of how Kennedy’s specific procedural framing of a queer liberal “legal 
genealogy” of sex and relation89 in constitutional law might yet differ from other, similar 
examples of queer judicial liberalism in ways that matter substantively to radical queer politics.  
In other words, the critical queer story of Lawrence originates from outside the law.  My attempt 
to articulate a radical queer perspective on Kennedy’s argumentative choice follows Aune’s 
call90 to begin rhetorical criticism of judicial rhetoric from within the terms of judicial opinion, in 
an attempt to find the best location and grounded interpretation for developing (as I explain in 
depth in Chapter Four) a queer epistemology of law for radical queer purposes.   
I argue that Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence—read in the dual context of the doctrinal 
history of Bowers I and II, and of post-Lawrence judicial rhetoric on same sex relation and the 
Constitution—offers an interesting and slightly different precedential genealogy of due process 
and sodomy in constitutional law than what is currently being developed on the road to arguing 
same sex marriage before the Supreme Court.  My reading of Kennedy’s decision renders the 
opinion less remarkable than the “unlikely watershed” narrative would have it, and at the same 
time more valuable to radical queer politics.  In the following sections, I turn first to a close 
reading of the first paragraph of Kennedy’s opinion as “dicta,” a reading that introduces my 
analysis in the subsequent sections of some of the different implications of due process and equal 
protection arguments for radical queer politics.    
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IV.  “Active Liberty,” Dicta, and Sex in Public  
The “specific procedural framing” I am interested in is first evident in the first paragraph 
of Lawrence, which along with the penultimate paragraph literally frames the rest of the content 
in Kennedy’s opinion:   
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or 
other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there 
are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not 
be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain 
intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and 
more transcendent dimensions.91 
In her criticism of Kennedy’s opinion, Jasbir K. Puar argues that “the language of Lawrence-
Garner prescribes the privatization of queer sex, rendering it hidden and submissive to the 
terrain of the domestic…an affront to queer public sex cultures that sought to bring the private 
into the public.”92 Puar’s critique of Lawrence’s reliance on “‘the broader privacy argument’ 
over the ‘narrower equal-protection argument’”93 is well taken, but her doctrinal argument here 
references secondary sources rather than the text of the decision itself (Puar also does not, as I 
will argue, fully consider the stakes involved in a switch from due process to equal protection).94  
The manner in which Kennedy frames the “‘broader privacy argument’” is not entirely consistent 
with Puar’s claim regarding the decision’s “language.”  Kennedy does speak of preventing 
“unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places,” but complicating in 
part Puar’s contention that the language of the case is specifically an “affront to queer public sex 
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cultures,” Kennedy goes on to say that persons should be protected from state intrusion into the 
operation of their lives outside the home as well.   
Two things are important here: first, Kennedy did not need to articulate a right to liberty 
as defined by freedom from government intrusion that extended beyond the private space of the 
home, as Lawrence and Garner, the petitioners in the case, were arrested for sodomy within a 
private dwelling.  Second, Kennedy does not place any physical limitation on where the 
“freedom” he talks about might apply.  Puar’s critique of Kennedy’s privacy arguments is 
doctrinally accurate; it is grounded in her reading of what the Justice’s more expansion 
definitions of privacy functionally mean given how they are modified by the precedential 
arguments he makes later in the opinion.  But in this opening paragraph, Kennedy gestures 
toward an interpretation of constitutional privacy protection that is not limited to traditional and 
privileged private spaces.  Grammatically, privacy is rendered as the freedom to be as you are 
not only in the home but also in any given place and at any given time—absent, of course, a 
more compelling state interest.95   
Kennedy frames his discussion of liberty and freedom in the context of “our [the United 
States’] tradition.”  If “the instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more 
transcendent dimensions,” then the freedom to engage in “certain intimate conduct” both within 
and outside the private physical space of the home is framed as a fundamental element of the 
United States’ democratic and legal traditions.  Tribe argues that a major innovation in Lawrence 
was precisely to articulate, as Kennedy declares, “‘a due process right to demand respect for 
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty.’” 96  Here is a possible framing of the 
right to privacy that might be detrimental to heteronormative restrictions on citizenship—the 
United States itself, through the Constitution, is defined not just through the liberty of the private 
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and autonomous individual, but also through the general principle that for the government to 
legislate against any method of living a life is an affront to American democracy.  
In Active Liberty: Interpreting our Democratic Constitution, Justice Stephen J. Breyer 
argues that in United States constitutional philosophy and jurisprudence, “liberty” is understood 
in two ways: first, as individual freedom from “improper government interference,” and second, 
as “active liberty,” or the “collective” right of the populace to fully participate in the operations 
of government.97  Kennedy’s opening definition of liberty as “that which protects the person 
from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places” is the converse 
of Breyer’s notion of “active” liberty, and Kennedy’s sentence further suggests that the purpose 
of privacy protection has little to do with protecting an individual’s right to do things that are 
part and parcel of their full participation in a democratic society.  The enigma of the opening 
paragraph thus lies in the contrast between liberty understood as freedom from “unwarranted 
government intrusions into . . . private places” and Kennedy’s subsequent association of 
“freedom of . . . certain intimate conduct” with freedom of “thought,” “belief,” and “expression.”  
As Breyer argues, freedom of expression in particular is a necessary component of “active 
liberty”;98 in Breyer’s ideal Supreme Court, judicial interpretation of the Constitution should be a 
means99 to preserve the necessary conditions by which all citizens are encouraged, and have the 
full ability, to participate actively in United States civic life.100   
Kennedy does not—and could not be expected to—come close to approaching Shane 
Phelan’s demand that queer politics seek to queer the very status of citizenship as an institution, 
rather than engaging in an exclusionary 101 liberal expansion of citizenship protections to 
previously excluded persons and practices.102  However, this first paragraph at least suggests that 
the constitutionally protected freedom from governmental intrusion into private intimate conduct 
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is not only a protection from governmental interference with private conduct in the home.  I can 
also be related to those freedoms and resources that are necessary to preserve the ability of 
individual subjects to participate meaningfully and publicly in United States citizenship.    
A close reading of the ways Kennedy describes and frames privacy, freedom, liberty, and 
queer actions reveals the possibility—again, limited to the opinion’s opening paragraph—of a 
more radical interpretation of what Puar, Eng, and Lynne Huffer103 argue is an anti-radical text.  
It is possible, using a rhetorical analysis of Kennedy’s language, to conceive of a world in which 
future judges choose to read this opening passage in Lawrence, against much of the rest of the 
decision, as not a proscription of public queer cultures, but rather an argument that sex in public 
could be constitutionally protected conduct.  Here is a distinction between the material political 
and cultural reality of Lawrence v. Texas and the latent rhetorical possibility of a future reading 
of the decision’s first paragraph that might be consistent with some radical queer politics. 
Certainly, the relevance of this radical future possibility pales in comparison to two less 
optimistic material realities.  First, while Lawrence has had some positive impact, no judge has 
cited Kennedy’s opinion—nor is one likely to any time soon—as precedent for overturning 
zoning and other laws104 restricting and outlawing queer public sex culture.  The effects of the 
case have perhaps been most ambiguous in Texas, where as I note above the ruling has had some 
positive impact but has not forced Texas to repeal the law or entirely stopped Texas police from 
arresting people for sodomy.105   Second, the ways in which Kennedy frames concepts of liberty 
and freedom in the first paragraph of a Supreme Court opinion are not likely to have (and for the 
most part have not had) an effect on the ways in which state governments and municipalities 
make laws concerning sexual conduct that are not explicit provisions outlawing sodomy.106  
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These barriers to the relevance of a radical queer reading of this passage in Lawrence 
might then point to the limited rhetorical significance107 of specific judicial arguments in general.  
The statements that Kennedy makes about liberty, privacy and sexual conduct cannot themselves 
be examples or not of “queer world making.”  The primary rhetorical significance of the 
argumentative choices that judges make in their statements about constitutional doctrine and is 
not then in those statements’ immediate effect on life outside the Court.  It is rather in a judge’s 
rhetorical power to participate in delimiting what future laws will and will not be able to 
proscribe and enable actions by individuals and cultural groups, as well as in the delimitation of 
the set of rhetorical resources available for how a future subject might identify themselves as a 
petitioner to the law.  Specific judicial arguments have political effect independent from an 
opinions’ binding conclusions of law, but some judicial arguments—like those in Kennedy’s first 
paragraph—matter only through a particular reading of the significance of dicta arguments as 
legal performatives.  That is, the potentials of some of Kennedy’s opening statements can only 
be realistically juxtaposed against the far more regressive arguments I am about to discuss if they 
can be read, from the perspective of the rhetorical criticism of judicial argument I outline in the 
introduction, as having some tangible effect on future possibilities for the articulation of radical 
queer politics before law.  I will argue that they can.   
As a rhetorical critic, I want to find Kennedy’s opening paragraph significant in that (in 
contrast to more conservative and limiting statements made later in his opinion) this passage 
suggests a “nominalist” politics wherein constitutional privacy doctrine should defer to the “self-
understandings”108  of parties before the bench, perhaps enabling a more free, open, and 
contingent vision for the ways in which the freedom to be a fully queer occupant of United States 
citizenship should be addressed by future courts.  But from a certain, more analytic legal 
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perspective (one that I think Puar shares), the relevance of these initial statements about liberty is 
more questionable.  Kennedy’s opening statements are arguably an example of “dicta,” portions 
(as I note in the above discussion of Comer and Thompson) of a judicial opinion that, while 
accorded some authority because of the inherent credibility of the judge, are either unnecessary 
or irrelevant to the doctrinal findings in the ruling.109  What counts or not as dicta is often a 
matter of some dispute.  Lawyers or judges who disagree with a set of arguments in a decision 
will often dismiss them as “dicta” and thus deserving of no further refutation110—a tactic 
derisively employed by Scalia in his dissent to the Lawrence majority.111   
The first paragraph of Lawrence is arguably dicta not because it is totally irrelevant to the 
final holding of the Court, but because it discusses legal principles in terms “more broadly than 
is necessary” to the findings of the opinion,112 and because it is redundant to the third to last 
paragraph in the decision.  This third to last paragraph consists of (as even Scalia seems to 
agree)113 doctrinally relevant and binding language, as it occurs immediately before and is 
directly connected to Kennedy’s legal holding that “the Texas statute furthers no legitimate state 
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”114  
It is only in this third to last paragraph, which occurs immediately after Kennedy 
officially declares the Court’s earlier decision in Bowers to be officially reversed, that Kennedy 
appears to turn explicitly and singularly to the Texas law being challenged in Lawrence.  The 
very first reference to the “Texas statute,” however, actually occurs in the opinion’s first 
paragraph (the one on which we are presently focused)—while Kennedy’s discussion of liberty, 
freedom, and privacy in constitutional philosophy is stated in—even radically115––general terms, 
he closes the opening paragraph by contextualizing his discussion in terms of the “instant case,” 
where “the instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent 
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dimensions.”  The “instant case,” of course, is Lawrence, and more specifically, the conviction 
of Lawrence and Garner under the “‘Homosexual Conduct’ statute.”  While the opinion begins 
with a statement of how constitutional protections of liberty and privacy interact generally with 
proposed state interference, Kennedy immediately constrains his initially expansive, spatially 
free conceptualization of liberty and privacy to situations parallel to that of the state’s 
interference with Lawrence and Garner—that is, to instances where the state attempts to interfere 
in private sexual acts occurring in private residences.  This qualification at the end of the first 
paragraph, in combination with the next two passages that I discuss, illustrates why Puar does 
not accept Kennedy’s initial framing of privacy as having any potential for a radical politics.     
The first several sentences of the third to last paragraph of the decision appear to put this 
limitation in terms that are more binding on future courts:   
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be 
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be 
refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons 
seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from 
each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.116 
Kennedy’s qualifying arguments in this passage—again arguably more legally binding than in 
the first paragraph of the opinion—epitomize the “homonormative”117 politics of “queer liberal” 
tolerance rejected by Eng and Puar.  Kennedy appears dismissive of the relevance of all but the 
“sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle,” which are tolerated.  This is certainly 
consistent with Puar’s contention––here evidenced with specific reference to the ruling’s text––
that “Lawrence-Garner looks a tad like cleaning up the homeless and moving them out of view, 
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a sanitizing of image and physical as well as psychic space,”118 especially as Kennedy’s framing 
of how such practices should be tolerated explicitly precludes such tolerance having any effect 
on the legal maintenance of political and cultural heterosexual mores outside of certain private 
interactions between two consenting adults.   
Puar further argues that the decision performs “a conversion from the vilified and 
repulsive ‘sodomitic outlaws’ to the . . . ‘domestinormative’ . . . further ostracizing nonnormative 
sexual and kinship praxis of not only homosexuals, but heterosexuals as well.”119  Indeed, the 
“domestinormative,” heterosexually defined doctrine of marriage underscores Kennedy’s final 
doctrinal argument before his finding in Lawrence.  This argument (the next several sentences in 
the third to last paragraph of the decision) centers the dicta of the opening paragraph even more 
concretely within an anti-radical politics of marital intimacy:120  
The case does involve two adults who . . . engaged in sexual practices common to a 
homosexual lifestyle.  The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.  The 
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private 
sexual conduct a crime.  Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them 
the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.  “It is a 
promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government 
may not enter.” Casey, supra, at 847.121  
Here, in juxtaposition to the opinion’s first paragraph, Kennedy articulates privacy less 
generally, and more specifically as a right accessed by privileged individuals who are already 
deemed potentially worthy for the presumptive protection of United States citizenship.122  The 
“realm of personal liberty” cited from Planned Parenthood v. Casey and applied to the “instant 
case” in Lawrence represents a kind of expansion of freedom in juxtaposition to the Texas and 
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Georgia anti-sodomy regimes.  But that expansion comes at the expense of the “nationalist, 
classist, and racist” “secondary marginalization”123 of those subjects furthest from dominant 
cultural norms.124  The “realm of personal liberty” invoked through an argument reliant on the 
precedent of Casey is limited in part to individuals whose sexual identities and relationship 
practices (heterosexuality, monogamy, dyadic relationship pairs, etc.) accord them privileged 
access to the institution of marriage, and entirely to those who enjoy the economic and racial 
privileges necessary for access to private space.  As Berlant and Warner argue, policies 
promoting anything less than an institutional protection of public sexual practice and being 
inevitably privilege those sexual subjects that are closest to heteronormative political and cultural 
norms.  Limiting constitutional protection to queers and queer practices that occur within the 
“realm of personal liberty” understood through Casey will do little effective work in combating 
institutionalized heteronormativity.125  
If, because of the distinction between dicta and doctrinally specific and binding 
arguments in a judicial opinion, it is this third-to-last “present case does not...Casey” paragraph 
that is most important for how Lawrence will shape future law, then there is little to read a 
radical queer potential into Kennedy’s introductory statements.  However, the rhetorical 
framing126 of the decision itself—and I mean framing both rhetorically127 and in the literal sense 
of how the first and (as I discuss in the next section) penultimate paragraphs bookend the written 
decision—suggests, from an argumentative perspective, that aspects of Kennedy’s dicta-claims 
may have some use for future queer advocates attempting to combat heteronormativity in one of 
its most important symbolic locations.   
Consider a hypothetical scenario in which an arrest for public sex is challenged under the 
Due Process Clause, based on a more expansive theory of the “substantive guarantee of liberty” 
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than that found in Lawrence.  Read as either a decision, or a set of doctrinal conclusions, 
Kennedy’s opinion would not help the petitioners in this future case—both in light of the 
Justice’s careful explanation that the “present case...does not involve public conduct,” and 
because of Kennedy’s definition-through-precedent of his early expansive theory of due process 
liberty in terms of marriage-like intimacy.  But what of a judge who (somewhat like Kennedy 
with Bowers), dissatisfied with the limits of Lawrence, wishes to rule for the petitioners, and so 
also try to protect some additional persons from stigma, persecution and incarceration?  In such a 
situation, this hypothetical future jurist could conceivably say that while the conclusions of law 
in Lawrence do not apply, the dicta-frames with which Kennedy begins and closes his opinion 
provide a productive starting point for the new doctrine of substantive freedom that she would 
need to articulate.          
Judicial arguments, even when they are not directly related to an opinion’s conclusions of 
law, can act performatively to both expand and contract the conceptual realm of possibility for 
future legal petitions.  Even when these possibilities seem conceptual and remote, the material 
importance to marginal life of the argumentative choices made by judges in constructing dicta-
frameworks for their opinions should not be understated.  To posit (carefully and from an 
assumption of radical queer political goals) that it matters what the appointed arbiters of the law-
of-the-land say and think about the relationship between constitutionally protected freedoms and 
marginalized identities does not require a valuation of legal sovereignty, but rather a recognition 
of the import of statements by those who can wield the law with sovereign effect.128   
A juxtaposition of some of the dicta in Kennedy’s opening paragraph works as an initial 
demonstration of this point, but these statements are only one result of the doctrinal 
argumentative choice between due process and equal protection that Kennedy faced in writing 
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the Lawrence decision.  In the next two sections I will explore the implications of this choice by: 
first, offering some thoughts on the relationship between Kennedy’s doctrinal due process 
arguments and the particular way that “like race” and “miscegenation analogy”129 arguments 
function in Lawrence v. Texas; and second, articulating a radical queer perspective on Kennedy’s 
meta-argumentative dicta-framing of due process jurisprudence.  I then turn to an analysis of due 
process arguments in various Bowers v. Hardwick opinions, before returning finally to an 
explicit juxtaposition of Kennedy’s majority and O’Connor’s concurring opinions in Lawrence.     
V.  Lawrence v. Texas, Due Process, and the “Like Race” Analogy   
According to the Supreme Court journalist Jeffrey Toobin, the Court, in deciding a case, 
first holds a vote; if a clear majority and minority exist, the senior justices on either side of the 
vote can choose to write the majority or minority opinion themselves, or to assign it to another 
justice.  In the case of Lawrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist assigned the minority opinion to Scalia, 
while Justice Stevens was faced with the choice of assigning the majority to either Kennedy or 
O’Connor.  Toobin claims that there were two issues at stake in Stevens’ decision: first, 
assigning the decision to Kennedy was probably a political move designed to connect the 
traditionally conservative Kennedy explicitly to the liberal justices on the Court.  Second, 
assigning the decision to O’Connor would have more likely130 meant a majority opinion 
grounded in equal protection rather than due process analysis.  O’Connor’s opinion would not, as 
Stevens wanted, have overturned Bowers v. Hardwick.131  Regardless of the other arguments in 
the majority opinion, Kennedy’s choice not only to posit due process instead of equal protection 
as the controlling legal doctrine in the case,132 but also to frame the meaning of due process 
jurisprudence in particular ways, is significant for how future courts might address similar cases. 
Kennedy’s primary reliance on the Due Process Clause, in contrast to O’Connor’s reliance on the 
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Equal Protection Clause, signifies an importance difference between the doctrinal genealogies of 
precedent invoked by each Justice.  
I want to make an argument about the importance, from a radical queer perspective, of 
Kennedy’s particular choice of due process over equal protection jurisprudence, but this assumes 
a relevant distinction—from that perspective—between arguments from different parts of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The problem with this assumption is that Kennedy’s Fourteenth 
Amendment (due process) arguments, articulated through a precedential genealogy of privacy in 
terms of intimate, marriage-like relations, work similarly to O’Connor’s Fourteenth Amendment 
(equal protection) arguments in their reliance on analogies not only between queer and 
heterosexual relationships, but also between race and sexuality.   
“Particularly when they argue to judges,” Halley declared three years before Lawrence, 
“[gay and lesbian] advocates are opportunists looking for a simile: ‘your honor, this is just like a 
race discrimination case; this is just like a sex discrimination case.’”133  Kennedy’s opinion in 
Lawrence is no exception to the resulting trend of “like race”134 arguments in U.S. judicial 
rhetoric about sexuality.  A major portion of Eng’s critique of Lawrence focuses on the important 
participatory role that all three of Kennedy’s opinion, O’Connor’s separate concurrence, and 
Scalia’s dissent play in the regressive propagation of the “racialization” (abjection of race) 
through U.S. legal and other public rhetorics of ostensibly sexually “progressive”135 politics of 
“intimacy.”136  The queer legal theorist Siobhan B. Somerville argues that these “like race” 
arguments produce race and sexuality as permanently separate categories, through the production 
and reproduction of “analogies between race and sexuality and between racialized and sexualized 
bodies.”137  This effective138 and popular139 argumentative technique of “gay and lesbian” 
advocacy140 works in part through “naturalizing a progressive teleology of rights,” wherein first 
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there was the civil rights movement to achieve racial justice, and now there is the civil rights 
movement to achieve gay and lesbian equality.   
This naturalized “like race” teleology saturates popular accounts of recent struggles for 
gay and lesbian civil rights.  A comment in response to New York’s legalization of same-sex 
marriage by David Remnick in the New Yorker provides a perfect example: “the gay-rights 
movement has, in many respects, mirrored the black freedom movement, but in hyper-speed.”141  
Remnick does not consider the possibility that this “mirroring” is the result in part of specific 
argumentative choices made by social movement representatives.142  Understanding race and 
sexuality through the analogy form clearly undermines attempts to conceive of politics that are 
deployed against racism and heterosexism as inseparable manifestations of sovereign oppression.  
The idea that such a politics would even be needed is an anti-warrant to Remnick’s 
argumentative history of gay liberation, where the implicit warrant is that “white homosexuality 
is like heterosexual blackness.”143  Queer is naturalized as white (thus also contributing to the 
simply racist re-naturalizing of whiteness itself) and racialized identity as heterosexual.144   
Remnick’s comment is a salient example of the especially popular “‘miscegenation 
analogy,’”145 which, in “legal argumentation,” often takes the form146 of gay couples:same-sex 
marriage::interracial couples:interracial marriage.147  The notion of same-sex marriage as a 
protected constitutional right is foreign to many judges, but it can become much more palatable 
through the miscegenation analogy-invocation of Loving v. Virginia (388 U.S., 1967), “the 
landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision that unanimously struck down state laws prohibiting 
interracial marriage.” 148   Given the prevalence of the miscegenation analogy in judicial 
arguments about same-sex marriage, it is particularly striking that, as Somerville points out,149 
Kennedy did not use a similar analogic argument through reference to McLaughlin v. Florida 
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(379 U.S. 184, 1964), a decision that “unanimously overturned laws against nonmarital 
interracial sex”150 and so “could be considered the closest analogy to laws against same-sex 
sodomy.”151              
Analogies work as the comparison of a familiar relationship (the “phoros”) with a less 
familiar relationship (the “theme”), for the purpose of “clarif[ying], structuring, and 
evaluat[ing]...the theme in terms of the phoros.”152  (Halley’s caution-to-critics that analogies are 
so “deeply ingrained in the logics of American adjudication” as to be inevitable153 is therefore a 
position that reflects the hyper-prevalence in judicial rhetoric of the “doctrinal” mode of 
argument,154 wherein the judge must explain her positions always in terms of what has come 
before.155)  Surely—especially given the specific exigence of vacating the Court’s previous 
statement on the question in Bowers—Lawrence was a case where a judicial rhetor could have 
found a familiar, and strongly precedential (as McLaughlin was a unanimous decision) phoros 
particularly helpful, and even comforting.  But the choice in Lawrence to focus on due process 
made the relationship to McLaughlin, an equal protection decision, less clear. 156   The 
precedential analogy Kennedy invokes instead—in an opinion that he declares “does not involve 
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual 
persons seek to enter”157—is Loving v. Virginia,158 which Scalia also cites in his dissent.159      
Eng argues that while Scalia and Kennedy obviously come to different conclusions as to 
how the Loving precedent is controlling (or not) on the questions of law in Lawrence, the warrant 
both sets of arguments rely on and thus perpetuate is “‘like race’” analogy.160  This anti-
intersectional judicial rhetoric of race and sexuality underwrites what Eng calls the “coming 
together of colorblind and queer politics” in service of the queer liberal project of inclusion, an 
inclusion that foments abandonment of the imperative for continued discussion of “racial 
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liberation” in the judicial rhetoric of constitutional law.161  As a response, Eng juxtaposes the 
“legal genealogy of the Lawrence ruling traced out by both the majority and dissenting 
opinions”—one that “concerns issues of privacy, not race”—with his own “alternate legal 
genealogy, through the specter of race, through the ghost of miscegenation,”162 following Halley 
to trace the “historical role of race in Constitutional jurisprudence” in particular through the 
“distinct history of the 14th Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses.”163  The 
equal protection argument “accepted in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence though ultimately 
dismissed by the majority opinion” explicitly “connects queer liberalism to histories of race, 
slavery, and segregation” as a particularly regressive form of the “like race” analogy.  But Eng 
argues that O’Connor’s equal protection arguments do not promote these regressively analogic 
politics any more than Kennedy’s reference to Loving, which occurs in the Justice’s citation of a 
passage from Stevens’ Bowers dissent.   
This citation, which occurs immediately before Kennedy’s official statement overturning 
Bowers, is no mere supporting quotation.  It is Kennedy’s elevation of what was a dicta-
introductory paragraph in Stevens’ dissent to a declaration of binding legal precedent.  Stevens’ 
arguments in this passage, Kennedy declares, “should have been controlling in Bowers and 
should control [in Lawrence].”  
 Our prior cases [Stevens says in Bowers] make two propositions abundantly clear.  First, 
the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular 
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; 
neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from 
constitutional attack.  Second, individual decisions by married persons, concerning the 
intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are 
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a form of “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married 
persons.164  
In his analysis of this passage in Lawrence in juxtaposition with O’Connor’s equal 
protection-based “like race” arguments, Eng does not appear to consider the difference between 
due process and equal protection arguments to be significant.  But—from a radical queer of color 
political perspective—the difference is significant.  Equal protection jurisprudence is inherently 
referential to the peculiar racial history of the United States; invocations of the Equal Protection 
Clause in cases about sex that don’t explicitly consider race (and many of those that do) will 
inevitably be productive of race-analogic discourses of sexuality in constitutional law.  Due 
process jurisprudence—which traces back not to the racial politics of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but rather to the question of the circumstances in which an English monarch may deprive his 
titular subjects of life and freedom—is not.165  Unlike the right to equal protection of law, an 
invocation of the U.S. constitutional guarantee of due process is not automatically citational166 of 
the United States’ judicial racial history.   
It may be the case that Kennedy’s choice to foreground due process over equal protection 
analysis in Lawrence led him to use the Loving miscegenation analogy instead of the more 
legitimately apropos McLaughlin.  McLaughlin would have been a more direct comparison—and 
it would have been very interesting to see a Lawrence decision based primarily on McLaughlin 
and so avoid the privacy rights for non-marital homosexual intimacy::privacy protections for 
marital intimacy:privacy protections for non-marital heterosexual intimacy analogy.  That said, 
the specific way in which Kennedy deployed Loving as evidence for his doctrinal arguments 
actually does more to disarticulate the “like race” analogy from the underlying logic of his 
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arguments in Lawrence than any citation of McLaughlin would have—a citation that would have 
been enabled by a hypothetical counterfactual Kennedy choice to make equal protection 
arguments.  I think that Eng’s critique actually demonstrates that for radical queer politics, the 
Lawrence majority’s due process arguments are less detrimentally productive of the “like race” 
analogy than O’Connor’s arguments from equal protection.  This does not mean that Kennedy 
does not abject race in his analogies of marital intimacy.167  As is evident from my arguments in 
Chapter Two, “the racialization of intimacy” works very well as a description of the meta-text of 
Kennedy’s Fourteenth Amendment arguments, writ across multiple opinions.  But, unlike 
O’Connor’s use of Loving to support the equal protection arguments in her concurrence, and 
unlike Scalia’s use of Loving to refute O’Connor’s arguments, Kennedy’s reference to Loving is 
not an intrinsic component of his invocation of the Due Process Clause as the controlling 
constitutional text in Lawrence.  That is, unlike O’Connor’s arguments from equal protection, 
Kennedy’s opinion is constructed such that his due process argument works with or without the 
analogy to Loving, a distinction that Eng obscures in his conflation of due process and equal 
protection arguments under the broader aegis of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Kennedy’s use of this portion of Stevens’ dissent certainly has the effect of positing an 
analogy between Lawrence and Loving.  Nonetheless, Kennedy eschewed more explicit 
articulations of a Loving-Bowers analogy in Justice Blackmun’s Bowers II dissent168 and Circuit 
Judge Johnson’s Eleventh Circuit Bowers I opinion169 in favor of a Stevens quotation that 
references Loving in a footnote—a footnote which is not included in the Lawrence majority 
opinion.  Kennedy’s argumentative choice here underwrites the fact that the particulars of the 
Loving case are less important to Kennedy’s doctrinal arguments than they are to O’Connor’s or 
Scalia’s.  Miscegenation is the example Stevens gives for his contention that “the fact that the 
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governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a 
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”  In Lawrence, Kennedy 
introduces the Stevens passage by declaring “the rationale of Bowers does not withstand careful 
analysis:” this is a reference to the question of whether Georgia’s interest in prosecuting § 16-6-2 
outweighs the resultant deprivation of liberty. 170   Given this context of the surrounding 
arguments in Lawrence, Kennedy does not include Stevens’ Loving example in support of 
Lawrence’s broader substantive due process argument (Kennedy’s conclusion that the conduct 
for which Hardwick, Lawrence, and Garner were charged is protected as a right of privacy, and 
so cannot be a reason for depriving the plaintiffs of liberty in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of substantive due process).   
Rather, Kennedy’s citation of Stevens’ implicit reference to Loving serves as a response 
to the narrower question of whether the state has a rational basis for or compelling interest in 
criminalizing gay sex (the first part of the two-part test, discussed in the next section, that the 
Court uses to determine whether the state has met the standard necessary to legitimately deprive 
an individual of her freedom).  Miscegenation is one example (among many provided by both 
Stevens and Blackmun in Bowers I) of a legal proscription that has enjoyed long historical 
support but that is nevertheless unconstitutional, and that could not be justified by the 
proscription’s long support in U.S. history alone.  While it is certainly telling that Kennedy 
picked a passage referencing Loving over the other available examples, the dominant Fourteenth 
Amendment analogy in this section of Kennedy’s opinion is not between race and sexuality, but 
between gay sex and heterosexual marital intimacy.  “Like race” analogies are an inevitable 
feature of U.S. judicial arguments about sexuality; it is therefore a productive exercise to 
distinguish between more or less “unjustifiably coercive” examples of the genre.171  A queer 
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rhetorical reading of Kennedy’s arguments from the Due Process Clauses (a “citation of the 
law...to produce it differently”172) can function cooperatively with Eng and Halley’s demand for 
“effort to move beyond the persistence and intractability of ‘like race’ arguments”173  in 
contemporary Fourteenth Amendment law.  
The present choice in federal judicial rhetoric about sexuality is not between racialized-
heteronormative or intersectional-queer discourses of racial and sexual identity.  The former will 
continue to dominate the ways that most judges talk about LGBT and people of color as U.S. 
constitutional subjects for the foreseeable future.  Rather, the choice is between judicial rhetoric 
about LGBT sex and relation dominated by arguments from either equal protection or due 
process, and within that choice, as I argue in the next section and the following chapters, the 
choice between Kennedy’s particularly “nominalist” framing of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
legal subjectivity, and more typically essentialist applications of equal protection.174   
Equal protection is about classes of persons who may be treated differently from others; 
in contrast, the guarantee of both procedural and substantive due process assumes no particular 
victim other than the (legal, cultural, and temporal) context dependent subject-before-law.  
Within Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, arguments from due process are more potentially 
useful to an intersectional, “multiple-axis”175 theory of constitutional protection than arguments 
from equal protection.  A radical queer epistemology of due process jurisprudence is one road to 
“the possibility of moving beyond liberal identity-based frameworks in order to emphasize not 
‘who we are but how we are thought.’”176    
VI. Due Process, Nominalism, and Subjectivity Before Law  
Kennedy’s specific applications of due process to the questions of law before the 
Lawrence Court (in the terms of the introduction, his legal conclusions) reference the Fourteenth 
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Amendment.  But Kennedy ends his opinion with dicta arguments articulates a general 
framework for future due process jurisprudence that is grounded in both the Due Process Clauses 
of the Fourteenth (intrinsically connected to the post-slavery constitutional jurisprudence of 
emancipation, reconstruction, Jim Crow, and civil rights) and Fifth (not so intrinsically 
connected) Amendments.  An analysis of Kennedy’s closing dicta arguments about due process 
on their own terms, within temporary analytical brackets, 177  allows for a comparison of 
Kennedy’s book-ending framing arguments for how the Due Process Clauses should be generally 
interpreted in constitutional jurisprudence, against the precedential genealogy of privacy and 
racialized intimacy that forms the basis for his conclusions of law.  Kennedy’s dicta meta-
argument about how due process should function generally in response to different forms of 
subjects who come before the Court as petitioners for constitutional protection—an argument 
that might be imagined as floating above the specific doctrinal arguments of the opinion—is 
arguably more important than his specific legal conclusions to future possibilities for the 
articulation of radical queer legal subjectivities.   
As I argue above, both the first and penultimate paragraphs of Lawrence appear to be 
textbook examples of non-legally binding dicta, but if the intervening legal discussion were 
removed, the penultimate paragraph would read as the conclusion to Kennedy’s procedural 
declaration (begun with the Lawrence’s first paragraph) of how the Constitution generally and 
the Due Process Clauses specifically should be interpreted:    
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the 
Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, 
they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They 
knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once 
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thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, 
persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater 
freedom.178 
If this passage, immediately before the specific order from the Court that the “Texas statute” be 
“reversed” and “remanded,”179 is an example of dicta, it is the more specific type known as 
gratis dictum, or “a court’s statement of a legal principle more broadly than is necessary to 
decide the specific case.”180  Kennedy’s more legally binding arguments about the “instant case” 
of Lawrence are examples of constitutional rhetoric that are contrary and damaging to a radical 
queer future, but the two paragraphs providing the decision’s literal frame are so general as to 
not be strictly necessary to the legal findings of the opinion.  As I argue above with respect to the 
first paragraph of the decision, this allows both paragraphs together to function as a separate and 
independently relevant example of a “meta”-argument181 concerning the way in which the 
Constitution generally and substantive due process specifically should be considered and argued 
in future cases.  While the non-dicta passages in Lawrence may be the more specifically 
powerful in terms of their immediate ability to shape future law, I believe that it is useful to 
juxtapose the resources for a radical queer “nominalism” and futurism in Kennedy’s book-ending 
meta-argument, against the queer-liberalist and heteronormative specific legal findings of the 
decision.      
In this penultimate paragraph, “Liberty” again appears as the dominant trope, not 
primarily through repetition as in the first paragraph of the decision, but through Kennedy’s use 
of the term vis-à-vis his discussion of the authorial intent of those responsible for the “Due 
Process Clauses.”  Liberty is framed as the ontological category for which the Constitution was 
primarily and most importantly designed to protect; while the whole Constitution “endures,” 
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liberty/freedom is the only truth about the Constitution that remains unchanged throughout 
history.  “Freedom” (and its correlative antonym “to oppress”) is again the quality through which 
liberty is defined.  Liberty and freedom are defined here in a manner consistent with Breyer’s 
“active liberty,” in that the one immutable truth of constitutional jurisprudence is the need to 
protect liberty as the process of petitioning the state for redress against its own wrongs.  The 
right to substantive due process is thus the right of “persons in every generation” to fully exercise 
“active liberty.”  Kennedy’s arguments suggest an interest in what he views as the true meaning 
of the Due Process Clauses, but this true meaning is not a fixed concept, but rather the ability of 
the constitutional text to be re-interpreted in the service of whomever might find themselves the 
victim of state oppression.  Kennedy’s rhetoric here calls into being a Constitution solidly within 
the “loose construction” tradition of constitutional interpretation.182  Such a Constitution, rather 
than being merely an instrument for legal positivism, has the potential to be an important vehicle 
for society’s periodic engagement in, as James Darsey puts it, “serious acts of redefinition based 
on radical principles.”183  
 The gay and lesbian civil rights activist and philosopher Richard Mohr is highly critical 
of Kennedy’s opinion, focusing—like Eng and Puar—in particular on Kennedy’s refusal to talk 
about sodomy except as the referent of a marital intimacy metaphor.184  But it is in Mohr’s 
reading of this passage that he is the most generous to Kennedy.  Citing Kennedy’s historically 
anti-gay record in numerous cases before Lawrence, Mohr posits that the “‘we’ in Kennedy’s 
‘us’” is “Kennedy . . . thinking of himself”—on other words, Lawrence might be a means for 
Kennedy to atone for his largely anti-gay judicial record.185  However, reading Kennedy here as 
talking primarily about himself, while interesting, does a disservice to the rhetorical potential of 
this passage.  Mohr leaves off the last line of the paragraph, that “as the Constitution endures, 
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persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.”  
The “we” in “us” (“blind us…”) might be Kennedy as much as it is the Court or the United 
States in general, but the “persons” in the last line is unqualified by any limiting modifier.  
Kennedy’s vision of change via the Constitution in a democratic society is decidedly collective 
in nature; for Kennedy in this passage, the right to substantive due process means that the 
Constitution should serve as the site at and the vehicle through which a continual process of 
radical political and cultural change can be enacted.   
Due process does not have an excellent reputation among liberal scholars of 
constitutional law and civil rights.  The story of due process has featured the protection of 
corporate autonomy and the undermining of civil rights legislation, stemming from the Court’s 
landmark 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York,186 in which the Court struck down a New York 
State law restricting the number of hours a baker could be compelled or allowed to work.187  
Equal protection, on the other hand, is synonymous with decisions such as Brown v. Board of 
Education188 that are viewed overwhelmingly in liberal circles as significant victories for racial 
justice.189  The Equal Protection Clause is also posited by some legal scholars as the greatest 
hope for gay and lesbian civil rights.190  Critical Race Theorists, however, have called the 
efficacy of the “equality model” of jurisprudence into serious question, suggesting that rather 
than ending “the state’s role in enforcing race and gender stratification,” equal protection 
jurisprudence may instead have insidiously “caused such regulation to assume new form.”191  
The UCLA law professor Russel K. Robinson draws on these criticisms to suggest that the 
problems posed for racial justice by the “equality model” should also give gay and lesbian 
judicial activists serious pause,192 a position that I argue is supported by the relationship between 
Kennedy’s due process arguments in Lawrence and radical queer futurist theory. 
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Kennedy’s insistent futurity in the decision’s first and penultimate bookending 
paragraphs makes his procedural arguments about how the Due Process Clauses should be 
interpreted deeply relevant to radical queer politics in the United States.  Part of the Foucauldian 
dilemma of queer politics generally is starkly reflected in Lawrence v. Texas specifically—that 
no matter what queer reforms or revolutions or challenges to the state occur, there will always be 
a shift in racist and heterosexist boundaries of inclusion and abjection193 in the liberal statist 
production of “new normativities and exceptionalisms through the cataloguing of 
unknowables.”194  This is a bleak prognosis of culture, but “queer futurity”195 (as Puar argues) is 
a potential antidote; in “queer futurity,” “queerness is expanded as” a deliberately unpredictable 
and unforecloseable “field, a vector, a terrain.”196  While there will probably never be a politics 
that fully achieves Judith Butler’s dream of an effective promotion of life-giving without any life 
effacing cultural and legal norms,197 it is this very difficulty that makes “opening up to the 
fantastical wonders of futurity” “the most powerful of political and critical strategies.”198  Such a 
politics is so “powerful” precisely because of its mutability; if “queerness” were limited to a 
discussion of specific political strategies, then the realization of any particular strategy would 
always be vulnerable to the remarkable adaptive abilities of the heteronormative nation-state.     
Conceiving of queer politics as “futurity” defined as a “field, a vector, a terrain” does not 
preclude a discussion of specific political goals, but adds to that discussion an articulation as to 
what the method of queer politics should be, regardless of the specific actions being taken to 
advance various queer agendas.  The basic criteria that Kennedy outlines for interpreting the 
“Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments” read as echoes (constitutional, 
constrained by liberalism, but echoes nonetheless) of Puar’s discussion of queer futurity.  
Kennedy recognizes that specific legal solutions that at one time and place seemed to be 
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expressions of liberty and freedom are in fact often oppressive, and his solution to this dilemma 
is to insist that the Constitution must never be limited to any fixed historical interpretation.  
Rather, it must remain always already open to the future possibility of change in what laws serve 
to liberate and what to oppress.   
In fact, Kennedy goes a step further—implicit in his meta-argument about due process is 
the recognition that the Constitution has always contained elements that were never liberatory, 
and that the only way to make a once and future regressive document available to progressive 
politics is to insist on judicial interpretation being more open to the necessity of interpretive 
change than it is beholden to historical precedent.  Kennedy insists that Supreme Court justices 
must not only be concerned with doctrine and historical convention, but also with the future 
political possibilities that their decisions will impact.  This prudential199 and loose constructivist 
mode of constitutional interpretation alone is not a radical position for a liberal decision from the 
Court, especially not in an opinion guided from behind the scenes by the “liberal leader” John 
Paul Stevens.200  Rather, the way that Kennedy frames the decision through his procedural 
interpretation of substantive due process attempts to not only establish the doctrinal value of 
prudential jurisprudence, but the mutable and theoretical availability of the Constitution as a 
lever, available to all persons, that can be used against the oppressions of the nation-state that 
gave the Constitution life and that the Constitution serves to protect.  Kennedy’s invocation of 
loose constructivist interpretation in the context of gay and lesbian civil rights has the potential 
to render the Constitution a valuable resource for radical queer politics.   
In fact, I see a strong parallel between the loose constructivist mode of Kennedy’s due 
process arguments, and Halley’s interest in “nominalist” articulations of Fourteenth Amendment 
doctrine.  While the nominalist queer theory of identity201 posits a subject that speaks itself into 
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existence on its own terms, Kennedy’s legal nominalism instead allows for the possibility of a 
subjectless position before the law, one in which constitutional protection not only allows 
petitioners to the law to describe their own identify positions on their own terms, but more 
importantly does not require any knowledge of the identity or nature of a petitioning subject as a 
pre-requisite for offering sovereign protection.          
Nonetheless, “queer futurity” is not only a dream for times to come but an expression of 
the confluence of queer identity and politics in a radical queer orientation against liberalism and 
homonormativity.  For Puar and Butler, to be queer is at least in part to struggle against—in the 
context of marriage202 and other flashpoints of dispute over the exclusion of gays and lesbians 
from full United States citizenship203—the refusal by the “mainstream lesbian and gay movement” 
to “[recognize] as a problem” the possibility that assimilationist political drives “might result in 
the intensification of [racist and heterosexual] normalization” in the United States.204  Queer 
futurity is not only a political orientation.  It is a particular and radical articulation of liberatory 
possibilities for subjectivity that may be mutually exclusive not only with “assimilationist 
political drives,” but with what Roderick A. Ferguson identifies as the “will to institutionality” 
that is part and parcel of recent racialized and subjectifying politics of mainstream struggles for 
gay and lesbian recognition.205   
How, then, can there be any potential resources for a future radical queer politics on the 
present United States Supreme Court?  The critique and radical hope inherent in queer futurist 
politics necessitates less a wholesale rejection of institutional action than an insistence on the 
need to, as Butler argues, “[distinguish between] the norms and conventions that permit people to 
breathe, to desire, to love, and to live, and those norms and conventions that restrict or eviscerate 
the conditions of life itself.”206  Radical queer politics should not surrender to the inevitable 
  95 
power of heteronormative institutions like the Supreme Court, but they should allow room for 
practical and procedural queer considerations of the relative value of the different actions that 
will, inevitably, be taken up by those institutions.207   In this way, Kennedy’s particular 
argumentative choices construct some space for optimism with respect to openings of 
“possibility” for a radical queer politics at the United States Supreme Court.  To make this 
argument does not require endorsing the desirability of the “will to institutionality,” but rather 
the practical awareness for radical politics that the manner in which future judges reject or 
endorse laws and practices concerning sexual identity (and the lifegiving or eviscerative norms 
those laws and practices endorse) will be determined in part by the range of possible arguments 
about constitutional law those jurists can look to as controlling in future cases concerning queer 
freedom.   
VII.  Privacy, Intimacy, and the “Right to Sodomy” 
 
When Richard Mohr read Kennedy’s statement that Lawrence “does not involve whether 
the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek 
to enter...[but] the case does involve two adults who...engaged in sexual practices common to a 
homosexual lifestyle,” his reaction was to comment that even given Kennedy’s evident 
discomfort208 with publicly asserting constitutional protections for anal sex, the rhetoric of the 
decision makes it clear that for Kennedy, “having to think about gay love is more frightening 
than having to think about guys buttfucking.”209  For Mohr, Kennedy’s analogies between 
homosexual sex and heterosexual marital intimacy metonymically stand in for and thus 
marginalize the potential for committed, homosexual partner intimacy.  Mohr might wish that 
Kennedy had more explicitly developed the miscegenation analogy.     
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The radical queer critique of Eng and Puar offers a precisely converse objection: that 
Kennedy’s argumentative construction of a privacy violation intrinsic to Lawrence and Garner’s 
arrest constitutes a “shift” (what Puar calls the “conversion” from “‘sodomitic outlaws’’” to 
participants in “‘domestinormative’” kinship) “from sodomy to intimacy,” resulting in an 
opinion that only makes it unconstitutional to criminalize gay sex if that sex takes place within 
the heavily circumscribed physical and conceptual spaces of intimacy that are conceivable within 
dominant heterocentrist family politics.210  Eng’s “shift from sodomy to intimacy” and Puar’s 
“conversion” from the “sodomitic” to the “domestinormative” are both clear references to a shift 
from the focus on the former in Bowers II, to the latter in Lawrence.  But, Mohr objects to 
Lawrence in part because he doesn’t think Kennedy has actually made such a shift at all—
Kennedy talks too much about sex, and not enough about relationships.  So, is Kennedy’s 
Lawrence opinion about the constitutionality of proscriptions on queer sex, or is it about the 
constitutionality of proscribing for homosexuals the benefits stemming from participating in 
intimate relationships that heterosexuals enjoy as a constitutional right?211  My answer—‘all of 
the above’—requires a turn back to Bowers.   
In his opinion for the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick (Bowers II), Justice Byron White 
famously212 declares that the “issue presented [to the Court] is whether the Federal Constitution 
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”213  Chief Justice Burger 
was so moved as to write a concurring opinion solely to “underscore” this position, arguing that, 
“in constitutional terms, there is no such thing as a fundamental right to commit homosexual 
sodomy.”214   Justice Harry Blackmun begins his dissent with the response that “[Bowers] is no 
more about a ‘fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy’...than...Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967), was about a fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone 
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booth.”215  Instead, Blackmun argues, “Hardwick’s claim” should be analyzed in terms of the 
“constitutional right to privacy.”216  But Stevens, in his separate dissent, refers to the “right to 
engage in nonreproductive sexual conduct that others may consider offensive or immoral.”217  
Stevens’ point here is that by definition of the statute at issue in Bowers II, a “right to engage in 
nonreproductive sexual conduct” is inclusive of precisely a “right to engage in sodomy”—and 
(while this may go beyond what Stevens meant) could also be taken up as a way of reading 
nonprocreative sex as definitionally queer.218  
The Bowers II Court appears to be at odds as to not only the correct decision-making 
framework for deciding the case, but the nature of the very legal question the Court is asked to 
decide.  The Justices explicitly argue with each other, but these are not “arguments as 
arguments”—rather, the majorities and accuse the dissents (and vice-versa) of misapplications of 
of precedent.  On closer examination, however, these differences are less a matter of 
fundamental doctrinal opposition than of strategic argumentative framing.  Justice Powell’s 
concurring opinion offers a helpful explanation: “I join the opinion of the Court. I agree with the 
Court that there is no fundamental right—i.e., no substantive right under the Due Process 
Clause—such as that claimed by respondent Hardwick, and found to exist by the Court of 
Appeals.”219  Powell says “substantive right under the Due Process Clause” instead of “right to 
substantive due process” to underscore his position that substantive due process is not, itself, a 
right.  Rather, it is the requirement—construed from the procedural guarantee of due process in 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments—that the state have a good enough reason220 to interfere 
with or deprive a person’s “life, liberty, or property.”221 If called by a judge to justify such an 
action, the state must at minimum pass what the U.S. courts term “rational basis” review, 
wherein the state must show that its deprivatory action is “rationally related to some legitimate 
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government interest.”222  This is a lenient standard; legislation and other government decrees 
usually pass the rational basis test.  It is only when the state seeks to deprive a person of a 
fundamental right—by killing them, for example—that its actions are typically subject to the 
more difficult “strict scrutiny” review, wherein the deciding judge(s) determine whether the 
statute or application of statute in question is “narrowly tailored to a compelling government 
interest” that outweighs the negative consequences of depriving a person of their fundamental 
rights.223  
From the perspective of the Bowers II and Lawrence Courts, there is no dispute that what 
Hardwick, Lawrence, and Garner seek to challenge is the constitutionality of the application of 
the Texas and Georgia statutes to consensual sex between two men in a private residence.  
Because Hardwick, Lawrence, and Garner claim that Georgia and Texas acted in contravention 
of their guarantee of substantive due process, each Court must ask three questions: first, did the 
state actions in question interfere with Hardwick, Lawrence, and Garner’s fundamental rights; 
second, if so, is the statute in question narrowly tailored to a government interest compelling 
enough to justify interference with those fundamental rights; and third, if not, is the statute in 
question at least rationally related to some legitimate government interest.   
The distinction between a right to engage in homosexual sodomy, and a right to self-
determination in the context of heterosexual marriage-like intimate relationships only matters to 
the first of these questions; so initially, it appears that White and Blackmun simply have different 
notions of what fundamental right might possibly be violated.  If this is the case, then Kennedy’s 
opinion in Lawrence most certainly represents a marked shift away from not only the effective 
conclusion, but also the argumentative framework of White’s opinion in Bowers II.  White asks 
the question of whether the Court can construe a constitutional right to engage in homosexual 
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sodomy (or more broadly, the right to have sex in the manner that one desires).  Kennedy, 
instead of answering White’s question about a right to engage in sodomy in the affirmative, 
instead follows Blackmun in asking the question of whether the Court should construe the 
particular actions of Hardwick, Lawrence, and Garner as equivalent to personal decisions 
concerning an individual’s intimate life and relation that the Court has already determined are 
protected under the constitutionally construed “right to privacy.”224 
Doctrinally, however, White, Kennedy, and Blackmun ask the same question.  Of course 
there is no explicit “right to sodomy” in the Constitution—any more than there is a “right to 
privacy.”  Thus the framing question White proposes in the Bowers II majority is not “is there a 
constitutional right to sodomize,” but “does the Federal Constitution” confer a “fundamental 
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”  White spends some time enumerating two ways 
the Court’s precedent allows for something not explicitly indicated in “life,” “liberty,” and 
“property” to be construed as a fundamental right “qualifying for heightened judicial protection” 
under substantive due process.  These are: “liberties...‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’” 
(such that liberty itself would be meaningless absent their protection); and liberties “‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’”225 (here is what Halley means when she says 
Bowers sounded an ominous note for constitutional advocates of women’s rights).  “Neither of 
these formulations,” White declares, “extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in 
acts of consensual sodomy.”  He further argues that such a conclusion would over-extend the 
authority of the Court to “discover” rights not textually indicated in the Fourteenth Amendment.   
White frames these “textual”226 claims as conclusions of law—but I read them as dicta 
arguments.  The language necessary to White’s ultimate finding is a different set of 
“doctrinal”227 arguments in in the opinion.   White does not actually determine whether there is a 
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“fundamental right...to engage in acts of consensual sodomy” itself, but rather whether the 
Eleventh Circuit was accurate in applying the precedent of various “right to privacy” decisions to 
construe the “Constitution to confer a right of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy.”228  
The Justice compares, in turn, the putative “right to sodomize” with the “rights announced” in 
the cases cited by the Eleventh Circuit, but this comparison belies the fact that each of these 
rights is a component of the right to privacy.229  The respondents (Hardwick and John and Mary 
Doe) do not, as White claims, urge the Court cast “aside” precedent and “announce, as the Court 
of Appeals did, a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.”230  Here White uses what 
I call framing dicta to obfuscate detailed doctrinal arguments in the respondent’s brief and 
dissenting opinions that the majority does not directly respond to.   
What White refers to as a demand to recognize an aprecedential right to sodomize is 
actually the respondent’s (Hardwick’s) claim that Hardwick’s actions are protected as a 
fundamental right under the already recognized “constitutional protection for the associational 
intimacies of private life in the sanctuary of the home,”231 or in other words, the “decisional and 
spatial aspects of the right to privacy” taken up in Blackmun’s dissent and parts of Kennedy’s 
opinion in Lawrence.232  The respondents’ arguments about the relationship between Hardwick’s 
actions and “liberties ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’” do not say that engaging in 
homosexual sodomy is, as a thing in itself, an inherent component of liberty per se.  It is so, but 
only in the context of relational intimacy.  As Stevens argues, the decision about whether or not 
to have sex with someone is one of the decisions about life that can be construed as fundamental 
to the zone of “intimate relationships” and personal decisions protected under the right to 
privacy.233  Sex alone might necessarily indicate a relationship (Stevens and Kennedy both seem 
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to think to does), but if there can be sex without a relationship it does not fall under privacy, and 
is not a right.   
What I call White’s framing dicta works a technique to discredit the precedential 
arguments of the respondent and the Bowers II dissents.  The dicta-frame becomes the warrant 
for White’s argumentative construction of an alternative genealogy of the same precedents that 
both the majority and the dissent agree are most likely controlling on the question of whether the 
case implicates Hardwick’s fundamental rights.  White and Burger’s insistence that recognition 
of a right to sodomy runs contrary to the will of the people and the long history and tradition of 
U.S. and English constitutional and common law234 does not initially make sense, given that, as 
Blackmun says, the case is not about a right to engage in sodomy.  But when read as framing 
dicta, White and Burger’s characterization of the question of the case in this way allows their 
historical arguments to become the warrant for White’s alternate genealogy of the precedent in 
the Court’s previous privacy rights cases.   
In White’s precedential genealogy, the privacy rights cases do not speak to and cannot be 
construed broadly in terms of a “certain private sphere of individual liberty.”235  Rather, they 
speak to a right to privacy in the zone of “family, marriage, and procreation.”  White offers no 
evidence for his claim that “no connection between these” and “homosexual activity...has been 
demonstrated” by the Eleventh Circuit or the respondents.236  The evidence is rather in White’s 
rhetorical framing of queer sex as the historically demonstrably immoral act of sodomy, which, 
tautologically, is the warrant to White’s argumentative construction of his heterosexist 
precedential genealogy of the right to privacy (a genealogy that is implicitly inclusive of the 
entire precedential history of § 16-6-2).  Through a mix of historical and doctrinal arguments, 
White finds that the construal of activities as rights of privacy must in deference to precedent be 
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exclusive of activities that are demonstrably immoral and unnatural in the history of law.  
White’s dicta frame may as well be a citation of Bloodworth’s logic in Comer v. State: Gay sex 
is immoral and unnatural in the history of law, and so it cannot be a component of any privacy 
right.  Accordingly, I read the opening statement in Blackmun’s dissent not as a doctrinal 
correction to White’s decision-making framework, but rather as a winking acknowledgment that 
White knows very well what the case is about, and Blackmun knows very well why White 
chooses to frame it in the way that he does.       
The doctrinal argument central to White’s conclusion of law thus relies on a converse 
(gay sex is mutually exclusive to the protected private zone of “family, marriage, and 
procreation”) of the warrants to the doctrinal argument of Blackmun’s and Stevens’ dissents, and 
later Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence (gay sex is a species of the relational intimacy protected as 
analogous to the private zone of “family, marriage, and procreation”).  Echoing Puar’s critique of 
Kennedy’s decision to take “‘the broader privacy argument’ over the ‘narrower equal-protection 
argument,’” Eng argues that “Kennedy’s majority opinion underscores the right to privacy as the 
sine qua non of gay and lesbian self-determination.”237  I agree, but would append “in U.S. due 
process jurisprudence.”  The issue, as Puar identifies, is between equal protection and due 
process, rather than privacy or not privacy.  Eng implies that White’s framing of Bowers II in 
terms of a right to sodomize is something that Kennedy could have directly taken up without the 
need to define sodomy in terms of heterosexual intimacy, thereby “desexualizing 
homosexuality...in the political-legal realm.”238  Why not simply accept White’s decisional 
framework, and reverse it to recognize a right to sodomy?  But if Kennedy had taken up White’s 
question of the “fundamental right to engage in sodomy,” this counterfactual Lawrence majority 
would likely have looked very similar to the real one.   
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Before Hardwick ever brought suit, the “shift from sodomy to intimacy” was already 
indicated in the Court’s prior decisions to articulate a fundamental right to make certain 
decisions in terms of a right to privacy, and also to find such a right of privacy only in those 
situations where the decision’s central importance to a person’s life and/or relationship could be 
demonstrated.  Kennedy could have taken up the “right to sodomy”—or the right to make a 
decision to have sex—dissociatively, severing its relationship from privacy as two separate rights 
construed from the guarantee of substantive due process.  Eng’s counterfactual exploration of 
what Lawrence would look like in this scenario is a valuable tool in a broader radical critique of 
privacy in judicial rhetoric about sexuality—and one that I make use of at the end of Chapter 
Three.  My point here is simply that Kennedy’s argumentative choice to articulate a right to 
sodomy separate from privacy would be in addition to his choice to accept White’s decisional 
framework in Bowers—the most reasonable and predictable way for Kennedy to talk about a 
“right to sodomy” would still be in the context of a right to privacy.  
While much of Kennedy’s opinion certainly focuses on the “spatial” aspect of privacy in 
the case of Lawrence and Garner (focusing on the assumed act’s occurrence in a private 
dwelling), this focus also demonstrates the importance of (following Blackmun and Stevens in 
Bowers II), Kennedy’s separate affirmations of Lawrence and Garner’s protected status in terms 
of the “decisional” right to privacy.  Kennedy speaks of the decisional component of privacy in 
heteronormatively grandiloquent terms.  But doctrinally, the precedential genealogy he invokes 
hearkens back to the Blackmun and Stevens Bowers II dissents, as well as Laurence Tribe’s brief 
for Hardwick and John and Mary Doe, in which the protection of the spatial right to privacy—
thus requiring that a protected sex act take place in a private home—is useful but not per se 
necessary for the finding that the “decisional” component applies as well.   
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In all of the cases I take up here, the example of judicial opinion that contains the most 
useful discussion of privacy and intimacy from a radical queer perspective is Blackmun’s 
Bowers II dissent.  Stevens would strongly limit the decisional right of privacy in cases of sex to 
the space of the private home.239  Blackmun instead argues that while the Court tends to think of 
the “decisional” component of privacy in terms of marriage, family, procreation, etc., decisional 
privacy does not need to implicate these things.  For Blackmun, the reason the Court has 
recognized the decisional component of privacy as a fundamental right only when it can be 
located in these particular spatial realms is not because the Court sees decisional privacy as 
necessarily a subordinated component of spatial.  Rather, it is because the Court has sought to 
protect the public benefit inherent in allowing individuals to make unregulated decisions when 
“they form so central a part of an individual’s life.”240—that the Court has, in the past, 
understood the importance of such decisions in primarily spatial terms does not mean that they 
must always do so.   
Here, Blackmun’s doctrinal argumentative frame suggests a latent radical “opening” for 
radical queer politics in his repudiation of White’s specifically heteronormative precedential 
genealogy of privacy.  I quote the Justice’s dissent at length to illustrate my point:   
We protect those rights [associated with heterosexual inter-family decision-making] 
because they form so central a part of an individual's life.  “[T]he concept of privacy 
embodies the ‘moral fact that a person belongs to himself, and not others nor to society as 
a whole’”...only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is 
‘a sensitive, key relationship of human existence’...the fact that individuals define 
themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with others 
suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many “right” ways of 
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conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will come 
from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely 
personal bonds...in a variety of circumstances, we have recognized that a necessary 
corollary of giving individuals freedom to choose how to conduct their lives is 
acceptance of the fact that different individuals will make different choices.241  
Blackmun still seems to need, ideologically, to connect the decision to have sex with a person of 
the same sex with the notion of an intimate relationship—his rhetorical framing here certainly 
participates in a heterocentrist politics of desexualization, and the sanitizing of non-normative 
queer sexuality.  But Blackmun, like Kennedy after him, still offers a latent constitutional 
rhetorical resource for future decisions that might seek to articulate a less ideologically 
constrained version of the decision to have sex—regardless of the act’s  spatial location—as a 
right of privacy.  
If a petitioner seeks to force recognition of a queer political subject before U.S. 
constitutional law, and so force the state to pass a more rigorous test to justify regulation and 
criminalization of queer persons and lives per se, the most evident and likely to succeed 
argumentative resources to do so in the context of due process jurisprudence are in the 
“decisional and spatial aspects of the right to privacy.”  The practical result of the critical queer 
narrative about Lawrence is to suggest, as Puar does, that Kennedy, like O’Connor, should have 
eschewed due process in favor of equal protection as the basis for the Lawrence majority.  Again, 
the choice is between equal protection or due process.  Given due process analysis, the 
precedential history of Lawrence demonstrates that in the judicial rhetoric of substantive due 
process, there are few argumentative resources for a judicial articulation of “gay and lesbian self-
determination” through an avenue other than decisional privacy.242  The question then becomes, 
  106 
again: what are the comparative implications of due process and equal protection arguments 
from the perspective of radical queer politics?  
VIII.  A Queer Comparison of Due Process and Equal Protection, via Strict Scrutiny 
 
The primary importance that Kennedy attaches to the Due Process Clauses is largely 
absent in recent court decisions in favor of the legalization of same-sex marriage.  I take up some 
examples here prior to a more detailed analysis in Chapter Three.  Partly in response to The 
Supreme Court of California’s May 15, 2008 ruling in In re Marriage Cases,243 California voters 
passed the “Proposition 8” initiative banning same-sex marriage in November 2008.244  On 
August 4th, 2010, Judge Vaughn R. Walker of the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California ruled in Perry v. Schwarzenegger that “Proposition 8 is unconstitutional 
under both the Due Process 245  and Equal Protection 246  Clauses” of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.247  Chapter Three will explore some more queerly positive invocations of equal 
protection.  But for now, the juxtaposition between on the one hand, Kennedy’s invocation of 
due process in the context of his marriage-analogies in Lawrence, and on the other the equal 
protection arguments in O’Connor’s separate concurring opinion in Lawrence, and Walker’s 
opinion in Perry demonstrate that even given the critical queer narrative about Lawrence, 
Kennedy’s reliance on due process is still far more hopeful to the future articulation of a 
radically nominalist queer subjectivity before the law. 
For O’Connor, the key difference between the Texas and Georgia statutes is that while 
Texas explicitly forbade sex between two men, the Georgia law in question in Bowers outlawed 
the practice of sodomy under any circumstance.248  O’Connor implicitly rejects Kennedy’s 
arguments that the issue in question in both cases is a fundamental right to liberty in “individual 
decisions . . .  concerning the intimacies of their physical relationships” (regardless of the 
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identity of the adults participating in those relationships), and that these decisions are thus “a 
form of ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”249  By 
refusing to recognize the “petitioner’s right to liberty under the Due Process Clause” and relying 
instead on equal protection, O’Connor, in the context of gay and lesbian civil rights, echoes the 
famous argumentative logic of the Court’s 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, which held that 
as a Louisiana law requiring blacks and whites to travel in separate train cars applied equally to 
both races, it was not unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.250   
Equal protection analysis that is not at least accompanied by due process arguments 
allows for decisions that not only uphold but valorize oppressive and discriminatory policies, so 
long as the Court can argue that the deprivation of liberty in the case at hand is not specifically 
targeted against a particular group.  This is how O’Connor can simultaneously find that “the 
[Texas] sodomy law” is unconstitutional because it “is targeted at more than conduct.  It is 
instead targeted at gay persons as a class,”251 and argue that because the Georgia statute outlaws 
all sodomy, it discriminates against no particular class of people.252  Here I succumb to my own 
“like race” analogy to say that just as the Plessy Court was able to use equal protection to ignore 
differentials in racial power and privilege in Louisiana,253 O’Connor uses equal protection to 
argue that a law outlawing all forms of sex that are not penis in vagina intercourse is not 
discriminatory.  O’Connor’s analysis ignores, of course, the fact that while the Georgia statute at 
issue in Bowers prevented heterosexuals from having certain kinds of intercourse, it by definition 
outlawed any form of gay and lesbian sex—a definitional reality constructed through several 
decades of legal rhetorical debate about and negotiation of the meaning of § 16-6-2 by the 
Georgia legislature and judiciary.   
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Both O’Connor’s application of equal protection and Kennedy’s application of due 
process rely on liberal valuations of privacy and individual liberty that are problematic to radical 
queer politics, but given the inevitability of Supreme Court decisions on these questions, due 
process is far less detrimental, and not only because O’Connor’s concurring opinion has been 
specifically damaging to the ability of Lawrence to effect legislative change toward “mainstream” 
gay and lesbian civil rights.254  Kennedy’s insistence on the controlling nature of substantive due 
process in both Bowers and Lawrence255 rhetorically enacts a future vision of a Constitution that 
is far more able to be a resource for future judges who would respond in nuanced fashion to the 
various ways in which U.S. state governments might think to deprive lesbian, gay, and queer 
subjects of liberty—including via the sodomy laws that are still on the books, in defiance of both 
Kennedy and O’Connor’s opinions.     
Just as importantly, Kennedy’s application of due process in the Lawrence decision, 
unlike the application of equal protection in the marriage cases and O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Lawrence, does not rely on the definition and explanation of certain sexual minorities as “suspect” 
classes.  Instead, Kennedy locates the liberty in question in terms of a right that is not only 
fundamental to all, but open to continual future redefinition against statist and institutional 
efforts to redefine the bounds of legal heteronormative oppression.      
In both state and federal constitutional law, the “guarantee of equal protection 
coexists . . .with the reality that most legislation must classify for some purpose or another.”256  
Legal classification and differential treatment cannot per se be unconstitutional, or few laws 
would survive judicial review.  As I note above, due process jurisprudence requires state 
interference in a “fundamental right” in order to activate higher levels of judicial scrutiny than 
the rational basis test.  The Court’s focus is thus more likely to be on the nature of the activity in 
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question, rather than on the nature of the identity of the person the state deprives of liberty.  This 
is perhaps why White was compelled to employ the framing dicta that he did, even though the 
tenor of his arguments suggests that what White really wanted to do was deny Hardwick 
protection of law because he was queer.  Due process jurisprudence is an anti-essentialist process.  
Equal protection jurisprudence is (often) the opposite.   
If a court finds that a law targets a “suspect class”257 (a group designated for unequal 
treatment under the law because of a suspect classification), “strict scrutiny” review is typically 
applied, meaning, again, that the law must be “narrowly tailored to a compelling government 
interest”258 that outweighs the negative consequences of the suspect classification.  In the context 
of assessing the scope of equal protection, this functionally means that courts engage in a 
limiting function, reproducing processes of liberal definition that often259 result more in a 
shifting of the boundaries of exclusion and inclusion than they do in a lessening of the normative 
power of the state.260  To advance an equal rights claim in the courts, petitions to the state for 
justice must be made on behalf of a particular kind of essentialist identity that can at best be an 
incomplete stand-in for the “radical undecidability”261 of radical queer political being.262     
This limiting function is evident in Walker’s arguments about marriage in Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger.  Arguing that restrictive marriage laws are not a simple example of sex 
discrimination, but a disenfranchisement of a definable class of people, Walker first stipulates 
that sex and sexual orientation are necessarily interrelated, as “an individual’s choice of romantic 
or intimate partner based on sex is a large part of what defines an individual’s sexual 
orientation.”263  In the next paragraph, Walker argues that 
Those who choose to marry someone of the opposite sex—heterosexuals—do not have 
their choice of marital partner restricted by Proposition 8. Those who would choose to 
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marry someone of the same sex—homosexuals—have had their right to marry eliminated 
by an amendment to the state constitution.264  
For Walker, it is not only that gays and lesbians are “similarly situated” to heterosexuals vis-à-
vis marriage, rendering legal classifications targeting them for discrimination suspect, but that 
gay and lesbian identity itself should be defined in part through the desire for entrance into the 
institution of marriage.  
Walker, however, does not choose (in his equal protection analysis) to apply strict 
scrutiny review to Proposition 8, arguing that, following Kennedy’s 1996 opinion for the Court 
in Romer v. Evans,265 a law based on “moral disapproval alone” cannot survive even rational 
basis review.266  Establishing that Proposition 8 targets gays and lesbians as a suspect class was 
thus unnecessary even for Walker’s ultimate legal finding with respect to equal protection267––a 
point further evidenced, as I discuss in the Chapter Three, by the narrow grounds on which the 
Ninth Circuit chose to uphold Walker’s ruling in what had become Perry v. Brown.268  In this 
light, Walker’s entire discussion of the relationship between sexual orientation, marriage, and 
identity is arguably dicta—Walker’s provision of a justification for the application of higher 
levels of review in possible future decisions.  What is interesting about Walker’s equal protection 
arguments is the implicit suggestion that in the context of judicial decisions about marriage and 
sexuality, making a compelling argument from equal protection almost necessitates (if not an 
explicit conflation of queer identity with the marriage institution) at least the valuation of queer 
lives and relationship practices only and restrictively within heterosexual marriage norms, even if 
this valuation is doctrinally unnecessary to the finding of the case.  
 Due process argumentation does not so necessitate, even when the entire subject of the 
case is about access to marriage.  In contrast to the “suspect classification” requirement for an 
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equal protection finding, a judicial application of strict scrutiny in substantive due process 
analysis requires only the presence of “fundamental rights.”269  The “parties” in Perry “do not 
dispute that the right to marry is fundamental”270 and it is for Walker a doctrinal given that “the 
freedom to marry is recognized as a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause.”271  
That “freedom to marry is a fundamental right” was decided in case law long before a major 
public debate about same-sex marriage.   
Consequently, Walker frames the due process question of Perry as simply if “plaintiffs 
seek to exercise the fundamental right to marry”; if the answer is yes, and not “recognition of a 
new right” because of their identity as “couples of the same sex,” then Proposition 8 is 
unconstitutional regardless of the equal protection findings of the case.272  As Walker argues in 
the due process section of Perry,    
To characterize plaintiffs’ objective as “the right to same-sex marriage” would suggest 
that plaintiffs seek something different from what opposite-sex couples across the state 
enjoy—namely, marriage. Rather, plaintiffs ask California to recognize their relationships 
for what they are: marriages.273  
From a radical queer standpoint, any judicial decision on marriage equality will almost certainly 
represent a problematic reification of Puar’s “homonormativity.”274  What is evident in the 
contrast between Walker’s arguments from due process and his arguments from equal protection 
is that even in jurisprudential rhetoric about marriage, due process analysis is simply less 
inconsistent with radical queer theory’s nominalist critique of normative identity politics.   
IX.  Conclusion: A Radical Queer Epistemology of Rational Basis 
Puar is correct that much of Lawrence seeks to define and classify queer identity in 
“domestinormative” terms.  Kennedy’s ultimate legal finding that in the context of his due 
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process analysis that “the Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual”275 establishes no doctrinal precedent 
for the constitutional protection of queer public life.  But as in Blackmun’s dissent, Kennedy’s 
definition and classification earlier in the decision of queer identity in terms of heterosexual 
relationship norms is not strictly necessary to the ultimate legal finding of the case.  White’s, 
Blackmun’s, and Stevens’ opinions in Bowers did not stop at the question of whether Hardwick’s 
actions were construable under his fundamental right to privacy.  Each opinion also took up 
Laurence Tribe’s request in the Brief for Respondents that (while the only question the Supreme 
Court needed to decide was the presence of a fundamental right, thus necessitating the trial 
ordered by the Eleventh Circuit) the Court also take up the question of whether there was any 
rational basis for the enforcement of § 16-6-2 on Hardwick, and if not, to rule the statute 
unconstitutional. 
 
Given this precedential context, it is likely that the statement “the Texas statute furthers 
no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the 
individual” is actually Kennedy’s concise application of the rational basis test.  If so, this 
sentence is Kennedy’s argument that even if there was no violation of Lawrence and Garner’s 
fundamental rights, their arrest was still a violation of the constitutional guarantee of substantive 
due process.  If this is the case, then almost all of Kennedy’s opinion with respect to the Texas 
statute—including his arguments that appear to constrain constitutionally recognized queer sex 
to the constrained realm of heterosexual-like intimacy—is actually gratis dictum, and Kennedy’s 
meta-arguments about the future application of the Due Process Clauses accordingly take on 
greater importance.  This rational basis argument in Lawrence does not occur in a vacuum—it is 
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a component part of what I argue is a latent radical queer “opening” not just in Kennedy’s due 
process, but his overall Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.   
The opinions of Kennedy and Blackmun are representative of the radical queer potential 
of due process jurisprudence, read against the heteronormative frame through which due process 
arguments about sexuality will for the present moment inevitably be articulated.  Due process 
jurisprudence, while constrained by the deep limitations of the Constitution for any kind of 
radical politics, at least allows for a partial constitutional recognition of the mutable and political 
nature of identity.  Here is a future vision of constitutional law that can be aligned in favor of a 
Constitution that stands as a “perhaps even forever unknowable”276 legal resource for the 
struggle against violently heteronormative oppression.  Even significant (from a constitutional 
perspective) doctrinal change will not adequately address “informal” hetero and other normative 
citizenship structures that pervade and constrain the conditions of meaningful life in the United 
States.277  Precisely because of this, radical queer rhetorical legal scholarship needs to include 
procedural queer considerations of the relative positive and negative impact different forms of 
constitutional judicial argument and doctrinal interpretation might have to the substantive goal of 
radical resistance to the dominant sovereignty of U.S. constitutional law.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE “CORROSIVE CATEGORY OF RACE”: KENNEDY’S 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RHETORIC AND THE IDEA OF THE POST-RACIAL 
QUEER  
   
“At least in Seattle, racial balancing is a compelling goddam state interest.”1 
- Jen Graves, The Stranger 
 
In this Chapter, I respond to what I see as the optimistic turn of Chapter One with a more 
explicitly queer of color political corrective.  When read through an assembled “collocation”2 of 
Kennedy’s Fourteenth Amendment rhetoric, the possibility of a radical legal queer subject latent 
in Kennedy’s meta-argumentative framing of substantive due process in Lawrence v. Texas is 
dependent on the unspoken idea of what I call a post-racial queer subject of U.S. constitutional 
law.  I demonstrate this argument through a detailed examination of Kennedy’s role in the recent 
parallel development of “colorblind” and “post-racial” theories of equal protection jurisprudence, 
before turning at the end of the chapter to a specific analysis of what I argue should be read as 
Kennedy’s “meta-argument” about the relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and 
possibilities for subjectivity before the law of the U.S. constitutional state.  
I.  A Pessimistic Turn  
In Chapter One, I argue that Justice Kennedy’s particular argumentative framing of 
substantive due process in Lawrence v. Texas is more useful to radical queer politics than the 
arguments from equal protection foregrounded by Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion. 
While arguments from equal protection are often reliant on essentialist processes of liberal 
identification, substantive due process analysis in cases concerning gay and lesbian civil rights is 
simply less inconsistent with radical queer theories of identity.3  When a judicial rhetor applies 
the “strict scrutiny” test via arguments from due process, she is unlikely to find a need to 
articulate the subjective nature of the petitioners to whom the Court extends the protection of the 
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Constitution, because substantive due process is a negative check against state interference with 
fundamental rights of liberty.  Most equal protection arguments, on the other hand, necessitate 
the judicial rhetorical definition and thus delimitation of a “suspect class” of persons who are 
treated differentially under the law.  I therefore identify parts of Kennedy’s substantive due 
process analysis in his Lawrence opinion, and Justice Blackmun’s substantive due process 
analysis in his Bowers v. Hardwick dissent, that suggest future possibilities for subjectless 
appeals for the protection of sovereign law. 
Kennedy’s due process arguments in Lawrence also participate in what David L. Eng 
calls the “racialization of intimacy”4 through an anti-radical, “queer liberal” valuation of privacy 
rights.  “Kennedy’s majority opinion,” Eng argues, “underscores the right to privacy as the sine 
qua non of gay and lesbian self-determination.”5  In response, I suggest that because the “right to 
privacy” is the most likely way in which due process protection for queer sex can be articulated, 
there is a critical need to develop a radical perspective on what possibilities might yet exist for 
queer of color politics even within the current privacy focus of substantive due process rhetoric.  
This need derives in part from my argument that when contrasted with O’Connor’s equal 
protection arguments, Kennedy’s particular argumentative framing of substantive due process in 
Lawrence is still less problematic from the perspective of radical queer politics.   
In 1989, the Critical Race Feminist Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw argued for a centering 
of the “multidimensionality of Black women’s experience” against the “single-axis framework”6 
through which Black women are forced to approach the bench as petitioners for judicial 
protection—that is, as either Black persons or female persons before the law.7  The possibility 
for a subjectless substantive due process jurisprudence that I suggest in Chapter One would be an 
interesting corrective to single-axis judicial institutions, in the context of “multidimensional” 
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queer of color subjectivity.  While judicial protections for non-marital but potentially marriage-
like (dyadic, monogamous, long-term, religious, etc.) queer kinship relations are articulated 
through the doctrine of the “right to privacy,” they may also in the future constitute a possible 
space of legal approachability wherein subjects may be free to articulate their own subjective 
“self-understandings”—and demand the Court respond accordingly––or else alternatively be free 
to engage in no such articulation at all.  This may be a component of what Eng seeks in a legal 
doctrine that could realize, citing Janet E. Halley, “the possibility of moving beyond liberal 
identity-based frameworks in order to emphasize not ‘who we are but how we are thought.’”8      
I make an argument for this possibility in Kennedy’s argumentative framing of 
substantive due process jurisprudence, and I juxtapose this possibility in the context of due 
process against what I see as a corollary anti-possibility in judicial rhetorics of equal protection.  
But my comparison in Chapter One, grounded in Kennedy’s judicial rhetoric, elides an important 
part of the Justice’s jurisprudential archive, one that seems almost as if it had been (although of 
course it was not) deliberately “crafted to make room for...particularly queer...understandings of 
sexual orientation in civil rights discourse.”9  In her reading of Kennedy’s 1996 opinion for the 
Court in Romer v. Evans, Janet E. Halley argues that the Justice “adopts an extreme form” of 
queer “nominalist” politics,10 given that Kennedy was able to find a way to declare an anti-gay 
policy unconstitutional without any need to define the nature of the legally legitimate and 
constitutionally protected gay legal subject.  Writing three years before Lawrence, Halley is 
“uncertain whether Romer’s nominalism will appear in other equal protection decisions.”11  In 
Chapter One, I argue that it does, but in a due process decision that is juxtaposed to an anti-
nominalist version of equal protection that stands in stark contrast to Romer.  From this 
confluence—of Kennedy’s arguments in Romer, and his arguments in Lawrence—it would be 
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tempting to argue for the existence of a (critic-realized) Kennedy meta-text of a queer Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence, a text composed of rhetorical fragments of Romer and Lawrence that 
consist of the total set of (mostly dicta) arguments Kennedy makes about the relationship 
between the Fourteenth Amendment (both due process and equal protection), and the manner in 
which the Supreme Court’s Justices should execute their sovereign responsibility to extend 
constitutional protection to legally de-realized subjects before the law. 
Arguing for the existence of such a (meta) text would be an optimistic move—an attempt 
at the Butlerian praxis of, as I note in the introduction, “opening [of] possibilities” for the “field” 
of legal subjectivity even to those whose identifications are constituted as “unrealizable” within 
that same field.12  The present Chapter will be less optimistic.  The “queer understanding of 
sexual orientation” enabled by the nominalist subject-politics of Kennedy’s Romer arguments is 
an anti-queer of color form, one that depends on, as Reddy argues, a “refus[al] to engage [the] 
racial conditions” of that understanding.  I argue that these racial conditions are enacted in part 
by Kennedy’s similarly constructed equal protection framing arguments in his concurring 
opinion for the Court in Parents Involved In Community Schools v. Seattle School District no. 1 
(551 U.S. 701, 2007). Kennedy’s opinions in Romer and Lawrence are ostensibly about sexuality, 
analogically related to race; his opinion in Parents Involved is explicitly about race with no 
connection to sexuality.  Following the example of Siobhan B. Somerville’s analysis of Loving v. 
Virginia, I take up all three here as concomitantly about both forms of legal identification.  In the 
following sections, I read Kennedy’s Fourteenth Amendment framing arguments in Romer, 
Lawrence, and Parents Involved “sideways”13 (as Somerville advocates) as component parts of a 
critic-constructed meta-text of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.  Read through this 
constructed meta-text, the conditions of queer subjective freedom before law suggested in Romer 
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and Lawrence are inseparably linked and enabled by a “color-blind” constitutionalist politics of 
racial minority subjectivity before law that is constituted through the rhetoric of Kennedy’s and 
Chief Justice John Roberts separate and majority opinions in Parents Involved.   
Kennedy’s Parents Involved opinion is a component part of the Justice’s broader 
rhetorical framing of the Supreme Court’s response to anti-racist policies in terms of a particular 
and peculiar version of what is called “color-bind constitutionalism.”  This peculiar project 
began to be fully realized in Kennedy’s dissent to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s opinion in 
Grutter v. Bollinger.  Before I turn specifically to Parents Involved, and then my reading of 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in that case together with Romer and Lawrence, I therefore begin 
with a substantial introductory aside about the Supreme Court’s explicitly argumentative debate 
about the relationship between equal protection and race in Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger.    
II.  The Michigan Cases: An Introduction 
In 2003 (the term of the Lawrence v. Texas decision) the Supreme Court decided two 
challenges to the University of Michigan’s use of race in its undergraduate and law school 
admissions policies, with Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist 
filing the Court’s responses to each challenge on June 23.  The “Michigan cases”14 (and their 
direct ancestor in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke)15 are among the best recent 
demonstrations of judicial rhetoric’s potential for material-political effectivity.  Just as there was 
following Justice Lewis F. Powell’s 1978 opinion for a divided Court in Bakke,16 there is a clear 
causal relationship between Rehnquist and O’Connor’s “confusing”17 but nonetheless definitive 
demarcation of constitutionally acceptable and unacceptable ways to write public university 
admissions policies;18 and a recent series of rapid policy shifts by the nation’s leading public 
universities.19  The Michigan cases are also significant to the related but once-removed struggle 
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over K-12 school integration policy at the municipal level of public school districts.  I therefore 
begin with substantial attention to these cases, because the rhetorical frameworks through which 
O’Connor, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and the other dissenting and concurring Justices articulate their 
arguments in both Gratz and Grutter function as limiting and enabling constraints in the judicial 
rhetorical situation in which Kennedy delivers his 2007 concurring opinion in Parents Involved 
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. 
In Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court found that Michigan’s use of race in undergraduate 
admissions failed to meet the strict scrutiny standard for a constitutional use of “racial 
classifications” under the Equal Protection Clause.  Passing on an opportunity to explicitly rule 
on the legitimacy of the “[University of Michigan’s] asserted compelling interest in diversity,”20 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist was content in his majority opinion to find that the 
undergraduate admissions policy failed the first half of the strict scrutiny test’s requirement for 
the policy to be “narrowly tailored to achieve” the “asserted compelling interest” 21  in 
“educational diversity that [Michigan] claims justifies their program.”22  Simultaneously, in 
Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court determined that Michigan’s law school admissions policy did 
meet the strict scrutiny standard on both sides of the test23 (Rehnquist also declined to directly 
address the compelling interest question in his dissent to O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter).24  
Unlike Rehnquist, O’Connor in Grutter did see fit to rule on the question of diversity as a 
“compelling interest”; in fact, while Rehnquist describes the Court’s grant of certiorari in Gratz 
as the simple decision to rule on a disputed question of Fourteenth Amendment law25 (eschewing 
the Petitioners’ repeated invitations to the Court to rule that an “interest in diversity” is per se not 
a “compelling state interest”26), O’Connor explicitly frames the Court’s decision to take up the 
case in Grutter in terms of the political exigence27 of addressing a “question of national 
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importance:” “whether diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use 
of race in selecting applicants for admission to public universities.”28  The process by which the 
Court actually decides to review one case and not many others is highly influenced by U.S. 
partisan and other political-cultural concerns beyond the most immediate purview of 
constitutional law.  The role of politics in Supreme Court decisionmaking, however, should not 
be taken as a replacement for, but rather a component of, the legal reasoning that remains at the 
heart of Court decisions regarding review.29  While a combination of political and doctrinal 
imperatives to grant review was undoubtedly at play in Gratz as well as Grutter, it is O’Connor 
in Grutter and not Rehnquist in Gratz who decides to frame the the legal exigence of the Court’s 
decision to grant judicial review in explicitly broad political terms.   
“Whether diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of 
race” is a question of constitutional interpretation that inspired significant “disagreement among 
the Courts of Appeals;”30 as such, there are explicit jurisprudential31 reasons for the Court to take 
up the case.  But O’Connor made the doctrinally unnecessary (because disagreement among 
lower courts would be enough) decision to argue that the compelling interest question in Grutter 
is particularly ripe for final review (in implicit comparison to the many other cases in the 539 
term in which the Court did not grant cert) because of its status as a “question of national 
importance.”  O’Connor’s argumentative choice functions as the suggestion—weighty in its 
origin at the powerfully constitutive pulpit of the United States Bench—that the relationship 
between the Equal Protection Clause and the use of race in University admissions policies is 
partially determinative of the nature of the U.S. polity itself.  
Francis J. Mootz finds the judicial rhetoric of the Michigan opinions to be wonderful 
examples of, as I discuss in the introduction, rhetorically rather than analytically framed 
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“arguments as arguments.”32  The contrast between Rehnquist and O’Connor’s stated exigencies 
of judicial review in Gratz and Grutter is not one of the examples Mootz offers in support of this 
claim.  But I think this particular O’Connor/Rehnquist contrast plays an important role in Mootz’ 
observation as to the Michigan cases’ rhetorical effect, wherein “the discourse of affirmative 
action changed after Grutter and Gratz,” a change that both “reflects and constitutes a changed 
reality”33 in the realpolitik of U.S. public education policy.  This change is two-fold: first, the 
Michigan Cases functioned as a spark for additional challenges affirmative action admissions 
policies; and second, these cases—basically on their own—completed a shift in University 
policy concerning race away from working against racism, and toward working for diversity.34    
O’Connor’s statement about the decision to grant review is arguably dicta—in the senses 
that: it was not (as I note above) a necessary justification for the Court’s issue of cert in the case; 
and because the reason the Court decided to grant review in Gratz and Grutter does not change 
the immediate effect of O’Connor’s or Rehnquist’s conclusions of law with respect to whether 
Michigan’s admissions policies are constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.  What is 
not dicta is O’Connor’s decision to rule on the “compelling interest” half of the test at all, given 
that: first, the Grutter Court is highly deferential to the Law School’s own statements of its 
interests in maintaining the program,35 rendering (as Justice Thomas astutely notes in his 
separate Grutter opinion)36 the evaluation of those interests possibly moot to the Court’s 
decision; and second, that none of the concurring opinions in Gratz or dissenting opinions in 
Grutter explicitly refutes the University’s claim to a compelling interest in enacting both of its 
admissions policies.37   
In a judge’s rhetorical construction of an argumentative framework for her decision, 
“framing the question at issue is not a matter of demarcating the perspicacious features of the 
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world-in-itself that can later be investigated, but rather is the activity of rhetorical engagement 
that provides us with a world in the first instance.”38  Because the Grutter majority could have 
upheld the admissions policy based on narrow tailoring arguments alone, O’Connor’s doctrinal 
choice to explicitly rule on the compelling interest half of the test—regardless of the language 
she uses to frame the imperative of that choice—thus functions on its own as the argumentative 
framework determinative of the overall Grutter ruling’s future social, political, and cultural 
effects.  That is, O’Connor’s choice to wade into the “compelling interest” debate at all locates 
the decision in Grutter (and implicitly, in Gratz as well) within a rhetorically constructed 
precedential genealogy—the specific nature of which, O’Connor argues through her earlier 
decision to frame the Court’s imperative to rule at all in political terms, should be determinative 
of the relationship between racial identity, diversity, and the public good in the United States.  
Kennedy’s repudiation of this precedential genealogy, as I will argue, would become central to 
his implicit construction, through Parents Involved, of a post-racial queer subject before the law.     
O’Connor’s adjectival phrase “of national importance” is, accordingly, quite significant.  
The debate in Grutter between O’Connor, and Kennedy and Rehnquist (her direct dissenters) is a 
textbook example of a disputed frame of the “question at issue.”39  Neither Kennedy nor 
Rehnquist dispute40 O’Connor’s conclusion that “student body diversity is a compelling state 
interest that can justify the use of race in University admissions.”41  While an implied objection 
can be read into the close of Rehnquist’s dissent,42 Kennedy goes so far as to applaud the Grutter 
Court’s decision to affirm the theoretical constitutionality of the narrowly tailored use of race in 
efforts to increase “racial [minority]”’s access to “educational opportunities.”43  Kennedy and 
Rehnquist’s position is that O’Connor fails in her application of strict scrutiny, because a truly 
rigorous judicial review of the policy would not simply accept (as they say O’Connor does), but 
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rather rigorously test (as they say they do)44 the accuracy of the Michigan Law School’s 
assertion45 that its interest in a race-inclusive admissions policy is solely in “‘obtaining’”46 “‘the 
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.’”47   
In other words, Kennedy and Rehnquist argue that O’Connor’s application of strict 
scrutiny is “nothing short of perfunctory,”48 because the Justice literally allows the Law School 
to deceive her49 into asking and answering the wrong question of law.  The Law School’s real 
interest, the Chief Justice and Kennedy argue, is not at all in a “diverse student body” narrowly 
conceived (the interest that O’Connor and Kennedy agree can in theory be achieved through a 
narrowly tailored race inclusive admissions policy) but rather in “‘racial balancing,’” which 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Rehnquist all agree is established in strong precedent as “patently 
unconstitutional” under the Equal Protection Clause.50 
I find it difficult at this point to overlook the apparent gendered dynamics of this 
exchange, wherein two rightist male Justices take their conservative colleague Sandra Day 
O’Connor to task for what they allege is an inexcusable error in her constitutional judgment.  It is 
one thing for a dissenting Justice to express anger at the majority’s decision over a perceived 
threat to the basic integrity of the Court’s mission of judicial review.  It is quite another, as 
evidenced in the telling presence of the phrase “respectfully dissent” only in Thomas’ separate 
(mostly dissenting) Grutter opinion, to use this righteous legal ethical anger as an occasion to 
publicly insult the basic legal intelligence of a colleague.  Justice Scalia, as we know from 
Lawrence v. Texas, is of course no stranger either to hyperbolic sarcasm or the collegial insult, 
but in his separate (also mostly dissenting) Grutter opinion, it is difficult to so generously read 
his opening dicta-“framing [of ] the question at issue”51:  
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As [the Chief Justice] demonstrates, the University of Michigan Law School’s mystical 
“critical mass” justification for its discrimination by race challenges even the most 
gullible mind.  The admissions statistics show it to be a sham to cover a scheme of 
racially proportionate admissions.52   
In the apparent estimation of her male colleagues, O’Connor is either lazy (“perfunctory”), or 
childishly naïve.  These insults have both legal rhetorical and doctrinal implications.   
The Grutter dissent narrative of deceit—the story of a pernicious, race-baiting institution 
of public education attempting to hoodwink the High Court guardians of the constitutional dream 
of racial harmony53—would be repeated four years later in Chief Justice John Roberts’ 
characterization of the respondent Seattle School District’s arguments in Parents Involved.  The 
Grutter dissenting opinions, and Scalia’s separate opinion, could have held to the argument that 
the “‘critical mass’ justification” is simply not commensurate with the effective reality of the 
admissions policy.  But the “sham” component functions as an important warrant to Kennedy 
and Scalia’s hybrid doctrinal-prudential54 argument that the Grutter decision will undermine the 
future efficacy of the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment mission to use the Equal Protection Clause 
as a tool to check policies productive of racial antagonism.  Even isolated from the more 
evidently “legal work”55 of their decisions, Scalia, Rehnquist, and Kennedy’s insults are not 
mere dicta.  They are at once enabled by and constitutive of the majoritarian supremacist 
framework through which the Rehnquist, Roberts, and (for some analysts) “Kennedy Courts”56 
will continue to apply the Equal Protection Clause to public policies that seek not to destroy 
racial harmony, but rather to alleviate racial oppression57––a form of application that would 
continue in Parents Involved.  
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O’Connor does not accept the Law School’s description of their intent and interest in 
using race-conscious admissions sight unseen.  She constructs a detailed and well-evidenced 
argument for “giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions” under the First 
Amendment to the Constitution. 58   Her conferral of argumentative presumption on the 
Respondent for the purposes of the compelling interest question is not based in naïveté, but 
rather specific precedent59—precedent that Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Scalia largely ignore.  In 
O’Connor’s precedential genealogy, the judicial presumption of the Law School’s “good faith” 
(presumption accorded public educational institutions by the First Amendment) in its stated 
interest in “attaining a diverse student body”60 is inclusive of the Law School’s claim that the 
intent of their race-inclusive admissions policy is to achieve a “‘critical mass’ of minority 
students’...defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to 
produce.”61  This claim, however, is the crux of the Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Scalia’s mockery.   
The three dissenting Justices claim that it is obvious “critical mass,” in practice, means 
the same thing as “quota.”  The greatest insult to O’Connor here is that Kennedy, Rehnquist, and 
Scalia fail to presume that O'Connor even has an argumentative response to this position.  
O’Connor argues that critical mass is not the same as “quotas,” because the content of the 
critical mass is always to be determined in reference to the Law School’s compelling interest in 
diversity, which O’Connor spends considerable time explaining, and which Kennedy even agrees 
with in the abstract.  An actual, considered refutation of O’Connor’s conclusion of law would 
thus require a detailed response, supported by evidence, in order to challenge O’Connor’s 
application of precedent in support of granting a degree of presumption to the Law School’s 
claims of intent.  Focused as they are on the numbers of different minorities admitted or not 
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under the Law School’s policy, Kennedy, Scalia, and Rehnquist do not really mount any 
response to the presumption argument itself.   
In other words, the Grutter dissenters claim that the Law School admissions policy 
cannot be tailored narrowly using the strict scrutiny test, because there is evidence that 
admissions decisions with respect to particular applicants were made primarily based on those 
applicants’ race––meaning that race became a “predominant factor in the admissions 
decisionmaking [sic].”62  But this line of argument suggests an almost willful ignorance of the 
doctrinally grounded warrant63 to O’Connor’s argument that the policy is not a quota system.  
To put it in terms of a Toulmin diagram: claim—“critical mass” is not a synonym for "quota 
system," and is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest in diversity; data—the critical mass 
sought is that which will achieve educationally beneficial diversity, which is a fluid goal not 
dependent on specific racial ratios; warrant—as the Court is instructed through the Court’s 
precedent in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Law School (and the numerous 
educational experts submitting amicus briefs) is in the best position to determine the necessary 
content to achieve that critical mass, in which case “minimum goals for minority recruitment” 
certainly are not synonymous with racial “balancing” or “quotas.”64   
In his separate opinion from Grutter (which dissents from most of O’Connor’s 
conclusions of law), Thomas is not just “respectful” in comparison to Kennedy, Rehnquist, and 
Scalia because he says the word.  He is argumentatively respectful, in that rather than resorting to 
mockery and deliberate ignorance, he acknowledges O’Connor’s arguments, and the evidence 
she provides in support of those arguments, and then he refutes them.  The most important 
exchange in either Gratz or Grutter (as Mootz also argues65) is that between O’Connor and 
Thomas.  For O’Connor, the Court grants presumption to the Law School’s stated intent to 
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achieve a critical mass of minority students for the purpose of educational diversity.  This means 
that the specific (sometimes predominantly racial) decisions the Law School makes with respect 
to admitting certain students cannot be for the purpose of filling a “certain fixed number or 
proportion of [admissions] opportunities...‘exclusively [with] certain minority groups,”66 because 
the numeric racial content of the admitted class will be measured always against the diversity 
goal.  Again, the crux of much of Grutter itself is this question of presumptive deference, and 
Thomas offers a detailed refutation of the Court’s conferral of presumption in this instance.67  
Read against Thomas’ opinion, I think it is fair to say that Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Scalia’s 
elision of O’Connor’s presumption argument in order to conflate “critical mass” with “quota” is 
a purposeful misreading of the intent of an educational institution’s anti-racist actions, in order 
for the Court to use the Equal Protection Clause as a protection for racism, under the guise of 
attacking racism itself—a majoritarian rhetoric that would have a more sophisticated articulation 
in Parents Involved.     
Kennedy et al take O’Connor to task for a putatively false application of the strict 
scrutiny test in Grutter—ignoring her anticipatory argument that given the doctrinal 
appropriateness of granting presumption in this particular instance, deference in this context is 
consistent with strict scrutiny.68  In other words, O’Connor arrives at her conclusions of law 
within the confines of a particular genealogy of strict scrutiny in race-conscious admissions law.  
Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Scalia attempt a factual refutation of O’Connor’s conclusions without a 
compelling response to the precedential genealogy that gives them strength.   Thomas, in contrast, 
begins the substance of his answer to O’Connor by constructing a detailed, alternative, and 
largely mutually exclusive precedential genealogy of strict scrutiny in the context of race-
conscious public policy.69  By doing so, Thomas is able to isolate and respond to the notion of 
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diversity per se as a compelling state interest—something that Kennedy does not choose to do, 
and that Rehnquist and Scalia largely fail to do.70  For Thomas, it is not that diversity in this case 
stands in for a racist policy of racial balancing, but that the goal of achieving diversity through 
racial means is, always and on its own terms, a form of “racial discrimination,” and thus 
unconstitutional in the context of the important, but certainly not constitutionally important goal 
of providing a better education within elite institutions.71     
This is all to say that O’Connor’s introductory framing of the compelling interest 
question with the dicta-phrase “question of national importance” lies at the heart of the particular 
power of her opinion in Grutter.  Even if Kennedy and his colleagues are correct that O’Connor 
is deceived by the Law School, and her entire defense of diversity as a compelling state interest 
is dicta to the finding of the case, O’Connor’s Grutter opinion is still of great importance as a 
response to and buffer against Thomas’ equally important separate opinion.  Because O’Connor 
makes this argument, it becomes part of the Court’s argumentative archive.  As I note in Chapter 
One, future judicial readers of Court decisions can make productive use even of statements that 
may be dicta.  O’Connor not only posits the framework for decision in Grutter as whether there 
can be a compelling interest in diversity, but frames this question at issue72 as a “question of 
national importance.”  O’Connor’s meta-argument about the relationship between the Equal 
Protection Clause, public policy, and race functions independently of the rest of the content of 
the decision.  Here O’Connor enacts a precedential genealogy of race in constitutional law that is 
constitutive of a particular protected racialized subject of U.S. constitutional law, one whose 
public and civic legibility is determined by and constrained within the potential for “interest 
convergences” between elite (economic and racial) power in the United States and limited, 
largely individual, instances of minority admission to elite status.73   
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Kennedy’s dissent might be read as establishing a similar buffer to Thomas’s particular 
genealogy of race in constitutional law, given his concluding statement that:  
It is regrettable the [Grutter] Court’s important holding allowing racial minorities to have 
their special circumstances considered in order to improve their educational opportunities 
is accompanied by a suspension of the strict scrutiny which was the predicate of allowing 
race to be considered in the first place. 
But Kennedy has a demonstrable track record of “agreeing with the liberals in theory” but the 
“conservatives in specifics.”74  This means that (as he does in Grutter, and will later in Parents 
Involved)75 Kennedy’s opinions about race tend to construct a decisional framework within 
which a narrowly tailored race-conscious policy could be possible in the future, but cannot be 
allowed in the present, because they are not adequately “narrowly tailored.”  It is conceivable 
that a policy might legitimately address racism through race, but Kennedy finds “race” to be 
such a “corrosive category” that most well-intentioned anti-racist policies are not designed well 
enough to avoid actually functioning as racism.  Race is corrosive; it ruins everything it touches, 
and should be avoided except in the most well-designed of policies responding to cases of 
extreme need.   
This is the difference between Kennedy and O’Connor that helps to define the rhetorical 
situation of Parents Involved.  The precedential genealogy underlying O’Connor’s Grutter 
conclusion of law is constructed both through her “framing [of] the question at issue,”76 and 
through the warrant (First Amendment judicial deference to public universities) underlying her 
answer to that question.  In his opinion for the Court in Gratz, Rehnquist dismisses the dissenting 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s central objection to the manner of the Court’s application of strict 
scrutiny as the “remarkable” suggestion that public university equal protection “violations should 
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be dealt with...by changing the Constitution so that it conforms to the conduct of the 
universities.”77  Rehnquist is willing to lecture O’Connor on a failed application of strict scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause.  At the same time, via a clear misreading of Ginsburg’s 
dissent,78 he simply ignores Ginsburg’s indictment of the Court for the same sin.  Ginsburg 
argues (through a critically race-conscious precedential genealogy 79 ) that given the 
overwhelming evidence80 of the continued effects of the “‘system of racial caste’”81 the Equal 
Protection Clause was originally designed to deconstruct,82 public policies clearly designed to 
rectify past, and alleviate ongoing, discrimination83 (policies that, given the present racial 
demographic realities of “class discrimination” in the United States, must by definition be race-
conscious84) should generally survive Fourteenth Amendment “close review” by the Court.85   
For Ginsburg, it is Rehnquist’s opinion in Gratz that is grounded in a dangerously flawed 
interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment strict scrutiny review.  As University of California at 
Berkeley Professor of Law in Access to Justice Leti Volpp says, “space is constituted through 
legal language, and then serves as the seemingly natural ‘ground’ for that language.”86  The 
Chief Justice, and by implication also Kennedy in his Grutter dissent, deliberately gives anti-
racist policies a test written to ensure their failure, in order to make it seem like that failure was 
the fault of the policy, and not the test.           
Ginsburg’s analysis in Gratz could function as backing for O’Connor’s judicial deference 
warrant, but O’Connor in Grutter neither cites Ginsburg, nor makes more than a passing 
reference to “inequality.” 87   O’Connor’s focus is instead on the affirmative benefits of 
educational diversity in the modern United States.88  Many of these benefits, consistent with the 
Justice’s opening “framing of the question at issue,”89 are ones fundamental to the effective 
operation of public institutions vital to the integrity and survival of the U.S. polity.90  The 
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Grutter Court is even at odds with Ginsburg’s concurring opinion insofar as O’Connor works 
from the assumption not of a society yet implicated in the residual organization of a racial caste 
system, but rather of a presently “heterogeneous” society that accordingly requires a valuation of 
diversity in the process of educating the nation’s elite.91   
The Critical Race Theorist Derrick A. Bell argues that O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter is 
most properly understood in terms of her larger body of work on race and equal protection.  
O’Connor’s career was devoted in part to the construction of a precedential genealogy that, more 
than the work of even many of her conservative colleagues, has been singularly productive of the 
idea that it should be unthinkable and impossible to design a public policy that is both race-
conscious and constitutional.92  In the context of O’Connor’s previous, highly constraining race 
and equal protection decisions, Bell insists on a practical evaluation of her Grutter opinion’s 
utility for extra-judicial radical politics.  The judicial rhetorical “question of national importance” 
framework underlying Grutter (and its antithesis in Thomas’ separate opinion) is at least 
constitutive of a realm of selective, public, higher education as the one public space in which 
Ginsburg’s demand for a solvent Equal Protection Clause can be even partially met.   
Because Kennedy refuses to answer the question given in the same framework, the 
political future constituted in the judicial rhetoric of his Grutter dissent is exclusive of any 
instances where Ginsburg’s vision of an equality jurisprudence of equal protection can be 
realized—even though Kennedy asserts that he could conceive of some hypothetical future 
policy for which Ginsburg’s call might be possible.  Three days after Gratz and Grutter v. 
Bollinger, Kennedy delivered the opinion for the Court in Lawrence v. Texas—an opinion 
wherein, in the context of sex and kinship, he simultaneously constructed a dicta-framing of the 
question at hand, and an answer to that question in the specific instance before him.  This 
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brought to existence a set of future doctrinal possibilities for a racially silent but sex conscious 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence of due process––a jurisprudence that could do the anti-
inequality work with respect to yet-to-be-recognized identity categories, that Ginsburg hoped 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence might successfully accomplish with 
respect to race.93  These cases were on the same docket.  Here is the first example of a queerly 
progressive Fourteenth Amendment, where that queer progressivism is conversely dependent on 
regressive (even racist) politics of race.     
Doubtless to Scalia’s horror,94 the Michigan cases would be, as he predicts in his separate 
Grutter opinion,95 productive of a new wave of race-conscious public education policymaking 
and the inevitably resultant jurisprudential challenges (now before the Court in Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin).96  Four years after the Rehnquist Court’s highly constrained 
affirmation of the societal necessity and thus constitutionality of race-conscious efforts to 
achieve diversity in public higher education, the Roberts Court, sans O’Connor, would again take 
up the question of voluntary race-conscious diversity policies––this time at the municipal level 
of public K-12 school districts. 
Derrick Bell refers to O’Connor’s Grutter opinion as a textbook (and therefore at once 
laudable, disappointing, and fragile) example of what Bell calls “interest convergence,” or the 
need for progressive advocates to strategically recognize and exploit those situations where 
dominating, elite and oppressed, minority interests converge (because elites will never create 
those situations voluntarily, or not without perception of their own benefit).97  O’Connor’s 
opinion should be recognized as “interest convergence” because it represented for all practical 
purposes the most hopeful outcome on the Rehnquist Court for an anti-racist Equal Protection 
Clause in the context of public education policy.  Unfortunately for interest convergence, the 
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dynamics of the Court with respect to race and equal protection had by 2007 become sufficiently 
more muddied such that the set of practical possibilities for equal protection doctrine had shifted 
one more step away from the liberal-conservative toward the majoritarian supremacist right.   
In this new judicial rhetorical situation, Kennedy’s unique brand of Fourteenth 
Amendment doctrinal issue framing carries more weight: and in Kennedy’s Fourteenth 
Amendment, the politics of “interest convergence” are defined in terms of queer liberation at the 
expense of anti-racist struggle.  In the next sections, I turn to a detailed analysis of: first, Chief 
Justice Roberts’ construction of what I call a post-racial white subject-before-law in his plurality 
opinion for the Court in Parents Involved; and second, to my analysis of Kennedy’s separate 
concurring opinion in the same case.  I begin with a substantial discussion of Roberts’ opinion, 
because I want to distinguish between the post-racial politics of the Roberts plurality and the 
color-blind politics of Kennedy’s concurrence.  This distinction will then form the basis for my 
argument that Kennedy’s argumentative construction of race in Grutter as a “corrosive category” 
functions in Parents Involved as the “post-racial” component of his meta-textual constitution of a 
radical queer subjectivity before law.  When Kennedy’s color-blind constitutionalist arguments 
in Parents Involved are read as components of a meta-argumentative framing of the range of 
possible subjectivities constituted as subjects of Fourteenth Amendment protection, they form 
the basis for Kennedy’s implicit construction of a post-racial queer subject of his Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  
III.  Race and Equal Protection in Roberts’ Parents Involved Plurality and Breyer’s Dissent 
 
A.  Roberts’ Plurality  
On June 28, 2007, Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the plurality98 opinion for the 
Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, reversing the 
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United States Ninth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals’ respective decisions in Parents 
Involved and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education.99  The Court took up both cases 
together under the rubric of Parents Involved, responding to equal protection challenges to “race-
conscious”100 school assignment policies in the Seattle School District (case no. 05-908) and 
Jefferson County, Kentucky Public Schools (case no. 05-915) that determined school 
assignments (where kids get to go to school) in part101 of the basis of a student’s race, and in part 
on the racial composition of the school a student desired to attend.102   
Both policies were “voluntary.”103  Seattle schools have never “been subject to court-
ordered desegregation,”104 and Jefferson County adopted the policy challenged in Meredith 
subsequent to the District Court for the Western District of Kentucky’s June 20, 2000, ruling in 
“Hampton II” (Hampton v. Jefferson County Board of Education) that dissolved the 
desegregation order the district had been operating under since 1975.105  Roberts’ opinion was 
joined in part106 by Scalia, Thomas, and Justice Samuel Alito; Thomas filed a concurrence,107 
with Justices John Paul Stevens108 and Stephen J. Breyer (the latter joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, 
and Justice David H. Souter)109 filing separate dissenting opinions.  Kennedy filed a separate 
opinion, concurring with the Court’s judgment, but only in part with Roberts’ plurality opinion 
(Kennedy accepted Roberts’ narrow tailoring arguments but objected to his compelling interest 
claims).110  In combination with his Grutter dissent (which also agreed with only the “narrow 
tailoring” arguments in the other Justices’ responses to O’Connor’s opinion), this Parents 
Involved concurrence almost rises to the level of a trend.   
In reversing the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, Roberts affirmed the plaintiff’s contention that 
(in Roberts’ words) the school districts’ allocation of “children to different public schools on the 
basis of race violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection.”111  With this 
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argument, Roberts draws a straight line from the white plaintiffs in Parents Involved and 
Meredith, to the black plaintiffs who brought suit in Brown v. Board of Education.112   
In the Western Journal of Speech Communication’s 1990 “Special Issue on Rhetorical 
Criticism,” the rhetorical theorist and critic Michael Calvin McGee cites the group of cases 
“related to” the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Brown as evidence for a growing 
“presumption of cultural heterogeneity.”113  Fifty-three years after Brown, Roberts argues in 
Parents Involved that the Warren Court’s equality doctrine renders “differential treatment on the 
basis of race” clearly verboten under the Equal Protection Clause.114  While the Warren Court 
demanded school integration, Roberts now equates integration with segregation, deploying a 
repudiation of the “separate but equal”115 doctrine as a reason to strike down Seattle and 
Jefferson County’s attempts to integrate their schools—that is, to render them less 
homogeneous.116  McGee’s 1990 argument was prescient; decisions subsequent117 to Brown 
would deploy a “presumption” of existing and satisfactory heterogeneity.   
This presumption allows Roberts to argue that laws and policies mandating diversity 
justify themselves through the false construction of a homogenous culture that needs to be 
corrected—a sort of straw-homogeneity.  In this perniciously unnecessary correction, Roberts 
argues, the Seattle and Jefferson County school districts reproduce the very discrimination they 
claim to be interested in rectifying.  Without such a presumption of cultural heterogeneity, 
Rehnquist and O’Connor in Gratz and Grutter would have been unable to cite substantial Court 
precedent for their contention that the Court’s duty in enforcing the Equal Protection Clause is 
more properly to enjoin racial classification, than it is to check the racist production of inequality 
itself.118  A “presumption of cultural heterogeneity” is also necessary to Roberts’ concluding 
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declaration in Parents Involved that “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”119   
Roberts here articulates a precise distillation of an increasingly (over the past forty or so 
years) dominant120 mode of jurisprudential application of the Equal Protection Clause, known to 
many Critical Race121 and other legal scholars as “color-blind constitutionalism.”122  This 
interpretive mode—“a collection of legal themes functioning as racial ideology”123—relies on an 
ahistorical valuation of equality of “process” over substantive justice, a valuation that enables 
jurists to “willfully blind”124 themselves to the reality of ongoing discrimination that specifically 
and primarily targets “African Americans” and other people of color.125  As Ginsburg argues in 
her Gratz dissent, color-blind jurisprudence amounts to the normative equation of “actions 
designed to burden groups long denied full citizenship stature” with “measures taken to hasten 
the day when entrenched discrimination and its after effects have been extirpated.”126  For the 
Critical Race Theorist Neil Gotanda, given the “existence of American racial subordination,” this 
“color-blind constitutionalism…fosters white racial domination” through the ideological 
obfuscation of the reality of institutionalized “social, economic, and political advantages” for 
white people in the United States.127 
Roberts’ stipulation in Parents Involved that “one form of injury [the Court has 
recognized] under the Equal Protection Clause is being forced to compete in a race-based system 
that may prejudice the plaintiff”128 is exemplary129 of Gotanda’s characterization of color-blind 
constitutionalism.  The qualification “may” is not mere dicta.130  In response to the Seattle 
School District’s argument that the “harm” articulated by the plaintiffs in Parents Involved is 
“too speculative…to maintain standing,” Roberts finds that Crystal D. Meredith and the 
members of the group Parents Involved in Community Schools (the plaintiffs in the combined 
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case) have standing not only because they have a reasonable expectation of being subject to 
racial discrimination in the future,131 but also because the Equal Protection Clause renders being 
subject to racial classification a harm in and of itself.  In other words, it is not only that the “race-
based system[s]” in Seattle and Jefferson County may specifically prejudice the plaintiffs in their 
future applications for school placement.  The possibility of prejudice inherent to any “race-
based system” is itself an immediate “injury that the members of Parents Involved can validly 
claim on behalf of their [mostly white] children,”132 regardless of the effective outcome of the 
policy in question.  Or, as both Ginsburg and Gotanda might say, regardless of racial hierarchies 
of advantage that persist in status quo institutions like public schools. 
“Color-blind constitutionalism” is a predominant term for describing Roberts’ mode of 
constitutional interpretation—so much so, in fact, that commentators as diverse as CRT critics, 
judicial advocates of color-blind constitutionalism like Justice Clarence Thomas,133 and popular 
press commentators134 all use some variation of the notion to describe the same set of legal 
arguments or “collection of legal themes.”  I think, however, that Robert’s particular deployment 
of color-blind constitutionalist arguments in Parents Involved is more accurately described as 
post-racial rather135 than color-blind: a perspective that is (as I argue below) specifically useful 
my attempt to articulate a queer of color perspective on “racialized,” color-blind applications of 
the Equal Protection Clause.   
McGee, the Warren Court in Brown as arguing that traditionally “American” valuations 
of a homogeneous culture are damaging to those presumptively excluded from idealized 
homogeneity.136  Roberts performs the converse argumentative move in Parents Involved.  
Starting from the assumption that the Seattle and Jefferson County schools have achieved an 
acceptably heterogeneous status quo, Roberts does not argue that attempting to achieve what we 
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already have will construct a problematic ideal of racial sameness that minorities cannot and 
would not want to achieve.  Rather, Roberts dissociatively137 articulates a call to work toward 
precisely this ideal of racial sameness, with a presumed heterogeneous status quo serving as both 
implicit and explicit warrant.  Heterogeneity is both unnecessary (because we already have it) 
and problematic (because it will undermine our ability to get to the point where the question of 
hetero vs. homo no long matters).  In other words, Roberts’ arguments in Parents Involved shift 
from dreaming of a future of sameness to suggesting that we already live in a post-difference 
future, wherein difference exists, and is even valuable, but has lost its capacity for harm—except 
for in the unnecessary meddling of well-meaning public institutions. 
The Constitution is not an absolute barrier to state encroachments into the “realm of 
personal liberty,”138 and the rights enumerated in the Constitution are not guaranteed to every 
person in every instance.  Judicial review, it bears repeating, is not a scientific application of 
Constitutional test, but rather the simultaneously rhetorical and dialectic argumentative 
juxtaposition of competing interests toward the goal of a just outcome.  The circumstances under 
which “heightened” levels of scrutiny are applied is a question of jurisprudential interpretive 
theory; the manual for how strict judicial review should be in a given case is constituted by 
constantly evolving doctrines of constitutional law.  The fascinating thing about the Court is that 
while these doctrines change from decision to decision, they remain in the vast archive of U.S. 
judicial rhetoric, and so have powerful memorial features that can be resurrected for future 
occasions even after they have been consigned away as no longer valid.   
O’Connor, Rehnquist, Kennedy, Thomas, Scalia, and Ginsburg all mostly agree that 
some from of “strict” or “close” scrutiny is warranted in judicial review of policies employing 
racial classifications; most of the greatest contention among the Justices in the Michigan cases is 
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not about what form of review should be applied, but rather just what that application means for 
the decision of the Court.  As I discuss in Chapter One, Judge Vaughn R. Walker grounds his 
application of heightened scrutiny in Perry v. Schwarzenegger to “Proposition 8” in his finding 
of a differential treatment of a “suspect class”139 (a group designated for unequal treatment under 
the law because of a suspect classification).  In such cases, as Walker argues, “strict scrutiny” 
review is typically applied, meaning again that the law must meet the dual test of being 
“narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest” that outweighs the negative 
consequences of the suspect classification.140  
In Parents Involved, Roberts also bases his finding of the school district policies’ 
unconstitutionality on an application of strict scrutiny review, but, operating within a near-
identical precedential genealogy as Rehnquist and O’Connor in Gratz and Grutter, his 
justification for applying strict scrutiny is rather different from what a reader familiar only with 
the same-sex marriage cases might expect.141  For Walker, gays and lesbians are “situated 
identically” to heterosexuals vis-à-vis marriage,142 rendering legal classifications targeting them 
for discrimination in the context of access to marriage suspect.143  The parallel move for Roberts 
in Parents Involved would be anything but color-blind, as the ethnicity of the plaintiffs would 
require the Chief Justice to establish whiteness specifically as a suspect racial classification—
and therefore as a racial category that matters. 
Instead, Roberts cites Gratz to (as Stevens puts it in his Parents Involved dissent) 
“grandly [proclaim] that all racial classifications must be analyzed under ‘strict scrutiny.’”144  
But how is this different?  While I place Roberts’ and Walker’s application of strict scrutiny 
review in juxtaposition, the doctrinal effect, at first glance, seems identical.  Roberts does not 
explicitly perform the legal argumentative labor of establishing whiteness as a suspect 
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classification, but if “all racial classifications must be analyzed under ‘strict scrutiny,’” it follows 
that jurists must apply heightened review to laws treating persons differently because those 
persons are white.  Consider the apparent similarity between the following passages: first, 
Roberts’ citation of Gratz: 
Racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact 
connection between justification and classification;145 
second, Walker’s argument that strict scrutiny can be appropriately applied to Proposition 8:  
Strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review to apply to legislative classifications 
[such as those in Proposition 8] based on sexual orientation. All classifications based on 
sexual orientation appear suspect, as the evidence shows that California would rarely, if 
ever, have a reason to categorize individuals based on their sexual orientation.146 
The difference is that for Walker, “all classifications based on sexual orientation are suspect” 
because “gays and lesbians are the type of minority strict scrutiny was designed to protect.”147 
The harm that can only be justified through narrow tailoring to a compelling government interest 
is the simultaneous legal recognition and (oppressively) differential treatment of a minority 
group.  As Ginsburg can be heard to proclaim (through Stevens) from her Gratz dissent, the 
plaintiffs in Parents Involved are not minorities, either in the context of the public schools to 
which they are granted or denied assignment, or in the broader U.S. status quo.  
Stevens suggests in his dissent that Roberts should only be able to claim that the Seattle 
and Jefferson County integration policies must survive strict scrutiny because racial 
classification is the harm in and of itself, without regard to the specific differential treatment of 
individuals belonging to any particular racial group.  This position invokes Ginsburg, who insists 
in her Gratz dissent—in an argument that is at odds with the precedential framework of 
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O’Connor’s Grutter opinion as much as it is with Rehnquist’s conclusion of law in the Gratz 
majority—that “our jurisprudence ranks race a ‘suspect’ category, not because [race] is 
inevitably an impermissible classification, but because it is one which usually, to our national 
shame, has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial inequality.”148   Because there is no 
evidence that denial of assignment in the Seattle case (No. 05-908) on the basis of race carries 
any racial harm,149 any other articulation of harm would require there to be some basis in stare 
decisis for the Court to regard differential treatment of an advantaged majority group with 
suspicion—and Stevens, echoing in my imagination the frustration of the unacknowledged 
Ginsburg, insists that such a precedent does not exist:  
There is a cruel irony in the Chief Justice’s reliance on our decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955). The first sentence in the concluding paragraph of 
[Roberts’] opinion states: “Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and 
could not go to school based on the color of their skin”…the Chief Justice fails to note 
that it was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the history books do 
not tell stories of white children struggling to attend black schools.150 
In contrast to Thomas’s concurring opinion in Parents Involved, in which his arguments 
conform to the view that “‘our Constitution is color-blind,’”151 Roberts mentions the phrase 
“color-blind” only once, in a footnote.152  The implicitly contrasting positions Thomas and 
Roberts take on whether or not the Constitution is color-blind or not suggest that the taken-as-
fact153 color-blind Constitution is useful to, but is not necessary for, Robert’s ultimate finding 
with respect to equal protection.  Roberts’ “Constitution is color-blind.”  But more specifically, it 
is post-racial.  For the Roberts Court, policies based on racial classification are verboten because 
the Constitution asks us to be blind to race, but more specifically, because the Constitution 
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recognizes the reality of race and demands that we resist at every turn policies that constitute 
race as significant.  Roberts carries Rehnquist and Kennedy’s Gratz and Grutter trope of 
deceitful race-mongers into Parents Involved.  The plurality opinion in Parents Involved is 
exemplary of Roberts’ efforts throughout his career  to imbue in legal argument the notion that 
the status quo is post-racial, against the pervasive and “‘pernicious’”154 attempts of states and 
municipalities to re-inscribe and come to terms with the significance and reality of racial 
difference in the United States.155            
  Other legal scholars have made similar arguments about post-racial trends in Roberts 
Court decisions.156  A particular focus on Parents Involved, however, is useful because of the 
distinction Roberts makes here between “diversity” and “racial balancing”—a distinction that 
both follows and attempts to evacuate all of Derrick Bell’s “interest convergence” potential from 
Grutter v. Bollinger.  Rather than articulate a post-racial model of equal protection in the 
negative, Roberts lays the groundwork to affirmatively replace race-consciousness with 
“diversity” as a legitimate aim of government—a conception of diversity from which, in a step 
beyond even what O’Connor attempts in Grutter, the significance of racial difference would be 
substantively evacuated.  In rejecting the possibility of a “compelling state interest” that might 
allow the Seattle and Jefferson County policies to pass strict scrutiny review, Roberts cites in 
part some of the Brown antecedents that McGee in 1990 was probably referring to:  
Allowing racial balancing as a compelling end in itself would “effectively assur[e] that 
race will always be relevant in American life, and that the ‘ultimate goal’ of ‘eliminating 
entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being’s 
race’ will never be achieved.”157 
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The phrase “racial balancing as a compelling end in itself” summarizes a complex and 
multilayered doctrinal argument.  Roberts presents two layers of juxtaposition: first, between 
policies attempting to achieve “racial diversity” as opposed to “broader diversity,” not defined 
(exclusively or primarily) by race;158 second, between policies that attempt to achieve “racial 
balance, pure and simple,” as opposed to “racial diversity.”159   
These distinctions are vital for the conclusions of law in Roberts’ opinion, as they speak 
to both the “narrow tailoring” and “compelling government interest” requirements of strict 
scrutiny.  As Roberts argumentatively defines the controlling precedent, the Court prior to 
Parents Involved has established “two interests that classify as compelling” in the context of 
educational policies that employ racial classifications.160  The second, “diversity in higher 
education,” derives from Grutter.161  Roberts functionally contends that the Grutter precedent 
clearly establishes that diversity can only be a compelling interest if diversity is de-racialized.  
His argument is not precisely that O’Connor’s opinion ignores race; rather, Roberts cites 
O’Connor’s argument from her precedential genealogy of Bakke (and O’Connor’s own past case-
history) that “racial or ethnic origin” should be only a “single” if “important element” in the 
diversity an educational policy seeks to achieve.162  Here Roberts quotes O’Connor’s celebration 
of the University of Michigan Law School’s definition of diversity in all possible terms but 
minority inclusion.  As Roberts would have it (in what reads as an implicit citation of Thomas’ 
separate Grutter opinion163), the diversity that Grutter acknowledges may be a compelling 
government interest seems designed specifically to ensure the widest possible variety of elite and 
not non-elite participation in an educational institution.164  But while Thomas objects to what he 
views as the elitism of O’Connor’s position, Roberts pulls it out, brings it forward to Parents 
Involved, and celebrates it as the only acceptable constitutional affirmation of diversity.     
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Following his precedential framing of Grutter, Roberts insists that there is a doctrinal 
difference165 between the use of racial classification as a tool to increase a de-racialized diversity, 
and racial classification as a tool to increase diversity understood primarily in terms of “racial 
balance.”166  The brief for the respondents on behalf of the Seattle School District argues 
(echoing Ginsburg in Gratz) that any finding that Grutter does not allow the district policy to 
pass strict scrutiny review must “[rest] on the false assumption that a desire to integrate public 
schools is constitutionally indistinguishable from the intent to segregate them.”167  But while 
Roberts goes to great lengths to sever the precedential link between the Michigan Law School 
affirmative action policy upheld in Grutter and the Seattle and Jefferson County school 
assignment systems, he also rejects all of the respondent’s additional (non-Grutter dependent) 
claims to a compelling government interest in “racial diversity” as references to “racial balance, 
pure and simple,”168 derisively noting that “racial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently 
unconstitutional’ [a point repeated ad naseum throughout the opinion] to a compelling state 
interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial diversity.’”169  Roberts refers to the unconstitutional telos 
of “racial balance,” but the effect of his doctrinal arguments is to retrench in stare decisis the 
notion that policies seeking to insure minority inclusion are just as harmful as policies that seek 
to exclude.170   
The Chief Justice frames his conclusions of law insistently in the terms of the 
unconstitutionality of “racial balance” or “proportional representation”171 and not the language of 
“integration” and “segregation”/“inclusion” and “exclusion” used by the respondents, Stevens,172 
Breyer,173 and others involved in the case.174  Roberts’ rhetorical argumentative choices here are 
not dicta; he has a reasonable case for arguing that policies that seek only “racial balancing” are 
not constitutional in light of the Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger majorities, but the 
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doctrinal ground for his application of strict scrutiny in Parents Involved is less stable.175  The 
argumentative elision of the myriad interests articulated by Seattle and Jefferson County with 
“racial balance, pure and simple” is a necessary pre-requisite to Roberts’ legal finding.   
While Seattle and Jefferson County make no claims to proportionate race balancing as a 
goal in itself, Roberts dismisses (just as Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Scalia dismiss the Michigan 
Law School) the Respondent’s arguments to this effect as mere rhetoric, “verbal formulations to 
describe the interest they promote [racial balance]” as “racial diversity, avoidance of racial 
isolation, racial integration.”176  Just as Ginsburg’s “close review” distinction is mostly ignored 
in both the Gratz and Grutter majorities, Roberts’ argument here is a rather flippant elision of 
Stevens and Breyer’s177 insistence in their Parents Involved dissents that there is a doctrinally 
established fundamental difference between exclusionary and inclusionary racial classifications.   
Despite this insistence, Stevens and Breyer still operate within a broader paradigm of 
“race-neutral decisionmaking”178 that includes their interpretation of Grutter.  What neither see, 
therefore, is that even if both are correct that Grutter establishes that “only…racial classifications 
that harmfully exclude” should be presumed under strict scrutiny as “fatal in fact,”179 the 
potential for construing whiteness as a suspect racial classification (which would mean the 
Seattle and Jefferson County policies do contain “racial classifications that harmfully exclude” as 
well as include180) is implicitly present in Roberts’ explicit doctrinal claims.   
This potential is most evident in Roberts’ reference to the Ninth Circuit’s prior “Parents 
Involved VI” decision against the Seattle School District.  As Roberts quotes the Ninth Circuit: 
[T]he tiebreaker’s annual effect is thus merely to shuffle a few handfuls of different 
minority students between a few schools—about a dozen additional Latinos into Ballard 
[High School], a dozen black students into Nathan Hale, perhaps two dozen Asians into 
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Roosevelt, and so on. The District has not met its burden of proving these marginal 
changes . . . outweigh the cost of subjecting hundreds of students to disparate treatment 
based solely upon the color of their skin.181 
The possibility of constituting white students as members of a suspect and harmed class is 
implicit in the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to name those ethnicities that bear the cost of “disparate 
treatment,”182 even as it (sarcastically) notes some of those that may benefit from inclusion.  The 
post-racialization of whiteness functions as an unspoken warrant to Roberts’ doctrinal distinction 
between “diversity” as a compelling and “racial diversity” as an illegitimate state interest.   
Again, Roberts here underwrites an agenda not so much of color-blindness as an 
aggressively post-racial multiculturalism.  Against the reality that, as the NAACP argues as 
Amicus Curiae, “race-neutral” education policies are “anything but,”183 Roberts lays down a 
race-conscious doctrinal precedent for actively punishing policies that may disadvantage white 
students, under the guise of the color-blind doctrine that “all racial classifications…must in 
practice be treated the same” in constitutional judicial review.  While Breyer notes that—given 
the overwhelming number of government procedures based in part on racial classification––
Roberts’ finding of no compelling state interest is not only doctrinally questionable, but 
prudentially184 ridiculous,185 the decision makes more sense from policy perspective if the real 
harm the Roberts Court is concerned with is not racial classification per se, but racial 
classification as a signifier for policies that seek to change the status quo of white supremacy.   
This is of course how Critical Race Theorists have historically characterized not the 
“post-racial” but the “‘color-blind constitution.’”186  As the sociologist Nikhil Pal Singh argues,  
The imperative to be color-blind only makes sense if we assume that to perceive color 
automatically leads to hierarchies of value.  In the United States, only one socially 
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significant tradition is built on this assumption: white supremacy.  Under the universal, 
color-blind regime, in other words, we are forced back on an unstated belief in the order 
of white over black.187         
In the case of the Parents Involved plurality, however, “post-racial” more precisely articulates 
the ideal world constituted in the Chief Justice’s doctrinal arguments.  In this world, difference 
(defined as “diversity”) is valued and promoted only in those situations where it does not 
threaten hierarchies of racial identity in the status quo, and where the existence of racial 
difference is acknowledged (and even celebrated) simultaneously with the devaluation of its 
significance.  While Roberts declares that “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is 
stop discriminating on the basis of race,” the constitutional harm Roberts would disallow through 
the Fourteenth Amendment is not just racial classification (the color-blind position), but the 
existence of race itself, or more specifically, the significant existence of race outside the 
normative category of whiteness.   
B.  Breyer’s Dissent 
In her Gratz dissent, Ginsburg quotes Yale Law Professor Stephen L. Carter at length in 
support of her rejection of Rehnquist’s (and later, Roberts’) notion of race itself, in all instances, 
as a constitutionally verboten classification:  
“To say that two centuries of struggle for the most basic of civil rights have been mostly 
about freedom from racial categorization rather than freedom from racial oppressio[n] is 
to trivialize the lives and deaths of those who have suffered under racism. To pretend . . . 
that the issue presented in [Bakke] was the same as the issue in [Brown] is to pretend that 
history never happened and that the present doesn’t exist.”188  Our jurisprudence ranks 
race a “suspect” category, “not because [race] is inevitably an impermissible 
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classification, but because it is one which usually, to our national shame, has been drawn 
for the purpose of maintaining racial inequality.”189 
Ginsburg’s use of Carter’s elegant symploce here effectively delineates the stakes at the 
boundaries of the precedential genealogy assembled by Breyer in his Parents Involved dissent 
(which Ginsburg joins).   
O’Connor’s finding of law in Grutter relies significantly on the doctrinal argument that 
established First Amendment law demands a degree of judicial deference to the expertise of 
public universities in determining education policies most likely to achieve effective education 
outcomes.  But this warrant to O’Connor’s Grutter holding is entirely silent on the question of 
race.  The Grutter Court is deferential to the Law School’s stated need for a race-conscious 
admissions policy because the Law School believes the policy is necessary to a desirable and 
ultimately purportedly race-neutral compelling interest in educational diversity.  In Breyer’s 
rhetorically constructed history of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the “basic objective of 
those who wrote the Fourteenth Amendment” was “forbidding practices that lead to racial 
exclusion.”190  In this precedential genealogy (grounded in the voluntary school integration case 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education191 and its antecedents) the settled doctrine 
of not the First Amendment, but rather the Equal Protection Clause demands a race-conscious 
judicial deference to the expert decisions made by public K-12 educational institutions, because 
these institutions are best placed to craft effective educational policies that resist societal and 
anti-Constitutional exclusions of racial minorities.192  
The key passage in Chief Justice Warren E. Burger’s April 20, 1971, opinion for a 
unanimous Court in Swann is (along with the Bakke and Michigan cases) another core example 
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of the potential material effectivity of judicial rhetoric, including those “dicta” statements by 
jurists that are not “a technical holding”193 of the decisions in which they appear:   
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement 
educational policy, and might well conclude, for example, that, in order to prepare 
students to live in a pluralistic society, each school should have a prescribed ratio of 
Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as 
an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities; 
absent a finding of a constitutional violation, however, that would not be within the 
authority of a federal court. As with any equity case, the nature of the violation 
determines the scope of the remedy. In default by the school authorities of their 
obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to fashion a 
remedy that will assure a unitary school system.194 
For thirty-six years (until Parents Involved) this one dicta passage in Swann was cited as 
controlling in K-12 school integration doctrine in federal and state courts.195  The Swann 
decision—and this passage in particular—was also directly inspirational to “hosts of different 
kinds of...race-conscious plans” school districts around the United States (acting voluntarily, like 
Seattle; under court order, like pre-Hampton II Jefferson County; and after the dissolution of 
“earlier orders,” like post-Hampton II Jefferson County) “adopted, modified, and experimented 
with” toward the common goal of “greater racial integration of public schools.”196   
 Breyer does not have the argumentative resources to accuse the Chief Justice of a veiled 
defense of white supremacy.  The rhetorical situation of judicial constitutional rhetoric is 
fundamentally exclusive of a critique of the Constitution (and especially the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) as a document designed to maintain structures of racial 
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oppression and inequality in the United States.197  Nonetheless, Breyer, in his uptake of Swann, 
does appear to acknowledge and respond to the racial politics implied in Roberts’ public address.  
In Breyer’s reading of the holding in Roberts’ plurality opinion in Parents Involved, the Chief 
Justice refutes potential Swann-based objections to his conclusions of law in three ways: first, 
with an attempt to limit the reach of Swann to court-ordered desegregation (which Breyer argues 
is simply an “historically untrue” doctrinal claim);198 second, by arguing that the Swann passage 
is dicta, and thus not binding on the Parents Involved plurality;199 and third, by arguing that 
Court rulings subsequent to Swann—among them Grutter v. Bollinger—stipulate that all racial 
classifications must be subject to an identical strict scrutiny test, whatever their purpose.200   
Breyer really rises to the rhetorical occasion to answer Roberts’ dicta-claim, insisting that 
while technically201 dicta, the Swann passage was a rare example of judicial public address with 
immediate resonance “throughout the Nation.”  Breyer thereby takes the plurality to task for 
attempting to obscure a radical ideological agenda behind a disingenuous treatment of 
jurisprudence as “an exercise in mathematical logic.”202  Here Breyer argues that the Swann 
passage was so publicly influential that it must be treated as irrefutably good doctrine, despite 
being dicta.   
But, more than just good law, Breyer suggests that Burger’s paragraph was broadly 
constitutive of U.S. public culture in the aftermath of Swann—and constitutive as well of the 
place and authority of law in the American polity.  The key passage in Swann was set forth not in 
“a corner of an obscure opinion or in a footnote, unread but by experts,” (as the Parents Involved 
plurality, Breyer is saying, hides its refutation) but rather “prominently in an important opinion 
joined by all nine Justices, knowing that it would be read and followed throughout the nation.”203  
Regardless of authorial intent, I believe that implicit in Breyer’s (effectively hopeless) demand 
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that the plurality “explain to the courts and to the nation why it would abandon [such] 
guidance...which the law has [subsequently] continuously embodied,”204 is the leveled charge 
that the plurality Justices have smugly taken the cowardly step of obscuring a naked white-
majoritarian power grab of national scope behind the sophistic dismissal of arguably the most 
important set of words on race the Court has produced post-Brown as (precisely as any bully 
responds to powerful words they wish to dismiss) mere rhetoric. 
In Jen Graves’ well-circulated article in The Stranger (“Deeply Embarrassed White 
People Talk Awkwardly About Race: Please Don’t Stop Reading This Story About Race Just 
Because You’re Not Racist”) about Parents Involved and the peculiar liberal politics of Seattle 
racism, Seattle DJ and cultural fixture Riz Rollins205 declares that “‘racist is the new nigger’”;206 
meaning that in the language of the Parents Involved plurality that is both reflective of and 
reflected in white cultural discourses about race and racism in Seattle, “racist” is the term used 
by white people against person of color activists—that is, by white people who would slur and 
silence resistant racially oppressed voices in a manner acceptable to Seattle’s dominant liberal 
political ideology.  For Roberts, not only “racist” but “race” itself is the “‘new nigger’”; any 
claim to race is more likely to be racist than racism itself.  
As Carter argues in 1988, this is the claim that the “foe is not the effect of the [racial] 
categorization, but the categorization itself.”207  One of Carter’s great contributions to a critical 
race understanding of the affirmative action debates (a contribution that appears throughout the 
jurisprudence of Ruth Bader Ginsburg) is to call out the ultimate ineffectiveness of the 
temptingly “neat” pro-affirmative action strategy of distinguishing “between stereotypes that are 
benign and stereotypes that are malign.”208  Carter argues that this distinction is the general form 
of the more specific judicial rhetorical strategy favored by Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer of 
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“distinguishing laws that affirmatively integrate and laws that affirmatively segregate.”209  For 
Carter (and as Ginsburg argues eloquently in her Grutter concurrence),210 “what matters” in this 
judicial framework of the “question at issue”211 is “rational relation to the holy purpose” of 
achieving a society free of racial hierarchy and oppression, and thereby of a national interest in 
rectifying the same.  Carter’s fear is that all affirmative action opponents have to do in response 
to this strategy is abandon the proposition that “Bakke is Brown,” in order to shift the terms of 
the debate away from systemic racial inequalities of opportunity, and toward212 the policy-
destroying tautological logic of Roberts’ conclusion in Parents Involved.213   
Carter predicts that the result of this shift will be to enable policymaking more explicitly 
grounded in racism than what is possible even in 1988.  Given the opportunity to demonize 
racial classification per se, “the critic of affirmative action programs” will be given the tools to 
foreclose efforts to stop racism in favor of what they can claim is the more laudable strategy of 
simply “teaching that racial consciousness is wrong.”214  Carter’s prediction has been borne out, 
with remarkable accuracy, in actual jurisprudence––except that the opponents of affirmative 
action on the Court have not abandoned their position that “Bakke is Brown.”  Rather, they 
maintain this assumed comparison while also eating the cake of framing racial classification per 
se as the only appropriate target of the anti-racist mission of Equal Protection Clause 
jurisprudence.   
Here is the conceptual underpinning of Kennedy’s balancing act in his Grutter dissent 
between decrying specific policies that stir up tension via their unnecessary use of the “corrosive 
category of race,” and his simultaneous affirmation, in the same opinions, of the theoretical 
laudability of future, more narrowly-tailored uses of race to alleviate racism.215  Given the racial 
categorization-as-foe framework in which Kennedy operates, it is a simple matter for the 
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“moderate”216 Justice to conclude, in each specific instance, that the more constitutional and 
effective anti-racist strategy will be to reject anti-racist policies in favor of the alternative of 
judicial opposition to racial classification.  There nonetheless remains a subtle but materially 
important (materially important as in implicative of “millions of tiny, individual, racialist 
decisions...made each day” 217 ) judicial rhetorical distinction between the framework of 
possibility for future policy implicit in the Rehnquist/Scalia/Roberts and O’Connor/Kennedy 
opinions in Grutter and Parents Involved.   
In the framework of possibility implicit in the judicial rhetoric of John R. Roberts, the 
application of strict scrutiny to race-conscious attempts to combat racism is a farce that only 
thinly disguises the white supremacist agenda of the Court, because in the radically regressive 
doctrinal framework of Parents Involved, “‘strict scrutiny’” is transformed even beyond its 
restrictive form in Grutter into “a rule that is fatal in fact across the board.”218  In the framework 
of possibility implicit in the judicial rhetoric of Anthony Kennedy and Sandra Day O’Connor, 
“racial classification” is at least not quite a slur.  It is dangerous, “corrosive,” a thing to be 
treated with such reverent caution that Kennedy (and here, the value of the interest convergence 
between O’Connor’s Grutter opinion anti-racist political struggle is yet more underscored) 
seems unable again and again to articulate an example of the constitutionally acceptable race-
conscious education policies he says are possible in theory.  But despite all of this, “race” in this 
framework is not automatically and without question synonymous, as it is in Roberts’ judicial 
rhetoric, with “race-baiter.” The framework of possibility in Kennedy and O’Connor’s judicial 
rhetoric includes a world in which the adaptive, interest-convergence survival of affirmative 
action programs is possible, even given the present Court, because the present Court is one in 
which Kennedy will retain significant influence for the foreseeable future.  
  163 
IV.  Race and Equal Protection in Kennedy’s Separate Concurrence  
 The Parents Involved plurality is not blind to race: its attention to race is the implicit 
doctrinal warrant for a reframing of equal protection219 as a constitutional defense for normative 
white power in U.S. politics and culture.  Carter’s critique of discourses of future solvency in 
affirmative action debates is well taken, but in closely comparing Kennedy and Roberts’ Parents 
Involved opinions, I am also mindful of Patricia J. Williams’ distinction between “color-
blindness as a legitimate hope for the future” and the “naïveté” of relying on willful color-
blindness in the status quo as the policy mechanism to achieve that hope.  As Williams 
summarizes the latter position, “‘I don't think about color, therefore your problems don’t exist.’  
If only it were so easy.”220  If the Parents Involved plurality is radically post-racial, I read 
Kennedy’s doctrinally significant221 separate opinion as more simply color-blind. 
  For Roberts, Seattle and Jefferson County fail both halves of the strict scrutiny test 
(Breyer’s “rule that [for the plurality] is fatal in fact across the board”).  Among other reasons, 
Roberts argues that “the districts have failed to show that they considered methods other than 
explicit racial classifications to achieve their stated ends,” violating Grutter’s admonition that 
“‘serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives’” are required for a 
policy to meet the narrow tailoring requirement.222  Kennedy concurs with the plurality’s 
“judgment” in the case, but only in part with the plurality opinion.  The Justice mostly agrees 
with Roberts’ narrow tailoring analysis—that the policy mechanisms in question were 
unconstitutional—but not with Roberts’ findings as to a lack of compelling state interest.   
Kennedy’s opening paragraph (which frames 223  the significance of his doctrinal 
departures from both the plurality and dissents) is emblematic of the tension Williams articulates 
between the “naïveté” of a color-blind status quo and the common dream of a color-blind future: 
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The Nation’s schools strive to teach that our strength comes from people of different 
races, creeds, and cultures uniting in commitment to the freedom of all…two school 
districts…seek to teach that principle by having classrooms that reflect the racial makeup 
of the surrounding community.  That the school districts consider these plans to be 
necessary should remind us our highest aspirations are yet unfulfilled. But the solutions 
mandated…must themselves be lawful. To make race matter now so that it might not 
matter later may entrench the very prejudices we seek to overcome…the state-mandated 
racial classifications at issue…are unconstitutional as the cases now come to us.224 
Kennedy’s arguments here identify and refute the post-racial ideological underpinnings of 
Roberts’ findings with respect to the “compelling state interest” half of the strict scrutiny test.  
Just as he does in his Grutter dissent, Kennedy frames racial difference here as significant not 
only for its potential future role in a de-racialized multiculturalism, but also for its status quo 
implication in racism.  
Kennedy’s refutation of the doctrinal holdings in the Parents Involved plurality and 
Thomas concurrence also parallel Williams in decisively rejecting Roberts’ post-racial axiom:  
The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires 
school districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling.  I cannot 
endorse that conclusion.  To the extent the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution 
mandates that state and local school authorities must accept the status quo of racial 
isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.225     
For Roberts and in particular for Thomas,226 the “color-blind Constitution” functions as the basis 
from which to articulate a constitutional articulation of post-racial ideology.  Thomas somewhat 
famously227 declares in his concurrence that “my view of the Constitution is Justice Harlan’s 
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view” in Harlan’s lone228 dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: “‘our Constitution is color-blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among its citizens.’”229  Kennedy’s rejection of the doctrinal 
significance of this quotation follows Williams’s urge for us to “be careful not to allow our 
intentions to verge into outright projection.”  Because the Plessy majority instantiated the 
“separate but equal” doctrine in affirming a racist law demarcating blacks and whites into 
separate train cars,230 Harlan’s dissent was not a statement as to how U.S. law and society does 
but rather should operate.  Kennedy insists that doctrinally, Harlan’s “axiom” is a required 
constitutional “aspiration” that nonetheless cannot be regarded as “universal constitutional 
principle.”231  In this moment, Kennedy appears to distance himself from decades of color-blind 
precedent, produced through the persistent constitutional rejection (outside the Swann context of 
public school integration policy) of the voluntary efforts of local governments to recognize and 
attempt to alleviate through law the reality that racial discrimination is not past but “persistent” 
in its detriment to minorities, and in its conference of continued racial advantage upon whites.232  
Nonetheless, Kennedy’s diction at the beginning of his decision is strikingly race value-
neutral—so much so that it rhetorically underwrites “color-blind” doctrine.  The opening 
paragraph lays the groundwork for his finding, contra-Roberts, that racial diversity is a 
“compelling state interest,” but Kennedy does not use the phrase “racial diversity” at any point in 
his opinion.  Instead, Kennedy says obtusely that “the dissent finds that the school districts have 
identified a compelling interest in increasing diversity, even for racial isolation,” and that 
because the plurality does not acknowledge this interest, he cannot join the plurality.233  Even as 
Kennedy rejects Roberts’ dismissal of the racial diversity as a legitimate goal, he grammatically 
avoids articulating his own affirmative defense of concern for the same.  The doctrinal effect is 
that when Kennedy says that “diversity, depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling 
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educational goal a school district may pursue,” the Justice enables but does not prescribe, as the 
Swann Court and Breyer’s Parents Involved dissent do, a finding of constitutional legitimacy for 
policies primarily or solely designed to increase racial diversity.234  
Here Carter’s prescience once again looms large.  The harm of racial segregation as 
Kennedy describes it sounds more like a failure on the part of educators to reveal the reality of 
our presently color-blind nation, rather than the need to enact structural change to achieve the 
dream of a color-blind future.235  Kennedy says that racial diversity is necessary to “teach the 
principle that our strength comes…from uniting,” in the present tense, and the Justice presents 
“diversity of race” as only one of three necessary components for this educational project.236  In 
Kennedy’s United States, it is not racial “hierarchies of value,”237 but “prejudice” that “we seek 
to overcome”;238 prejudice might be foundational to such hierarchies, or it could simply function 
to obscure a person’s ability to see that racial hierarchies of value are no longer extant or relevant 
in our “exemplary”239 society.   
Kennedy’s juxtaposition of “the enduring hope…that race should not matter” with the 
“reality…that too often it does”240 still occurs within the context of what Williams calls a “self-
congratulatory stance of preached universalism” that allows the Court to “indulge in the false 
luxury of a prematurely imagined community.”241  Supreme Court rhetoric must as a question of 
duty valorize the Constitution, but there is a difference between a Justice framing on the one 
hand: (as Justice Harold Blackmun does in his 1989 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company dissent, 
and as Kennedy does in Lawrence v. Texas) “the great promises of the Constitution’s preamble 
and of the guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights” as dreams of a future that have been 
actively repudiated throughout much of our history;242 and on the other (as Kennedy does in 
Parents Involved), those same “great promises” as inherent in “our Nation” which “from [its] 
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inception has sought to preserve and expand the promise of liberty and equality on which it was 
founded.”243  The United States is a country founded on slavery and genocide, “driven by bitter 
histories of imposed hierarchy,”244 but Kennedy (unsurprisingly) enacts a vision of a United 
States exceptional in its equality whose injustices are aberrant flaws to be rectified.  If Roberts’ 
racial ideology is color-blind, but more specifically post-racial, Kennedy’s is less post-racial, but 
more historically and traditionally color-blind. 
Singh’s use of the phrase “color-blind” suggests that color-blind and post-racial ideology 
are indistinct.  Nonetheless, for Williams, unlike Singh, the “imperative to be color-blind” 
certainly makes sense if one is interested in the realization of a genuinely just, free, and 
pluralistic society.  My analysis of Roberts’ opinion for the plurality demonstrates that the racial 
ideology Singh describes is more productively labeled “post-racial,” a question of diction that 
also explicates the difference between Singh’s and Williams’s characterizations of the racist 
status quo.  The important distinction here is that while Kennedy may constitute a color-blind 
politics that consistently fail to challenge white supremacy, that failure is, following Williams, a 
tactical one (albeit one that, given Kennedy’s history of such ‘tactical’ failure, functions on a 
strategic level).  In the ideal world of the Roberts Court, the failure to challenge racial 
“hierarchies of value” is the evident goal.  
Kennedy, like Roberts, strikes down two voluntary attempts on the part of school 
officials to address institutionally protected economies of white privilege plaguing their 
communities.  Kennedy, like Roberts, finds that it does not matter for the purposes of applying 
strict scrutiny whether the use of racial classification is designed to include or exclude 
minorities.245  Kennedy, like Roberts, finds that the mechanisms the school districts have 
implemented are not “narrowly tailored” to their goals. 246   And like Roberts, Kennedy 
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determines that a primary reason for the failure of the narrow tailoring half of the strict scrutiny 
test is what he views as the inexplicable and indefensible division of race (on the part of the 
Seattle School District) into the categories “white” and “non-white.”247  When I say that 
Kennedy’s failure is tactical, I do not mean it is politically or morally insignificant.  Kennedy’s 
opinion at once preserves the future ability of the Equal Protection Clause to protect efforts to 
alleviate racism, and ensures that such protection will be basically worthless in a United States 
context where the failure to implicate whiteness as a racial category unique in its universal, 
legally codified privilege248 is a primary reason why just efforts to truly achieve a color-blind 
future “are so often doomed to frustration.”249 
In the near future, Kennedy’s and Roberts’ opinions will have the same effect; Kennedy’s 
defense of a more traditionally color-blind position against the pernicious post-racial ideology of 
the plurality and Thomas’ concurrence did not—I can only surmise—do much to comfort the 
respondents in Parents Involved.  It certainly did not bring much comfort to the City of Seattle, 
where “segregation across Seattle Schools is worse than it was in the 1980s.”250  Kennedy, 
concurring with Roberts, may decry the “white/non-white” basis of the Seattle allocation 
policy’s racial classification as puzzlingly anti-pluralist, but as Jen Graves eloquently argues in 
The Stranger, “[it is] not that racial experience is monolithic. It's not black and white. But 
it's real. And across all measurable strata, white people in Seattle have it better [than everyone 
else].”251   
The Court has granted certiorari in the next school integration case, Fisher v. University 
of Texas at Austin,252 which will probably be decided in favor of the white petitioner according 
to the precedent laid out by the Parents Involved plurality.253  Such an outcome is likely, 
however, as much because Roberts will still be the Chief Justice, and because Thomas, Scalia, 
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and Alito will still vote with him, as it is for any forcible reason of precedent.  Kennedy’s 
Parents Involved opinion would provide him with at least some basis in stare decisis to 
determine that the University of Texas at Austin admissions policy is finally254 the one that 
meets his exacting narrow tailoring requirements.  But as the constitutional law Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky points out, Kennedy has “never voted to uphold an affirmative action program.”255  
Even if Kennedy decides to attempt a majority in favor of the respondents (a prospect 
complicated also by Justice Elena Kagan’s recusal from the case256), a Fisher decided for the 
respondents, regardless of who wrote the opinion, would go no farther than Grutter in its defense 
of racial classification for the purpose of minority inclusion.  And, because of its different 
context of higher education admissions, it would do little to repair the damage wrought to Swann 
by the Parents Involved plurality.     
The potential difference between a Fisher decision grounded in Kennedy or Roberts’ 
Parents Involved opinions is nonetheless significant—even if both possible opinions, as is likely, 
would hold for the Plaintiffs.  Adam Liptak, the Court reporter for the Times, declares “diversity 
is the last man standing, the sole remaining legal justification for racial preferences in deciding 
who can study at public universities.”257  In a Fisher decided for the Plaintiffs, the opinion that 
gains the most votes—that is, Kennedy’s or Roberts’—will determine which of three very 
different outcomes is realized: diversity remaining upright as a post-racial “man,” diversity 
remaining upright as a “man” in a world of unfortunately present racial significance who is 
generally blind to his own, and of diversity being knocked down from recognized constitutional 
existence altogether.          
Just as O’Connor’s highly limiting Grutter opinion is an important example of “interest 
convergence,” so too is Kennedy’s even more limiting opinion in Parents Involved.  Kennedy’s 
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argumentative choices in Parents Involved can be read as invitations for a future Court more 
inclined to, as Blackmun pleads in Croson, stop its present regression and “do its best to fulfill 
the great promises” of the Constitution.258  The political constitution of the Court will change.  
The manner in which it does so can be influenced by social movements grounded in progressive 
identity politics, 259  but future judges will continue to be argumentatively and politically 
constrained by the range of possible interpretation of constitutional precedent laid down in 
previous judicial opinion.  Not all opinions are equal in stare decisis.  If his opinion 
accomplishes no other good, Kennedy’s refusal to join Roberts in Parents Involved at least 
undermines the plurality’s future credibility by preventing a majority.260  Future post-Roberts 
Courts, if they are so inclined, will have the ready option of choosing to find Kennedy’s Parents 
Involved analysis more controlling on a school integration or related cases than the plurality’s—
or even, because of the relative weakness of a plurality opinion—a weakness created entirely by 
Kennedy’s decision to write separately—choosing to repudiate Roberts’ radical white-power 
grab in a re-affirmation of Burger’s unanimous opinion for the Court in Swann.   
This may not mean anything more than that Kennedy allows for a future Equal Protection 
Clause that is color-blind rather than post-racial, but such a perspective may give too much 
weight to the iconic significance of individual opinions, read as whole cloth.  As Kennedy argues 
in Parents Involved, there can and should be “rare instances” in which a Court can draw on 
arguments from separate, non-majority opinions to more credibly “maintain our own positions in 
the face of stare decisis when fundamental points of doctrine are at stake.”261  The implication 
(unlikely, but present) is that Kennedy may have reconsidered his concurrence with much of 
Roberts’ application of strict scrutiny if the Parents Involved dissents had relied on “separate 
opinions” rather than on the Gratz and Grutter majorities.262   
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Stevens, in fact, does rely on some of these separate opinions, which is perhaps why 
when Kennedy refers to “the dissent,” he means “Breyer’s dissenting opinion,”263 functionally 
excluding Stevens from his consideration.  As Stevens argues, “the [plurality’s] only justification 
for refusing to acknowledge the obvious importance” of the difference between minority 
inclusion and exclusion in determining the application of stare decisis “is the citation of a few 
recent opinions—none of which even approached unanimity.”264  Stevens’ argument here is an 
excellent example of the questionable impact the Roberts plurality will have on precedent in a 
circumstance where the Chief Justice no longer controls the majority of the Court.   
More importantly, Stevens—and ironically, Thomas’s confident invocation of Harlan’s 
dissent in Plessy—provides a template for the possibility that some of Kennedy’s arguments and 
not others may be effectively sutured into a broader judicial “text” from which a future Court 
may derive a doctrinal basis for interpreting the Equal Protection Clause on the basis of neither 
color-blind nor post-racial ideology.  But my argument here is not that Kennedy’s framing 
arguments in his Parents Involved opinion should be read as components of a possible future 
constitutional meta-text about race.  Rather, the particular way that Kennedy frames the 
relationship between the Equal Protection Clause and the subjectivity of petitioners to the Court 
so as to distinguish himself from Roberts’ post-racial position in Parents Involved suggests a 
different meta-text—one that constitutes the possibility of a post-racially queer subject of 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.    
V.  Parents Involved, Romer, and Lawrence 
 
Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence offers a future vision of constitutional law that could be 
aligned in favor of a Constitution standing as a “perhaps even forever unknowable”265 legal 
resource for the struggle against violently heteronormative oppression.  I have discussed David L. 
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Eng’s argument about the relationship between Kennedy’s due process arguments and the 
“racialization of intimacy”; here I want to begin this section by turning to Jasbir K. Puar’s related 
critique, articulated through the metaphor of “racist and nationalist queer liberal imaginaries” 
“[sneaking] in through the backdoor” of the decision.266  Puar focuses in part on the “silences” in 
both the decision and popular and critical responses to it around the “symbolic economy of [the] 
interracial pair” (Lawrence and Garner) who are the plaintiffs in Lawrence.  These silences 
demonstrate for Puar the multiple ways in which the decision participates in and is productive of 
the “either/or logic that endlessly produces racialized subjects as heterosexual and gay subjects 
as white,”267 as well as ongoing discursive politics of anti-miscegenation that persist in both 
hetero and homosexual communities in the United States.268   
The same passage that I identify in Chapter One as central to my claims regarding 
Kennedy’s framing of due process—the penultimate paragraph in his Lawrence majority—is 
also exemplary of Puar and Eng’s “queer liberal” imaginary:  
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the 
Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, 
they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They 
knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once 
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, 
persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater 
freedom.269 
Just as I argue in Chapter One for the temporary “bracketing” of those aspects of Kennedy’s 
doctrinal arguments that rely on liberal, anti-radical valuations of privacy, so I suggest here that 
parts of Kennedy’s opinion (and not others) still suggest the difficult possibility of a Constitution 
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protective of not a liberal, but radically nominalist or anti-essentialist, queer “subject before the 
law.”270  I maintain this argument partly because (as I note previously) the history of the Due 
Process Clauses—especially the Fifth Amendment version—is not fundamentally implicated in 
the peculiar racial history of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Due process protections do not require 
any statist demarcation and valuation of identity categories; the radical potential of due process 
jurisprudence is inherent in precisely what Mohr identifies as its its apparent relative lack of 
utility for mainstream liberal queer agendas.   
Nonetheless, the optimistic reading I offer, as a component of radical queer knowledge of 
Fourteenth Amendment rhetoric, of a possible future for radical queer subjectivities constituted 
in substantive due process rhetoric is, if not foundationally naturalized as white, at least 
racialized in the sense that the racialized components of these possible subjectivities position are 
occluded in the rhetoric through which it is produced.  Kennedy’s meta-framing of substantive 
due process in Lawrence, and his more explicitly doctrinal framing of his equal protection 
arguments in Parents Involved, can be read and interpreted as independently significant 
fragments of the whole opinions of which they are a part.  But they are also vital components of 
a Kennedy Fourteenth Amendment text, linked both sideways and linearly across time and 
precedent, whose potential for radical queer politics is grounded in an implicit idea of a post-
racial queer legal subject.   
The absence of an explicit suspect classification argument in Roberts’ and similar 
applications of strict scrutiny to affirmative action and other school integration programs does 
not mean that these applications do not rely argumentatively on an implicit warrant of suspect 
classification.  In his treatise Constitutional Law, Chemerinsky argues that “no topic in 
constitutional law is more controversial than affirmative action,”271 primarily because of the 
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fraught doctrinal history in determining how scrutiny should be applied in cases of minority 
inclusion.  Indeed, Sandra Day O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in Croson272 (read against 
Blackmun’s dissent) shows, in light of my arguments about Roberts and post-racial ideology, 
that the Parents Involved plurality is not the first, but rather the most radical and far-reaching 
(especially in its specific destruction of Swann) articulation—as Puar says, silently “floating 
upon” the explicit doctrinal arguments––of a white racialized subject as a suspect class.      
In Lawrence v. Texas, both Kennedy’s and O’Connor’s opinions rely on liberal 
valuations of privacy and individual liberty that are problematic to radical queer politics, but 
given the choice between the two, Kennedy’s is preferable from a radical queer standpoint.  
School integration policies will be inevitably subject to Supreme Court review for the 
foreseeable future.  Given the choice, advocates for addressing racial disparity in schools through 
the “candid” method of “direct assignments based on student racial classifications”273 should 
pick Stevens’s—and parts of Breyer’s—dissent as their constitutional defense.  The more 
realistic decision for courts in the near future, however, will be the Parents Involved plurality or 
the Parents Involved Kennedy, and Kennedy is clearly preferable.  The problem is that both of 
these least worst choices—between Kennedy and O’Connor’s opinions in Lawrence, and 
between Kennedy and Roberts’s opinions in Parents Involved––are articulated here in isolation: 
when read together as an assemblage of Fourteenth Amendment discourse, Kennedy’s framing 
of due process in Lawrence and equal protection in Parents Involved become more ideologically 
insidious from the perspective of queer of color politics. 
Kennedy’s framing of the relationship between equal protection jurisprudence and 
subjectivity before the law is strikingly similar to his due process rhetoric in Lawrence:  
And if this [the idea that if race is the problem, race is the instrument with which to solve 
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it cannot be accepted as an analytical leap forward] is a frustrating duality of the Equal 
Protection Clause it simply reflects the duality of our history and our attempts to promote 
freedom in a world that sometimes seems set against it.  Under our Constitution the 
individual, child or adult, can find his own identity, can define her own persona, without 
state intervention that classifies on the basis of his race or the color of her skin.274    
If Kennedy’s particular framing of due process in Lawrence suggests a Constitution that may 
eventually be available to the demands of queer “subjects before the law” without the restrictions 
inherent in “equality model” requirements of essentialist definition and fixed subordinate identity, 
his similar framing of an ideal mode of interpretation for the Equal Protection Clause in Parents 
Involved renders that queer subject radical, even poststructural, but also post-racial.  The 
imperative to avoid policies that might constitute a petitioner’s racial identity suggests that the 
post-racial mutability, and radical queer mutability of identity in Kennedy’s Fourteenth 
Amendment rhetoric are inextricably linked.  
  In Parents Involved, Kennedy argues that the Equal Protection Clause should be read in 
a similar light as his (at once originalist275 and loosely-constructivist) valorization in Lawrence 
of the Due Process Clauses’ lack of specificity.  Those who designed both clauses intended their 
meaning to change over time.  But in Parents Involved (responding to Breyer’s claims as to the 
original reasons for ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment), the Justice evacuates rather than 
evokes the originalist significance of the framer’s intent, calling for a broad mode of equal 
protection jurisprudence that aligns the Equal Protection Clause toward a future apart from its 
unfortunately necessary role in our sordid racist history.  For Kennedy, just as the Due Process 
Clauses should not be applied restrictively because our inherently limited jurisprudence has 
failed to conceive of all legitimate permutations of identity and relationship, so should the Equal 
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Protection Clause be protected as a resource for self-constitution through the Constitution, rather 
than maintained as a barrier to each individual’s quest to locate their own subjectivity vis-à-vis 
our “exemplary”276 polity.  Here Kennedy’s insistence on a color-blind politics that still 
recognize the necessity of anti-racist action is predicated on his framing of the Equal Protection 
Clause as presently enabling a post-racial legal subjectivity.     
The similarity between Kennedy’s framing of due process and equal protection in two 
opinions four years apart is no aberration; the Justice who is (erroneously, I think) known to 
many for his changeable and overly rhetorical legal character277 has been remarkably consistent 
in his nominalist framing of both equal protection and due process.  Kennedy begins his opinion 
in Romer v. Evans (517 U.S. 620, 1996),1 with the declaration that:  
One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court [in his Plessy dissent] 
that the Constitution “neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”  Unheeded 
then, those words now are understood to state a commitment to the law's neutrality where 
the rights of persons are at stake. The Equal Protection Clause enforces this principle and 
today requires us to hold invalid a provision of Colorado's Constitution.278 
For Kennedy, the neutrality of Equal Protection in Romer primarily concerns the question 
of government interest, while the neutrality of equal protection in Parents Involved primarily 
concerns the best way to narrowly tailor a race-conscious policy toward the dream of a 
heterogeneous society free of racial oppression.  As I argue above, one of the most progressive 
moments in Parents Involved is Kennedy’s rejection of Thomas’ framing of Harlan’s axiom that, 
                                                
1 The decision struck down Amendment 2 to the Colorado State Constitution: “‘No Protected Status Based on 
Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or 
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or 
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, 
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have 
or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the 
Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.’”  CO Const. Art. II, § 30b., 1992.    
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again, “‘our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among its 
citizens.’”279  In Romer, Kennedy cites the same passage from the Plessy dissent, except that he 
chops off the axiom that “our Constitution is color-blind.”  In Parents Involved, Kennedy 
ostensibly seeks to preserve the Equal Protection Clause from those who would wield it for the 
purpose of harmful discrimination.  But in Romer, he tellingly does not seem to consider 
Harlan’s dictate as to color-blindness useful to a finding about sexual-identity discrimination.  In 
other words, Romer’s uptake of Harlan’s dissent is color-blind in precisely the way that Kennedy 
rejects in his refutation of Thomas’ Parents Involved concurrence.     
Kennedy goes on to argue in Romer that “it is not within our constitutional tradition to 
enact laws of this sort.  Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's 
guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open 
on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.”280 This statement, combined with his more 
doctrinally famous281 declaration that “[the amendment’s] sheer breadth is so discontinuous with 
the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward 
the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests,” seems to presage 
Kennedy’s sweeping interpretation of the scope of the Due Process Clauses in Lawrence, as well 
as his statement in Parents Involved that “under our Constitution the individual, child or adult, 
can find his own identity, can define her own persona, without state intervention that classifies 
on the basis of his race or the color of her skin.”  In both Romer and Lawrence,282 however, 
Kennedy finds no need to apply heightened scrutiny to the statutes under review; it is enough 
that they, remarkably,283 fail to survive even the rational basis test.   
Kennedy’s spirited defense of the application of strict scrutiny in Parents Involved is no 
more than consistent with his arguments in Grutter, and with the long-standing “conservative” 
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treatment of the test with respect to race on the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.  But when 
Kennedy’s Parents Involved opinion is considered along with Romer and Lawrence as a 
component of his meta-Fourteenth Amendment rhetoric, the contrast between the levels of 
scrutiny in Parents Involved, and Romer and Lawrence is striking.  Read together as fragments 
comprising a whole doctrinal text, Kennedy’s arguments in Romer, Lawrence, and Parents 
Involved imagine a “living Constitution”284 where the Due Process Clauses are available to queer 
subjects unfettered by statist definition, and where the Equal Protection Clause, simultaneously, 
is prevented except in the most specific and remarkable instances from being used as a tool to 
maintain the validity of state recognized classifications.   
I say state “recognized” to emphasize the post-racial ideology inherent in Kennedy’s 
declaration that “racial labels” are “state-mandated” even in the case of the Seattle and Jefferson 
County policies, but when taken separately, these interpretations of due process and equal 
protection seem positive from a radical queer perspective only if that perspective is 
foundationally independent of race.  On its own, Kennedy’s opinion in Parents Involved is a 
“color-blind” check against the post-racial politics of Roberts’ plurality opinion.  On its own, 
Kennedy’s substantive framing of equal protection and due process in Lawrence is productive of 
latent possibilities for radical queer of color politics in U.S. judicial rhetoric.  When taken 
together, as parts of a coherent whole, these opinions as an assemblage of Kennedy’s Fourteenth 
Amendment rhetoric constitute a subject before the law whose post-raciality is essential to the 
radical legibility of her queerness.     
VI.  Conclusion: Post-Racial Queer 
By taking up these opinions and fragments of legal discourse in terms of their 
relationship to one another not only through doctrinal argument from precedent, but also their 
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implication through: ideology; synthesis and antithesis; and mutual uptake and elision; I attempt 
to examine the ways in which doctrinal arguments about race and sexuality are each productive 
of and implicated in the other—and also, more directly, are each the other.  The “post-racially 
queer subject” is a critical formulation; it is also a further development of my argument as to the 
demarcated range of identities that might successfully look to the present and future Court for 
recognition, access, and protection under and through the presently inevitable fantasy of U.S. 
constitutional sovereignty.  Roberts and Kennedy might often be described as “conservative” and 
“moderate,” but the “collocation”285 of various doctrinal arguments through which Kennedy 
frames his application of due process and equal protection arguments offers a more useful 
distinction—from a queer of color perspective—between the Court’s leading “conservative” and 
“swing” Justices.  Read through the assembled collocation of Kennedy’s Fourteenth Amendment 
rhetoric, the latent possibility of a radical queer subject of Kennedy’s Fourteenth Amendment is 
dependent on the unspoken idea of the post-racial queer.   
By “post-racial queer subject” I mean, finally, a radically nominalist form of sexualized 
subjectivity that retains a judicially recognized imperative to seek the protection of U.S. 
constitutional sovereignty, against ongoing statutory, institutional, and other valences of anti-
queer oppression.  Furthermore, persons articulated through this form of subjectivity will be 
permitted to stand before the law as who they claim to be, with the understanding that the law’s 
judicial representatives will accept the nature of this claim, and that furthermore this claim of 
particular being is not a necessary component of a successful petition for judicial protection.  
This radical queer subject, therefore, will not only be free of the requirement to self-define and 
describe via the legal sovereign’s own oppressively single-axis “framework for difference”—it 
will also be permitted to approach the law via an explicit repudiation of that framework, and to 
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demand judicial institutional recognition of that repudiation as a component of the judiciary’s 
own argumentative re-legitimation of its sovereignty.  This is the potential for a radical queer 
subject-before-law that I see in Kennedy’s meta-argumentative framing of substantive due 
process in Lawrence.  When I say, based on my reading of Kennedy’s arguments in Romer and 
Parents Involved, that this radical potential depends on the idea of a post-racial queer legal 
subject, I mean Kennedy’s meta-text suggests that the condition that must be met for a radical 
queer legal subjectivity is the acceptance of the present and future of a post-racial society.  In the 
constitutive judicial rhetorical framework of Kennedy’s meta-textual Fourteenth Amendment, 
the mutability and freedom of the radical queer subject-before-law is a condition of—is made 
possible through—her radical post-raciality.     
This racialized (where race is abject) queer subject position suggested in Kennedy’s due 
process and equal protection rhetoric is not grounded in a homogeneous, white-normative 
assumption of identity, but is rather a whole constituted out of fragments of at once radical and 
conservative possibility.  This is cold comfort, but given the presently inevitable significance of 
Chief Justice Roberts’ Supreme Court, Kennedy may be all the comfort to be had.  The task of a 
queer of color legal rhetoric vis-à-vis Kennedy’s Fourteenth Amendment is thus to critically seek 
out what possibilities for queer futures there may be on the Court, working always from the 
assumption that these futures will have the inherent potential for both the dual production and 
dual foreclosure of possibilities for radically progressive jurisprudence. 
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CHAPTER THREE: MARRIAGE CASES 
 
“A rose by any other name may smell as sweet, but to the couple desiring to enter into a 
committed lifelong relationship, a marriage by the name of ‘registered domestic partnership’ 
does not.” 
 
- Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt, for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Perry v. Brown 
 
Lawrence v. Texas is not about marriage.  “The present case,” Kennedy insists, “does not 
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
homosexual persons seek to enter.”1  Lawrence is about sex, sodomy, homosexuality, and 
consent—all taken up, in Kennedy’s opinion, through the doctrinal lens of privacy, or in Eng’s 
terms, a “legal genealogy” of sex and privacy in U.S. Constitutional law.2   Part of the 
significance of Kennedy’s 2003 opinion is thus that it makes a distinction between U.S. state and 
federal judicial pronouncements on the constitutionality of “gay marriage,”3 beginning just five 
months after Lawrence with the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s ban of any exclusion of 
gay and lesbian couples from Massachusetts “civil marriage” in Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health.4  In the words of their authors, Lawrence is about people who engage in “sexual 
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle”;5 while the marriage cases are about “people of the 
same sex”6 who wish to marry. If Lawrence concerns a person’s (limited) right to act queerly7; 
the innovation of the post-Lawrence marriage cases is that they are primarily interested in queer 
peoples’ right to marry (other people, queerly).8 
The Texas and Georgia sodomy laws ruled unconstitutional by U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Anthomy M. Kennedy’s 2003 Court order9 are still on the books in 2013,10 as are similar 
laws in Massachusetts,11 fifteen other states,12 and the United States’ Uniform Code of Military 
Justice.13  Nonetheless, the primary foci of national “GLBTQ” organizational politics no longer 
include resistance to sex criminalization.  The “struggle” for queer justice has come to be defined 
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instead14 through the telos and topos of “recognition of marriage as the boundary between a 
meaningful and supported existence and remaining subject to other’s intentions and 
worldviews.”15  Marriage is now the putative boundary between a just and unjust society for gay 
and lesbian persons.  The rhetoric establishing marriage as such functions to exclude those 
individuals and groups who are primarily affected by non-marital and familial politics of 
exclusion and oppression, from the benefits of lesbian and gay civil rights victories.  Regardless 
of the outcome of marriage “recognition” struggles, sodomy laws will continue their active role 
in the daily lives of, in particular, queer, trans, poor people of color.  The recent liberatory 
progress of U.S. state and federal judicial rhetoric on marriage has accordingly done less than it 
might seem for “marginalized queer families of all kinds.”16  
This is not to downplay the significance of that progress.  The primacy of marriage in 
national gay and lesbian civil rights rhetoric underscores the opportunity the “marriage equality” 
frame represents for the national GLBTQ civil rights movement to foment public address that 
will have immediate and tangible material effect.  Judicial and presidential17 declaration as a 
remedy for the criminalization of queer sex has failed.  At best, judicial and presidential 
repudiations of sex criminalization—including Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion and Barack 
Obama’s recent National Defense Authorization Act signing statements—have been only a 
partial remedy for the various and significant injustices perpetuated by sodomy statutes.  But the 
adaptive quality of judicial rhetoric has allowed the major attention of the national “well-
resourced” “LGBT legal” movement18 to turn once again to the Supreme Court—this time to 
demand the Justices’ response to federal and California prohibitions on same sex marriage.  No 
matter what the Court determines, it is nearly certain that early twenty-first century U.S. judicial 
rhetoric will prove empirically more immediately effective when stipulating boundaries of 
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legitimate marriage, than when stipulating boundaries of legitimate sex.  This is because 
marriage is a legally produced category.  One cannot be married without recognition from law.  
What judges say about the boundaries of sex criminalization produces but does not actually 
determine those boundaries, but judicial statements about the boundaries of marriage become the 
boundaries themselves.  Judicial arguments about marriage are thus an ideal focus for the 
rhetorical study of judicial institutional illocutions that function as “sovereign performatives”19 
of relational and sexual identity.  This chapter examines some of these arguments through a 
reading of some of the marriage cases soon to have their day in Court.  The Supreme Court has 
decided to take up the question of same sex marriage through multiple and contrasting 
precedential genealogies, each of which represent a different set of futures for Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence, and LGBT and queer of color legal subjectivity.  I read portions of 
these precedential genealogies to argue for the possibility of a Fourteenth Amendment right to 
marriage that queerly contests the bounds of that institution.  
I.  Gay Marriage Arrives at Court   
 
Goodridge led directly to Massachusetts becoming the first U.S. state to endorse the 
solemnization of gay and lesbian marriage applicants, but the decision is a shaky landmark for 
what Chandan Reddy calls the “gay marriage movement,”20 as it might have done more to 
foment same-sex marriage prohibition than legalization.  Goodridge appears to be a major 
catalyst for the first of three waves of state prohibitions of same-sex marriage: the first in 2004 
and 2005, after Goodridge; the second in 2006, after the final defeat of the federal constitutional 
Marriage Protection Amendment21 in the U.S. Congress;22 and the third in 2008, after Chief 
Justice Ronald M. George of the California Supreme Court on May 15 ordered marriage licenses 
issued to same sex couples in In re Marriage Cases (43 Cal.4th 757, 2008).23   
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California voters passed the November 4, 2008, “initiative constitutional amendment” 
“Proposition 8” 24 (repealing In re Marriage Cases) at the same time as Arizona’s Proposition 
10225 and Florida’s Amendment 2.26  Proposition 8 is not the first state constitutional amendment 
to overturn a state court’s legalization of same sex marriage;27 nor, qualitatively, is it the worst.28 
New Mexico, New Jersey, and Rhode Island are presently the only U.S. states that do not allow 
same sex marriage, which do not also specifically ban it;29 this leaves thirty-eight states with 
explicit bans, most of which have far less legal recognition for same-sex relationships than does 
California.  Nonetheless, in 2013, the California “marriage amendment” retains—in both queer 
legal study and popular U.S. media—a stronger synecdochal relationship to gay and lesbian 
politics than other individual state actions on marriage, or other national sites of dispute over gay 
and lesbian civil rights.30  California’s population and U.S. popular cultural importance make 
major decisions by the state easy objects of study, but I think Proposition 8 is so important not 
because it concerns California, but because it represents the segment of the national “marriage 
fight”31 that is about marriage itself.     
The passage of Prop 8 instigated protests throughout California and the United States.32  
By focusing on California’s amendment as the frame through which to address gay and lesbian 
civil rights broadly, these public actions begged a question that became the center of a strategic 
debate among same sex marriage campaigners: should the energies of the political movement 
that had opposed the initiative’s passage, and similar political movements in other states, be 
directed primarily toward legalization through popular amendments; federal court challenges; or 
through a state-by-state legislative and “state courts” approach?33  In May 2009—just before the 
California Supreme Court rejected a state constitutional challenge to the amendment—the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Lambda Legal (the organization that represented 
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Lawrence and Garner), the National Center for Lesbian Rights, the National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force, and others published “Make Change, Not Lawsuits,” a lengthy argumentative fact 
sheet urging individual members of the “gay marriage movement” to avoid suing governments or 
employers over their right to marry, out of concern for the possibility of “bad rulings,” which 
would make it “much more difficult for us to win marriage, and will certainly make [achieving 
recognized gay marriage] take much longer.” 34   Chief Justice George’s unsurprising 35 
determination for the California Supreme Court in Strauss v. Horton that Proposition was 
“valid” 36  as an amendment “equal in effect to any other provision of the California 
Constitution”37 reinforced the stakes of this debate over strategy by functionally requiring that 
any federal legal challenge to Proposition 8 hinge on claims of the substantive value of 
“marriage” itself—on whether the chance to achieve the status of marriage should be construed 
as a fundamental component of the liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.38   
After Strauss, The Nation’s Richard Kim39 called on queer activists to recognize the 
“relative equality” of post-Proposition 8 “marriage and domestic partnership” in California as a 
reason to shift gay rights movement energies away from an expensive repeal campaign, and 
toward broader labor and economic inequalities unaffected by, as the Ninth Circuit would later 
put it, “California’s same-sex couples”’ access to the “designation of the term marriage.”40  
Kim’s strategic proposal was distinct from the more visible public debate over tactics, as it 
questioned the desirability both of a judicial focus for the “gay marriage movement,” and the 
ultimate goal of the movement itself.  This proposal is particularly fascinating because it 
articulates, from a queer social movement perspective, an argument against focusing attention on 
the substantive content of the “term”41 “marriage” that echoes the position (that there are more 
important civil rights considerations than access to the term “marriage”) of the State of 
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California and dissenting Justice Carol A. Corrigan in opposition to the majority’s order in 
Marriage Cases.     
Needless to say, Kim’s proposal was not followed—Proposition 8 was challenged in 
Federal District Court and found to be unconstitutional by Chief Judge Vaughn R. Walker’s 
2010 ruling for the Northern District of California in Perry v. Schwarzenegger (704 F.Supp.2d 
921),42 a decision narrowly affirmed in Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt’s opinion for the Ninth 
Circuit in Perry v. Brown (671 F.3d 1052, 2012).43  The “gay marriage movement” seems to be 
succeeding with precisely the multi-cameral approach44 to achieving access to civil marriage that 
every major organizational member of the movement hoped to avoid in 2009––but of course, the 
ultimate contribution of recent state and federal court, legislative, and executive victories to the 
success of this ad-hoc, multi-cameral approach remains a contingent proposition.  Just as the 
ACLU et al warned in 2009, the ability of the movement to expand rapidly into more hostile 
electoral territory (states with recent constitutional gay marriage bans) now depends in large part 
on the outcome of two cases before the Supreme Court:45 Hollingsworth v. Perry,46 the current 
iteration of the challenge to Proposition 8; and United States v. Windsor,47 the result of New 
York City resident Edith Windsor’s suit against the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).48  
As of this writing, these will be argued in turn before the Court on March 26 and 27, 2013.49   
Hollingsworth and Windsor are both about marriage, but they represent distinct doctrinal 
histories.  The Perry cases, which directly affect only the manner in which individual states can 
set marriage policy, are primarily about the constitutional value of the “designation of the term 
marriage”50 itself, because there was little other means of substantively distinguishing between 
the effective California of Proposition 8 and that desired by its challengers.  Conversely, the 
original plaintiff in Windsor had equal access to the designation of marriage under New York 
  197 
State law, but were denied access to any of the federal benefits accorded to heterosexually 
married persons in identical situations (Windsor was allowed to be married, legally, but as of this 
writing does not have access to federal benefits meant for people who are married).  The 
questions about the substantive content of a “designation” that animate the Perry cases are barely 
mentioned in Windsor’s entire line of precedent. Accordingly, I focus primarily on the Perry 
cases and their California Supreme Court antecedents as an ideal laboratory for studying the 
substantive content of legal marriage recognition rhetoric.   
The particular focus of Perry cases on the constitutional content of the “term” marriage—
and the debate their various judicial authors stage over the material and performative 
significance of rhetoric—make them exemplary of one of the animating questions of this 
dissertation: that is, the role and implication of judicial rhetoric in constituting and delimiting the 
range of possible queer subjectivities before U.S. law.  In the following sections, I first perform 
an analysis of the rhetorical debate over the “term” marriage in Marriage Cases, before turning 
to Circuit Judge Reinhardt’s particular doctrinal invocation of Kennedy’s opinion in Romer v. 
Evans, one that I argue suggests some potential—even from within the fraught and limited space 
of marriage politics—for queer “nominalist” subjectivity.  
II.  Marriage Cases, “Marriage,” and Queer Relations 
 In In re Marriage Cases, the California Supreme Court took up “six consolidated appeals” 
of cases brought in the “wake of” its previous holding in Lockyer v. City and County of San 
Francisco (33 Cal.4th 1055, 2004) that San Francisco had erred in issuing marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples prior to a judicial review of the constitutionality of “the California statutes 
limiting marriage to a union between a man and a woman.”51  These included: California Family 
Code § 300 (a) (1977), “marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a 
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man and a woman”; and Family Code § 308.5––“only marriage between a man and a woman is 
valid or recognized in California”52––the statute popularly enacted in 2000 through Proposition 
22.53  Marriage Cases is a state court decision concerned with the meaning and appropriate 
application of the California State Constitution; it is relatively unfettered by, and not intrinsically 
connected to, the U.S. federal judicial opinions that make up the other objects of study in this 
project.54  The Marriage Cases nonetheless have an important effect on the federal judicial 
debate that would come after: the argumentative framework of their majority influenced the 
design of Proposition 8 as a “singular and limited change”55 to the California Constitution; and 
the Ninth Circuit took George’s re-affirmation of this argumentative framework in Strauss to be 
controlling on its interpretation of Proposition 8’s effect on California law.56 
For a rhetorical critic, In re Marriage Cases is an argumentative delight—not necessarily 
because the arguments between the California Justices are framed “as arguments,” but because 
the major stasis points in their doctrinal debate are explicitly concerned with the relationship 
between language, identity, and rights.  The argumentative exchange between the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Marriage Cases functions implicitly as a debate about the substantive 
value and impact of rhetoric itself.       
George previews his conclusion in Marriage Cases with a “like-race” simile57 that helps 
preserve an interesting distinction between gay identity and queer relationship forms, arguing 
that because California may not deny a person access to rights on the basis of their “race or 
gender,” both “gay” people and “same-sex couples” have the right to form the same “family 
relationships” as both “heterosexual” people, and “opposite-sex couples”:58  
Our state now recognizes that...an individual’s sexual orientation—like a person’s race or 
gender—does not constitute a legitimate basis upon which to deny or withhold legal 
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rights. We therefore conclude that in view of the substance and significance of the 
fundamental constitutional right to form a family relationship, the California Constitution 
properly must be interpreted to guarantee this basic civil right to all Californians, whether 
gay or heterosexual, and to same-sex couples as well as to opposite-sex couples.59 
In the footnote to this passage, the Chief Justice notes that “for convenience...in this opinion we 
shall use the term ‘gay,’ with reference to an individual, to relate either to a lesbian or to a gay 
man, and the term ‘gay couple’ to refer to a couple consisting of either two women or two 
men.”60  In the context of the footnote, this passage contains a tautological approach to defining 
the gay legal subject, begging the question of whether the gayness of same-sex couples derives 
from their gay members, or whether a person’s gay identity is determined by their participation 
in relationships with individuals of the same sex.  
This question is compounded by the fact that George actually uses the term “gay couple” 
only three times in a one-hundred page61 decision;62 variants of “same-sex couple” appear more 
times than it would be useful to note.  Marriage Cases defines “gay individuals” as “persons 
who are sexually attracted to persons of the same sex and thus, if inclined to enter into a 
marriage relationship, would choose to marry a person of their own sex or gender.”63  Unlike 
“gay couple,” George appears to assume that the term “same-sex couple” is self-defining.  But 
his definition of both “gay couple” and “gay individuals” functions to interpellate same-sex 
couples themselves as discrete entities that are ontologically gay.  Both George’s definition of 
“gay individuals” and his footnote about “gay couples” can be usefully read in the converse, as 
in—“in this opinion, we shall use the term ‘same-sex’ to refer to a couple consisting of either 
two lesbians or two gay men”; “two persons in a marriage relationship who are of the same sex 
are sexually attracted to each other because of their identical sex and are thus gay.”  “Same-sex 
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couples” are interpellated as “gay” through the logic of desire in George’s definitional 
arguments: both because each member of these couples must be gay (anyone who is not gay 
would not choose a partner of the same sex); and because there is something intrinsically gay 
(that is, relating to same-sex desire) about two people of the same sex joining together as 
members of a couple.  
One of the more important questions before the Court in Marriage Cases is the 
substantive weight of the “designation of marriage”64 itself—this is particularly true if the case is 
read as an argumentative exchange between the majority, portions of the Attorney General’s 
brief for the state of California, and Justice Carol A. Corrigan’s dissent, in which she argues that 
“this case involves only the names of [domestic partnerships and marriages].”65  The civil right 
of gay and lesbian individuals who are not in a state-recognized relationship to enter into 
marriage, and the civil right of gay and lesbian individuals who are in a state-recognized 
relationship to have that relationship recognized as a marriage, are conflated in the majority 
opinion as the “state constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry.”66  The defendants in the 
case argue that California’s marriage laws “do not prohibit gay individuals from marrying a 
person of the opposite sex,” and are thus not an example of discrimination “on the basis of sexual 
orientation.”67  They concede that these statutes may have “a ‘disparate impact’ on gay persons,” 
but this alone is not enough to trigger the strict scrutiny test.68  George responds––as Walker 
would do in Perry v. Schwarzenegger69—by describing marriage as a definitional component of 
sexual orientation identity, meaning that laws prohibiting gay persons from marrying other gay 
persons do so on the basis of their sexual orientation and are thus “clearly and directly” 
discriminatory.70   
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In making this argument, George seamlessly transitions between “gay individuals” and 
“same-sex couples.”71  He moves from the data that “a statute that limits marriage to a union of 
persons of opposite sexes, thereby placing marriage outside the reach of couples of the same 
sex...imposes different treatment on the basis of sexual orientation” to the claim that “the current 
California statutes realistically must be viewed as discriminating against gay persons on the basis 
of their homosexual orientation.”72  The terminological slippage between same-sex couples and 
gay persons as the entities subject to discrimination is important to the structural (logical) 
resistance of George’s doctrinal arguments to Corrigan and the Attorney General’s primary 
objection––as the Chief Justice says in a different context, this slippage is not “mere 
semantics”73 in a case about whether “domestic partners have a constitutional right to the name 
of ‘marriage.’”74  I read the evident confusion about what term to use for LGBTQ persons who 
wish to marry as a confusion over the topic of queer sexuality itself.  It may be that the reason 
judges cannot agree on terminology is that they have never had to encounter questions that 
contest not only the right of access to marriage, but demands for access to marriage that may 
undermine fundamental heterosexual assumptions about the nature of sexual relationships.     
In the brief for the State of California, the Attorney General’s office (hereinafter 
“Attorney General”) claims that following the “Domestic Partnership Act,”75 the substantive 
elements of what both the State of California and the Court agree is a “right to marry” protected 
by the California Constitution’s guarantee of due process and its equal protection clause are 
identical to the “human rights” the state has granted registered domestic partners through 
legislation and popular initiative.76  The key to this argument is the assertion that the designation 
of the term “marriage”––unlike the “rights, protections, and benefits” the California Family Code 
grants to “registered domestic partners” the “same” as to spouses77––is not itself a part of these 
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“human rights that inform a man’s right to marry a woman, and vice-versa.”78  “The label 
[marriage],” the Attorney General claims, is not related to the “right to marry.”79  “The label” is 
the mere “use of a word by the government to describe a particular legal status,” and the “use of 
a word” cannot be described as a fundamental right,80 liberty interest,81 component of the 
“California Constitution’s right to privacy,”82 or a right of association or expression.83   
The primary arguments on both sides of this dispute over the substance of the “label” 
work through the common argumentative strategy of “dissociation.”84  In Perelman’s philosophy 
of argument, dissociating the “real from the apparent” among “elements described in the same 
way” works to “elaborate a philosophical reality which is opposed to the reality of common 
sense.”85  In this way the apparent is judged in terms of the real, which itself is constructed 
through the apparent.86  Thus “reality”––“term II”––is “normative in relation” to the apparent––
“term I”––because it is reality that “confirms” the apparent as the “authentic expression” of itself 
or else “disqualifies it as error and false appearance.”87  As the rhetorical critic and encyclopedist 
James Jasinski puts it, “dissociative arguments not only divide but also redefine or 
reconstruct.”88  Reality is “both normative and explanatory,”89 a rule constructed through 
appearance that, through the argumentative dissociation among different elements of that 
appearance, becomes the naturalized standard by which those elements are ordered hierarchically 
in terms of relative distance from the posited truth90—or, rhetorically, the desired endpoint of 
persuasion.  Thus an argument in which the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’ consistent 
and evident popularity is used as data for the claim that his government was undemocratic, works 
to propose and defend an anti-populist theory of ideal democratic governance.91  
George cannot say that the “designation” “marriage” determines what marriage is for the 
purpose of adjudicating the right to marry—this would satisfy the petitioners’ immediate 
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demands while making possible an egregiously unequal future Family Code wherein gays and 
lesbians would be allowed to “marry,” but would still be treated differently, as couples, than 
married heterosexuals. The majority’s arguments thus appear tautological, 92  as in, the 
“designation” marriage is a substantive component of the right to marry, because everyone 
understands that marriage is marriage and other things are not.  This tautology can be explained 
as a dissociation, where “term I”—the appearance of marriage—is divided into the elements 
“marriage” and “domestic partnership,” so as to judge both against “term II,” or the reality of 
marriage contained within the “right”:  
We need not decide in this case whether the name “marriage” is invariably a core 
element of the state constitutional right to marry so that the state would violate a couple’s 
constitutional right even if...the state were to assign a name other than marriage as the 
official designation of the formal family relationship for all couples...rather [the state] has 
drawn a distinction between the name...of opposite-sex couples (marriage) and that for 
same-sex couples (domestic partnership)....embodied in the California constitutional right 
to marry is a couple’s right to have their family relationship accorded dignity and respect 
equal to that accorded other officially recognized families...assigning a different 
designation for the family relationship of same-sex couples while reserving 
the...designation of “marriage”...for opposite-sex couples...[risks] denying the family 
relationship of same-sex couples such equal dignity and respect....although the provisions 
of the current domestic partnership legislation afford same-sex couples most of the 
substantive elements embodied in the constitutional right to marry, the current California 
statutes nonetheless must be viewed as...impinging upon a same-sex couple’s 
constitutional right to marry under the California Constitution.93 
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Both the designations “marriage” and “domestic partnership” are elements of the substantive 
thing—a state-recognized official family relationship—that is marriage, but “domestic 
partnership” is normatively inferior in a world where the reality of marriage is constructed 
through the term itself.  Thus for George “marriage” is a substantive component of the “right to 
marry”; the former (“marriage”) is only actually marriage if it corresponds to the substantive 
components of the latter (“right to marry”), which includes the former as a fact of its 
construction.  “Term II” becomes the naturalized standard against which the elements of “term I” 
are judged; and so it is here—in Perelman’s terms, this is judicial argument as “demonstration” 
rather than “persuasion.”  George frames his conclusion about the substance of the “designation” 
as derivative of the reality of what marriage presently means in California, rather than as his own 
argumentative construction and normative defense of that reality against another.   
Corrigan and the Attorney General use diction implicitly to construct a different 
(“counter”) dissociation,94 where the elements of “term I” are not “marriage” and “domestic 
partnership,” but rather “terminology” and “substance.”95  The Attorney General grammatically 
dissociates the “use of a word to describe” and “particular legal status,” while Corrigan charges 
that, “the majority fails to recognize the case involves only the names of those unions,”96 so as to 
emphasize the “distinction between substance and nomenclature.”97  In this argument the illusory 
component of “term I” is not “domestic partnership” but “nomenclature”; marriage (as term II) is 
defined in substantive terms, and so it is most accurate to adjudicate the “right to marry” in non-
terminological fashion.  This dissociative tactic is apparent even in the contrast between the 
adjectives “word,” “name,” (Attorney General and Corrigan) and “designation” (George) to 
modify the noun “marriage”; “designation” emphasizes the correspondence with reality of the 
statutory utterance in question, while “word” and “name” emphasize the a-materiality of state-
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produced labels for real things; suggesting a greater distance between signifier and signified as 
components of the marriage sign.  As a function of argument structure, George’s is the only one 
among the three interlocutors to naturalize the civil right of family recognition as marriage.  
George provides detailed evidence to support his claim that the “designation of marriage” 
itself is an important substantive component of the “right to marry” as protected by both the due 
process and equal protection clauses.98  Rather than directly addressing the benefits, George lists 
the designation as conferring upon formally related couples, Corrigan inverts the majority’s 
argument, framing George’s rhetoric not as an attempt to imbue the designation marriage with 
substantive value, but instead as an attempt to “denigrate” the substantive quality of state-
recognized domestic partnerships.99  Here, substance is again placed above terminology in the 
Justice’s dissociative pairing, with respect to how Corrigan describes the central question of law 
(“whether domestic partners have a constitutional right to the term ‘marriage’”100):  
The people are entitled to preserve this traditional understanding [of marriage as between 
a man and a woman] in the terminology of the law, recognizing that same-sex and 
opposite-sex unions are different. What they are not entitled to do is treat them 
differently under the law.101 
The difference between terminology and treatment are made clear in Corrigan's account; if they 
are in fact different—having different meanings––there can be no claim to discrimination as a 
result of terminology unless the Court foolishly makes it so—thereby also underwriting the 
Attorney Generals’ suggestion that granting “suspect classification” status to sexual orientation 
could damage “gay men and lesbians” by inspiring “‘reverse discrimination’ sexual orientation 
lawsuits brought by heterosexuals.”102   
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Using this logic, George’s explanation of the substantive content of the marriage 
designation is actually a diminishment of the substantive content of domestic partnerships.  If the 
interest of the dissents in preventing “marriage” from becoming an umbrella term for all state 
recognized couple relationships can be critically bracketed—because, as none of the arguing 
parties or Justices recognize, neither the plaintiffs’ victory in court nor a similar legislative 
change would allow all family relationships in California to be termed “marriage” by the state—
a critical queer reading of Corrigan and the Attorney General enables the position that is George 
who would do more to enshrine inequality of family recognition in the California Constitution.  
In this critical queer reading, a specifically judicial requirement for the state to designate same-
sex unions “marriages” would only serve to render material a difference between heterosexuals 
and homosexuals that before the majority’s finding was merely terminological.  In other words, 
some of the arguments in Corrigan’s dissent can be read as functioning to resist the California 
Court’s performative sovereignty over the nature and identity of kinship in California.      
In his separate dissent, Justice Marvin R. Baxter further argues that it is impossible to 
find that same-sex couples must be granted access to the fundamental right to marry, because 
marriage traditionally is inherently exclusive to heterosexual couples, not same-sex ones.  What 
the majority calls granting a class of persons access to a fundamental right, Baxter (and to a 
lesser extent Corrigan) call a judicial redefinition of a popularly recognized and defined 
institution contrary to all precedent and the will of California voters,103 thus violating the judicial 
caution mandated by “separation of powers.”104  Baxter accordingly describes the majority as 
“finding a constitutional right to same-sex marriage,”105 at once ignoring and repudiating 
George’s argument that the case is not about judicial redefinition of marriage or the creation of a 
new civil right, but rather adjudication of the question of whether adequate justification exists to 
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deny gay men and lesbians the same right to marry that is accorded heterosexuals.106  As 
Corrigan says, “plaintiffs seek both to join the institution of marriage and at the same time to 
alter its definition.”107   
At first reading, Baxter and Corrigan’s objections almost seem deliberately obtuse: for 
Baxter’s summary of the Court’s finding in terms that the Chief Justice specifically divests his 
opinion from; and for Corrigan’s re-framing of the entire question of the case—whether or not 
the manner in which the statutes in question define marriage is constitutional—in terms that 
structurally erase the majority’s lengthy doctrinal argument that the current “definition” 
(Corrigan’s mere withholding of a “name”) is discriminatory as a matter of doctrinal fact.  
George’s responses (the right to marry must be evaluated in terms of the “substantive content” of 
that right108; a portion of that content is the “freedom ‘to join in marriage with the person of 
one’s choice’”;109 and the “tradition” of limiting marriage to a “union between a man and a 
woman” is not “sufficient justification for perpetuating...the restriction or denial of a 
fundamental constitutional right”110) also seem to avoid the crux of the matter.  If marriage is a 
“union of opposite sexes,” the “freedom ‘to join in marriage with the person of one’s choice’” 
does not grant a person the impossible right to marry someone of the same sex.111  Indeed, that 
freedom to marry who we choose is abrogated by many other substantive restrictions on the 
definition of marriage,112 leaving room for Corrigan’s argument that California’s creation of a 
substantively equal institution of “domestic partnership” is from an equal justice perspective a 
reasonable and even laudable legislative response to the intrinsic limitations of marriage twice 
recognized by California’s legislature and populace.113    
George rejects the “tradition” justification, but the dissenting opinions do not offer that 
justification on its own––rather, they present it through a conflation of what marriage has been 
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traditionally, with what marriage fundamentally is after § 300 (a) and Proposition 22.  The 
dissent’s traditional argument works much better than it first seems after reading George’s 
(convincing) opinion, if it is read via the warrant (explained in greatest detail by the Attorney 
General’s office) that the heterosexual nature of marriage is a substantive component of the right 
to marry, that is somehow also not exclusive of gay and lesbian access to that right.  In stronger 
terms, gays and lesbians have the right to marry partners of the same sex, even though a present 
component of that right in California is the intrinsic heterosexuality of marriage.  This would 
mean that (in the logic of Corrigan’s arguments) judicial deference to how the people of 
California view marriage as a substantive right would require starting from the presumption of 
the constitutionality of marriage as heterosexual.114   Without this warrant, the dissenting 
arguments actually function to underwrite the majority’s (and concurring Justice Joyce L. 
Kennard’s)115 response.  With this warrant, the dissociative diction in Corrigan’s dissent, I argue, 
has the beneficial effect of highlighting the ideologically obscured reality of marriage as a more 
exclusive than inclusive institution.116    
Corrigan and Baxter say that marriage is intrinsically heterosexual and that the people of 
California also now say it is so,117 meaning any change to that definition is not an adjudication of 
rights claims, but rather a change to marriage itself beyond the scope of proper judicial power.  
This argument contests but also underwrites George’s response that marriage has traditionally 
been intrinsically heterosexual, but now the legislature (in 1977)118 and the people of California 
(in 2000 with Proposition 22) say it is so, meaning that the question of whether these popular and 
legislative statutory declarations constitute a violation of liberty and discrimination against a 
suspect class is an appropriate matter for judicial review.  Corrigan chides George for failing to 
“recognize the case involves only the names of those unions,” but it is precisely the fact that the 
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case does involve only the names that allows George to ground the majority’s holding on a 
determination of the constitutional value of the names themselves.119    
Corrigan states “the voters who passed Proposition 22...decided to keep the meaning of 
marriage as it has always been.”  The grammatical construction of this sentence (the past tense of 
the verbs, the use of a pronoun for “meaning”/heterosexual) enables the warrant that the 
heterosexual definition of marriage is a substantive component—even a legitimate benefit for the 
purpose of the rational basis test—of both the right to marry and the right to enter into a 
domestic partnership in California.120  This warrant is what allows for Corrigan’s rather elegant 
conclusion that any change to that definition should come only through popular initiative—a 
move she would happily support.121  The Justice’s phrasing elides the distinction that first the 
California Legislature, and then California voters, took action to “keep the meaning of marriage 
as it has always been” traditionally, by adding in each case new statutory restrictions to that 
meaning.  George’s response (that it is the statutory declaration of the intrinsic heterosexuality of 
marriage, rather than the reality that marriage in California law has been intrinsically 
heterosexual, that works to specifically disadvantage the value of domestic partnerships and so is 
per se discriminatory toward gay people) is thus itself grounded in the related warrant that the 
ability to enter into marriage-like relationships is a fundamental component of the ability to fully 
be a homosexual person.122  
Corrigan and Baxter are right, in a sense: George does seek to redefine what marriage is, 
but not quite in the way that his interlocutors in Marriage Cases say he does.  Just as the 
Attorney General charges,123 George begins to shift the “right to marry” from the right to enter 
into a rhetorically malleable institution with substantive content, to a right to a designation that 
forms an important part of the substantive content of a more strictly defined institution.  In re 
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Marriage Cases is the first in a line of decisions (now possibly to be extended at the Supreme 
Court)124 that would change marriage from an institutional civil right to a signifier for (where 
that signifier will be a fundamental substantive component of) a broader institution that will 
replace “marriage” but still bear its name.  This will do much to performatively entrench the 
construction of constitutionally legible queer identity—legitimated queer subjectivity before U.S. 
constitutional law—via the restrictive terms of the “domestinormative” family.125   
This is where not only the slippage in the rhetoric of George’s opinion between gay 
individuals and same-sex couples as rights-bearing entities, but also his related inability to define 
a queer subject in terms other than coupling comes into play.  George holds marriage vital to a 
fully valuable and dignified life that is not fully possible without the designation itself, and also 
defines gay identity through homosexual desire.  Therefore: homosexuals who wish to marry will 
marry other homosexuals (because a homosexual is someone who wishes to marry someone of 
the same sex), dyadic coupling for purposes that can be described as beneficial to the public and 
to the state is a pre-requisite to a dignified and constitutionally legible homosexual life; and this 
life can be lived in full only through governmental bestowal of the term “marriage.”  
Contrastingly, for Corrigan in particular, a state-recognized union of two persons of the same sex 
must as a matter of equal protection of law be afforded the same benefits and public dignity as a 
union of two persons of the opposite sex, but the designation of marriage is not a vital 
component of that dignity.126   
What is deprived in California law (leaving aside, as the California Justices mostly do, 
the federal context) is the designation of marriage only.  This designation, only as it relates to a 
marriage-like legally recognized relationship, is vital because it is a pre-requisite to being fully 
dignified as a legal subject.  What is deprived in the withholding of the marriage designation is 
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therefore the right to be fully recognized as a subject realized in, bound, and privileged by law.  
George spends significant time in his decision responding to the more explicitly anti-equality 
arguments from Baxter, the Court of Appeals, and the anti-gay rights Proposition 22 Legal 
Defense fund,127 but much of this refutation is moot if the debate is framed, as Corrigan does, as 
one that is “only” about “the names.”   
Much of George’s refutation of Baxter involves answers to Baxter’s (and the defenders of 
Proposition 22’s) arguments that gay individuals should not be treated equally under the law.  
But Corrigan assumes that they should be so treated, insisting that  
Domestic partnerships and marriages have the same legal standing, granting to both 
heterosexual and homosexual couples a societal recognition of their lifelong commitment.  
This parity does not violate the [California] Constitution, [sic] it is in keeping with it.  
Requiring the same substantive legal right is, in my view, a matter of equal protection.  
But this does not mean that the traditional definition of marriage is unconstitutional.128    
The debate between George and Corrigan over the substantive value of statutory terminology 
provides a critical opportunity to examine the debate over same-sex marriage narrowly, in terms 
of the distinction between “everything but marriage” statutory regimes, and the material 
consequences of the judicial argumentative frameworks constructed to render such regimes 
unconstitutional.  My examination here uses the terms of this judicial argument as one frame 
through which to take up the “struggle...for recognition of marriage” critically as a struggle for 
the right to be defined as normal by the state, a determination that works as a synecdoche for all 
other efforts to realize queer (counter)publicity.         
Here, I acknowledge that Corrigan does much to elide the heterosexism that is clearly, as 
George argues, an intrinsic component of the California marriage statutes.129  In the status quo of 
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California circa 2008, George describes reality: “domestic partnership” is a “new and unfamiliar 
designation”; in contrast to the “historic and highly respected designation of marriage.”130  
“Domestic partnership” may be substantively equal to “marriage” in California, but the 
difference in designation has a substantial negative impact on the ability of a state-recognized 
couple to maintain that status while moving about the Union, and on their ability to either collect 
federal benefits or to bring challenges to the federal Defense of Marriage Act.131   Particularly in 
the context of equal protection, it is difficult to understand how Corrigan can maintain that there 
is no constitutional violation in the people of California’s twice-affirmed (as of May 2008) 
decision to call the otherwise identical132 relationships of same-sex couples a different name than 
that which the justifications for these restrictive statutes insist is synonymous with “dignity and 
respect.”133  As Justice Kennard eloquently notes in her concurrence, the gay and lesbian couples 
who took part in the 2004 “marriage ceremonies” invalidated in Lockyer did so with “great joy 
and celebration,”134 a joy that in many cases surely derived in part from the parties’ hitherto 
proscribed ability to demonstrate publicly and be recognized for their love and commitment on 
the same terms as any heterosexual person.  Corrigan’s opinion does not address the real and 
substantive value that many of these couple members—some of them the actual plaintiffs before 
her bench—placed on the “word” marriage, and her called-for remedy would have asked those 
plaintiffs to accept the continued devaluation135 of those pre-Lockyer ceremonies by one of 
California’s four mouths (the Court) while waiting for the affirmation of another (the people 
and/or the legislature).      
I do not present my favorable comparison of Corrigan to George literally as the position 
that I think Marriage Cases should have been decided in the opposite direction––although in the 
wake of Washington’s Referendum 74,136 approving the Washington Senate’s re-classification of 
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all state-recognized domestic partnerships as marriages through Senate Bill 6239,137 it is at least 
interesting to speculate about what legislative and popular initiative results a Corrigan-written 
decision in Marriage Cases may have led to.  (Perhaps instead of Proposition 8, the popular 
initiative the dissenting Justice calls for, to open California’s marriage designation to same-sex 
couples?)  My own stakes in marriage and domestic partnership as a political question are not 
those of the respondents in Lockyer or the plaintiffs in Marriage Cases.  All of my relationships 
have been heterosexual, and so eligible for (what I agree with George is) the substantive 
designation of marriage in every U.S. jurisdiction.  George rightly insists on the substantive 
content of the “opportunity” alone to establish a marriage and “to obtain the substantial benefits 
such a relationship may offer.”138  I may choose whether or not to ask the state to recognize my 
own partner relationships in the same terms as it recognizes others like mine, and I have not yet 
known (and probably never will) what it is to be denied such recognition as even a possibility for 
my future life.  As Reddy—a resident of Washington State—argued in a recent talk at the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, part of the overwhelming resilience of the “gay 
marriage movement” against challenges like Richard Kim’s is that iterations of this movement, 
including Washington State’s Washington United for Marriage,139 successfully conflate queer 
justice goals with legal recognition via marriage, leaving little practical space for an ethical, anti-
oppressive legal politics outside of that conflation.140   
Reddy noted, with respect to Referendum 74, that this Washington State election would 
represent his first opportunity to vote as a United States citizen, and that while he opposed the 
universalizing politics of the “gay marriage movement,” does this mean he should vote “no?” if 
he participates in this election?  A “no” vote in Washington in 2012, just like a “yes” vote in 
2008 California, is an alignment with the motives and goals of groups like the Proposition 22 
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Legal Defense Fund141 and Preserve Marriage Washington (the group responsible for placing 
Referendum 74 on the ballot to challenge SB 6239’s implementation),142 and of purveyors of 
state-bigotry like the Republican Congresspersons attempting to act as intervening respondents 
in United States v. Windsor (because the Obama administration as the plaintiff United States 
would have the Supreme Court review the case in order to find for the respondent).143  The 
critical task is therefore both to recognize and work to create radical queer legal political 
meaning for the situation produced by not only the passage of Proposition 8, but also the overall 
process of that passage, which includes the doctrinal story begun in Lockyer and Marriage Cases.   
In other words, it behooves what Reddy calls “progressive”144 opponents of the “gay 
marriage movement” to consider—counterfactually—the implications of the judicial opinions 
like Corrigan’s that the marriage movement would consider setbacks, were they to have become 
force of law.  The proper question for “the sexual progressive” is less a consideration of how to 
win back the rights and recognition lost in Proposition 8, and more what “speech of bodily 
groups that are the material foundations of the US nation-state”145 is enabled, encouraged, 
foreclosed, and/or demanded by the rhetorical situation of the political conflict over marriage.  
Reddy describes how the public conflict over Proposition 8 has increased access to hitherto less 
available argumentative techniques and strategies for the efforts of “various,” and especially 
Latino, “nonnational popular constituencies” to build rhetorics of “relation to state power in 
which they are not its expropriated object but in fact the ground for the state form,”146 as these 
are rhetorics that center on “family rights as foundational rights that precede and ground the 
identity of the state.”147  The argumentative exchange between the various Justices in Marriage 
Cases remains a polysemous text, one that both suggests and forecloses specific doctrinal and 
statutory possibilities for sexually progressive modes of familial definition.  
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My claim about polysemy is indebted to Derrick A. Bell’s concept of “interest 
convergence.”148  It is important to recognize that whatever the “real” motives of Corrigan and 
the Attorney General were as individual rhetors and/or mouthpieces of state institutions, their 
advocacy works in service149 of a regressive political movement designed to permanently 
marginalize a group of people through the discursive regime of marriage, a regime that will for 
the intermediate future remain a primary governing force over individual, group, and 
organizational movement among the multiple layers of United States labor, family, civil, and 
criminal law.150  Just after the decision in Marriage Cases, Ann Bradley’s Daily News of Los 
Angeles editorial chided Corrigan for consigning California gays and lesbians to a second-class 
status via a Plessy v. Ferguson-esque segregationist logic151––but as the blogger Leland Traiman 
suggests,152 this position is a bit unfair to Corrigan’s arguments when read in light of what I read 
as Baxter’s apparent personal homophobia.  Corrigan, at least, is not Baxter: but I am not 
spending all of this time on an “at least she’s not Baxter!” argument.  Rather, the political 
possibilities of Corrigan’s opinion are excessive of her arguments’ relationships to certain elite 
heteronormative interests.  The judicial debate staged at the California Supreme Court between 
marriage and domestic partnership as an “equal” institution provides critical opportunity to seek 
what “fortuity”153 can be found for radical, anti-establishmentarian queer political goals in the 
California and U.S. judicial rhetoric surrounding Proposition 8.  As Bell demonstrates in a 
similar exercise with Brown v. Board of Education, such counterfactual exercises can be useful 
when seeking out such “fortuity” in the inevitably anti-radical judicial rhetoric of U.S. 
constitutional law.154         
Corrigan’s dissent suggests a “marriage” with no intrinsic value other than that given to it 
by popular vote, suggesting conditions of possibility for legal demands on behalf of relationship 
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forms currently excluded not only from marriage, but all legally described legitimate family 
structures in California and the United States.  Her opinion represents one—predictably 
conservative, given its institutional context—example of how it might be possible in future to 
argue for state recognition of relationships which cannot ever be155 marriage, as equal in value to 
the state (and in dignity for individual and group)156 as the venerable institution.157  Corrigan 
enacts a judicial rhetorical separation of the components of the “marriage” sign, bracketing the 
signifier designation from the signified relationship form and demanding that each be treated 
separately for the purpose of constitutional review.  The particular argumentative tactic Corrigan 
employs works through an exemplary appearance/reality dissociation of majoritarian definitions 
of what family should be, from the substantive components of what families really are.   
There can be no such thing in the world of the majority.  The Chief Justice’s shift from a 
defense of gay individuals’ right of access to civil institutions like marriage, to the argument that 
the designation of “marriage” itself is a substantive component of this right, functions to collapse 
signifier and signified into an indissociable entity.  Under the sign “marriage,” George 
powerfully sutures: monogamous, economically elite, and procreation related dyad-pairs; with 
the limit points of legal family.  Responding to the Attorney General, George acknowledges the 
constitutional (due process and equal protection) viability of a world in which “California were 
to assign a name other than marriage as the official designation of the family relationship for all 
couples,”158 but he does so almost in the same breath as a specific argument for the substantive 
content of the term “marriage” itself.  In any case, this concession is still grounded in a 
dissociative warrant that sutures a statist terminological recognition of dyadic family relationship, 
with the substantive value of family relationship per se.  This logic privileges biological 
reproduction as a warrant for state support and recognition.   Even though George argues that 
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procreation is no longer a necessary or inherent component of the value of marriage, the value of 
reproduction still grounds the reasons for the state to privilege the non-biological bond between 
husband and wife, and after Marriage Cases, wife and wife and husband and husband.159  The 
majority’s conferral of substantive weight on the marriage designation naturalizes marriage-like 
relationships as the limit of familial subjectivity before law. Corrigan’s dissent and (in some 
ways) the Attorney General’s brief for California resist that naturalization by insisting on 
separating the question of access to the term, from the question of constitutional proscription of 
discrimination against marriage-like relationships without adequate justification.   
Writing on the relationship between territoriality and immigration law Leti Volpp argues 
that “space is constituted through legal language, and then serves as the seemingly natural 
‘ground’ for that language.”160  This principle works also within the conceptual rhetorical space 
of constitutional doctrine.  For example, Baxter does not acknowledge the right to enter state-
valued family relationships as one naturally attached to homosexual persons.  Instead, he chides 
the majority for basing its notion of gay individuals’ right to marry people of the same sex on the 
recent legislative conferral of related benefits through the Domestic Partner Act, which he says 
the majority uses in turn as the evidentiary basis for the judicial destruction of legislative intent 
with respect to the definition of marriage.161  Thus for Baxter the majority simultaneously 
performs legislative encroachment on judicial power, and judicial encroachment on legislative.   
George responds by declaring that, “the capability of gay individuals to enter into loving 
and enduring relationships comparable to those entered by heterosexuals is in no way dependent 
upon the enactment of the Domestic Partner Act; the...[DPA]...simply constitutes an explicit 
official recognition of that capacity.”162  “That capacity”—one entirely restricted, through both 
the grammar and ideological citation of the majority opinion, to “dyadic heterosexually based 
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family forms”163—is a conceptual version of Volpp’s “space” tautologically “constituted through 
legal language”; a form of legal subjectivity that is both constituted in law and a pre-requisite to 
that constitution.  The decision in Marriage Cases hinges on the notion that precisely the 
“explicit official recognition” of “loving and enduring relationships” is a vital pre-requisite to 
those relationships’ full existence.  It is because the socially constructed institution of marriage 
has defined particular family forms as eligible for constitutional projection as fundamental 
rights-bearing entities, that similar entities have the right to be called marriages.  
The Attorney General maintains that marriage should be treated differently from other 
“fundamental rights,” because the foundation of the right itself is state regulation—this argument 
works as both evidence and warrant for the claim that the “term” marriage is not part of the 
substance of the “right to marry” that the Court is bound to protect.164  Marriage is accordingly 
“not a fundamental interest in the same way as other interests are deemed fundamental”; it is a 
right whose boundaries are necessarily subject to popular redefinition because it is a right whose 
basic components have no clear natural (or at least pre-jurisprudential) basis.165  Instead, the 
Attorney General and Corrigan both argue, there is at least a pre-jurisprudential “common law” 
right to enter into personal and private relationships “with a beloved person,” 166  these 
relationships should be “free from government interference,”167 and those relationships whose 
members are “in the same position as married couples when it comes to the substantive legal 
rights and responsibilities of family members” should as a principle of equal protection be 
treated identically as parties to a marriage.168  Corrigan’s and the Attorney General’s notion of 
what “relationships with a beloved person” might legitimately consist of are clearly informed 
and restricted by “domestinormative” ideology.  Both also go to great lengths in order to 
preserve what is to me a nakedly “sophistic” (in the improper169 way in which George uses the 
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term170) claim about the substantive immateriality of words.  The Attorney General’s contention 
that “the state is unaware of any legal precedent establishing a fundamental interest in the use of 
a word by the government to describe a particular legal status”171 is particularly thin—what of 
“alien”; “felon”; “enemy combatant”?  Nonetheless, their arguments suggest a potentially more 
progressive future of state family regulation than the majority’s.   
In Corrigan’s dissent (and also in the Attorney General’s “fundamental interest” analysis), 
the very denigration of the “term” marriage as a word with no substantive content (other than the 
popular understanding of one specific tradition) makes a future conceivable wherein 
“relationships with a beloved person” currently excluded by the foundational assumption of 
“couple” could be rhetorically constituted as rights-bearing entities under the dissociative 
framework of the dissents’ non-marriage related “right to marriage.”  Judith Butler asks, “how 
does one oppose...homophobia without embracing the marriage norm as the exclusive or most 
highly valued social arrangement for queer sexual lives?”172  Corrigan’s dissent is not an answer, 
but it does make thinkable a doctrinal future for legally valued voluntary “bonds of kinship” that 
have little connection to marriage at all.     
Baxter expresses concern that the majority’s reasoning could result in future, greater 
expansions of the definition of marriage into areas including “polygamous and incestuous 
marriages” that (unlike same-sex marriage) the Justice cannot conceive of as ever reflecting 
popular will.173  This “dangerous” possibility is grounded in what Baxter calls George’s judicial 
activism174 in “inserting in our Constitution an expanded definition of the right to marry that 
contravenes express statutory law.”175  I think it is viable to say that George attempts to articulate 
a new right, but it is a new right called marriage, defined not through an “expanded definition of 
the right to marry,” but rather limited precisely by that definition as the “term II” reality in force 
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at the time of the opinion.  By insisting on ending the intrinsic heterosexuality of the “term” 
marriage itself, George does not expand the definition of the right to marry.176  Instead he grants 
“same-sex couples” access to the existing institution of civil marriage by naturalizing the 
substantive components of this right as what they have currently been made out to be:   
The right to marry, as embodied in article I, sections 1 and 7 of the California 
Constitution, guarantees same-sex couples the same substantive constitutional rights as 
opposite-sex couples to choose one’s life partner and enter with that person into a 
committed, officially recognized, and protected family relationship that enjoys all of the 
constitutionally based incidents of marriage.177 
The “dangerous” possibility that Baxter fears seems more possible in the argumentative 
framework of Corrigan’s dissent than in that of George’s opinion. There is potential in this 
possibility, as there remains, in both California and the rest of the United States, a strong 
disconnect between multi-modal activism for “GLBTQ,” gender, racial, and economic justice, 
and the public communication and operations of the “gay marriage movement.”178     
The “initiative...amendment” (now Article I, § 7.5) to the California Constitution adopted 
by Proposition 8 declares, “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California.”179  The particular history of California’s Family Code and the Domestic Partner Act 
as outlined in Marriage Cases made the grammatical and statutory focus of § 7.5 very different 
from the simultaneously adopted Article I, § 27 of the Florida Constitution (“Amendment 2”), 
which reads “insasmuch as marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, no other legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent 
thereof shall be valid or recognized.”180  § 7.5 is concerned with what kinds of marriages 
California recognizes as such.  § 27, although it is titled “Marriage Defined,” is not directly 
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concerned with marriage (for example, with whether marriage-like relationships can come to be 
called marriage), but rather with stripping legal recognition from any union that resembles 
marriage in its substantial characteristics.   
The contrast between California’s Proposition 8 and Florida’s Amendment 2 thus 
provides some comparative constitutional support for Kim’s plea that “in more than a dozen 
states gay couples have no partnership rights whatsoever...are there more-inclusive movement 
goals than an initiative that would give only California’s same-sex couples the M-word?”181  
Kim’s bold and rather unheralded argument can work against the “gay marriage movement”’s 
overall elision182 of pressing racial and economic justices issues, but it retains an assumptive 
focus on the “couple” as the primary family form.  The queer, trans, and legal theorists Dean 
Spade and Craig Willse’s related statement on the passage of Proposition 8, “I Still Think 
Marriage is the Wrong Goal,” does more to articulate the objection to marriage itself as a 
“coercive state structure that perpetuates racism and sexism through forced gender and family 
norms”183—echoing Butler’s pre-Goodridge discussion of the complexities of “queer” resistance 
to “lesbian and gay marriage” in Undoing Gender.184  Read together, Kim and Spade & Willse’s 
call to action demands a rejection not of one tactic or another in the struggle for relationship 
equality, but rather a strategic divestment from the “same-sex marriage battle”185 as a whole.   
What Corrigan calls California’s “historic” determination, via the Domestic Partner Act, 
of marital parity for a category of non-marriage relationships certainly made that state, as Kim 
urges, a potentially productive space for a more radical “queer political agenda.”186  Given the 
particular framework of Corrigan’s dissent, the campaign for Proposition 8 could conceivably 
have worked as a resource for queer politics against marriage, and for a refocusing of movement 
energy against interlocking economic, gender-based, nationalist, white suprematist, and cissexist 
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oppressions 187 —as the campaign did in fact work as an argumentative resource for 
“nonnormative” Latino immigrant community family claims.188  This possibility was foreclosed 
not by the passage of Proposition 8 itself, but rather by the doctrinal meaning of the resulting 
constitutional amendment—as that meaning was constituted through the rhetoric of George’s 
opinions for the Court first in Marriage Cases, and then in Strauss v. Horton.       
III.  Strauss v. Horton  
The primary questions before the California Supreme Court in the Strauss v. Horton 
challenge to Proposition 8 and the resulting § 7.5 were: whether the initiative was properly a 
constitutional amendment, rather than a full “revision” requiring a more stringent adoption 
process than a popular initiative;189 whether the Proposition functioned as a separation of 
powers-violating popular “‘readjudication’ of the issue resolved in the Marriage Cases”;190 and 
whether the amendment should be rejected as an abrogation of the “rights of privacy and due 
process” “guaranteed” as “inalienable” under Article I, § 1 of the Constitution.191  One year and 
eleven days after his opinion in Marriage Cases, George argued for the Strauss majority that 
Proposition 8 was properly an amendment rather than a full revision,192 and did not re-adjudicate 
his earlier opinion, as this had been written in the context of a previous constitution now 
rendered obsolete by the new amendment.193  George also found no ground for the Court to hold 
§ 7.5 incompatible with the basic rights of liberty and equality enumerated in Article I, § 1, as a 
founding and peculiar194 principle of the state’s Constitution is that those “constitutional rights” 
declared “inalienable” are also subject to reasonable regulation and interpretation of application 
by various representatives of the state (including the People)195—in short, it is a founding 
principle of the California Constitution that no part of the Constitution can be immune from 
amendment.196   
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George acknowledges that Marriage Cases held (as he describes his earlier opinion) that 
denying “the right to equal access to the designation ‘marriage’...does in fact diminish the rights 
of same-sex couples under” Article I, § 1.197  The strong implication here is that Marriage Cases 
created a new right subordinate to the inalienable rights of liberty and equality in § 1, and thus 
subject to amendments that clarify the meaning of how those rights should be applied (even 
though, as I note below, Marriage Cases-George did not actually create a “right to equal access” 
to the designation, as Strauss-George claims).  Prop 8 has no effect (in terms of California law) 
on same-sex couples’ access to the rest of the “fundamental substantive components 
encompassed within the constitutional rights of privacy and due process.”198  Accordingly, 
George argues, Proposition 8 did not have a “sweeping constitutional effect” that would require a 
more rigorous amendment process than a majority popular initiative199—rather, the amendment 
“establishes a...substantive state constitutional rule” 200  that is the “new” benchmark for 
determining the constitutional meaning of the term marriage itself.201   
This argument that Marriage Cases recognized a right of designation that remains subject 
to the interpretation of California voters looks like a misapplication by the Chief Justice of his 
own Marriage Cases precedent, because in the earlier opinion, George actually appears to lean 
more heavily on what Janet E. Halley calls the “natural rights argument”—an argument for a 
right that is prior to law and permits no revision.  Halley reserves particular disdain for the 
“justice-based right to marry” argument common to “gay marriage campaigns,” both because 
this claim is used as a catch-all response to progressive critiques of the marriage institution, and 
because in its tautological reduction of claim, data, and warrant202 (a natural right is immovable, 
because it is natural, and natural rights are irrefutable), it is a dangerously weak argument that 
can harm the campaigner just as much as the oppressor.203  Halley’s objection echoes Mary Ann 
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Glendon’s earlier warning about the proliferation of “excessively prodigal and absolutist rights 
talk” in U.S. jurisprudence.204  But where Glendon is broadly concerned with how “absolute” 
rights claims in U.S. popular discourse have come to be used as “trumps” in every comparative 
justice argument,205 Halley’s critique is more specific to the “natural rights argument,” which “in 
the absence of any agreed upon metaphysics of formal rights...posits that rights are definitionally 
entitlements that trump all other claims.”206  Halley can thus distinguish the formalist rights 
claims of the gay marriage movement, and the “rhetorically alert pragmatism” of Critical Race 
Theory’s defense of rights against critics like Glendon.           
Marriage Cases makes a rich text for any student of rights talk, in part because it is hard 
to parse the formalist and constructivist warrants in George’s “right to marry” arguments.  
George first defines marriage as a “basic, constitutionally protected civil right,” citing the 
California Court’s earlier decision in Perez v. Sharp in order to give the right to marry a legally 
constructed—“civil” rather than “natural”207—origin point.  In matters of California law, the 
California Supreme Court has no higher authority than the California Constitution.  As such it 
would not be a stretch to consider (as George does in Marriage Cases) the initiative statute 
Proposition 22 an invalid exclusion of gays and lesbians from a “‘fundamental right of free men 
[and women],’” and then to later rule (as George does in Strauss) that the initiative constitutional 
amendment Proposition 8 is a valid redefinition of what that right fundamentally is.208  As Justice 
Kennard notes in her Strauss concurrence,  
Unlike the state Constitution that this court interpreted in the Marriage Cases...the 
currently existing California Constitution, while continuing to protect the rights of same-
sex couples to form officially recognized family relationships, now restricts marriage to 
opposite-sex couples. As members of the judicial branch, the justices of this court have a 
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solemn obligation to interpret and enforce the entire state Constitution, including that 
new and valid voter-enacted restriction.209   
But George goes on in Marriage Cases to make the argument that the right to marry, as a 
fundamental right, is one that is not created in, but rather properly recognized by, constitutional 
law.210  The Chief Justice frames Marriage Cases as a “recognition that the [California] 
constitutional right to marry applies to same-sex couples as well as to opposite-sex couples.”211  
The “right to marry” is not created by but rather “embodied in article I, sections 1 and 7 of the 
California Constitution.”  In the grammar of George’s Marriage Cases opinion it is this prior 
right and not the Constitution itself that “guarantees same-sex couples the same substantive 
constitutional rights as opposite-sex couples to...enter...into a committed, officially recognized, 
and protected family relationship that enjoys all of the constitutionally based incidents of 
marriage.”212  As I argue in the previous section, the majority opinion in Marriage Cases 
responds to the dissents not by emphasizing an independent right to the designation, but rather by 
arguing that marriage cannot be marriage without the designation—a state-recognized 
relationship not called “marriage” is not marriage, and so access to that relationship cannot 
satisfy the “right to marry.”   
Strauss advances the different position that the designation “marriage” is only one of the 
many “constitutionally based incidents” of the right to marry that George outlines in Marriage 
Cases.213  Thus George can offer an analogy between Proposition 8 and previous initiative 
constitutional amendments that “made very important substantive changes in fundamental state 
constitutional principles,” and that were still held to be “amendments” rather than “revisions.”  In 
these past situations, the rights in question were not eliminated, but rather “diminished.”214  This 
analogy would not be possible under the dissociative logic of Marriage Cases.  George could 
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have, as I read it, explained his position with much greater brevity—perhaps Kennard should 
have written the majority—but Kennard’s summary of the Court’s position in Strauss also rests 
on the assumption that “the state Constitution does not prohibit constitutional amendments 
qualifying or restricting rights that the state Constitution describes as ‘inalienable.’”  As Justice 
Carlos R. Moreno—the only dissenting judge in Strauss—argues, George can only hold that 
Proposition 8 is a “qualification” or “restriction” of a right (because it denies only one of the 
many incidents of that right to gay and lesbian persons, as George takes care to emphasize even 
though amendments need not “be supported by a compelling state interest”215) if he elides the 
underlying logic of Marriage Cases’ description of the substantive rhetorical content of the 
“right to marry.”216  Following this logic means that a “qualification” or “restriction” of the right 
to marry that includes banning a suspect class of persons access to the designation of “marriage” 
and requiring that class to apply instead for a different form of state-relationship recognition is 
not a “diminishment” at all, but rather a fundamental denial of the right itself.   
I am with Moreno; I think Strauss can be read as only either a reframing of the Marriage 
Cases precedent, or rather a willful violation of that precedent in order to avoid structural 
conflict among the branches of the Bear Republic.  George’s opinion in Marriage Cases is clear 
on this point.  “Denying the designation of marriage to same-sex couples cannot fairly be 
described as a ‘narrow’ or ‘limited’ exception to the requirement of equal protection”;217 and any 
attempt to either separate or subsume the designation of “marriage” from or into the “right to 
marry,” as George does in Strauss, must create a “fundamentally different”218 regime of legal 
recognition.  In Moreno’s words, “the rule the majority crafts today...allows same-sex couples to 
be stripped of the right to marry that this court recognized in the Marriage Cases.”219   
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Strauss-George’s inaccurate reframing of the holding in Marriage Cases as establishing a 
“right to equal access to the designation ‘marriage’” is an odd echo of the argumentative logic of 
Corrigan’s dissent.  These portions of the Strauss opinion read as a kind of weak version of 
Corrigan’s strong repudiation of the substantive significance of the mere “term” marriage in 
terms of equal protection doctrine.  It is telling, then, that George does not cite Corrigan in any 
part of the Strauss majority.  The oddly “progressive” potential of Corrigan’s argumentative 
framework is evident in a counterfactual scenario in which George did do so, in order to strike 
down Proposition 8 in a manner consistent with the logic of Strauss—arguing perhaps that Prop 8 
unforgivably erred in not elevating the term “domestic partnership” to constitutionally 
recognized status as part of the language of § 7.5, or even that the Proposition should have better 
worded the amendment to signal broad parity between the newly constitutionally recognized 
heterosexual institution of marriage and any other non-marriage kin relationships that the people 
of California might recognize in the future.   
Instead, given the relationship between Strauss and Marriage Cases, George’s new 
position in Strauss that “right to equal access to the designation ‘marriage’” is an independent 
and substantive component of Article 1, § 1’s “rights of privacy and due process” participates in 
what Moreno calls the Strauss majority’s weakening of “our state Constitution as a bulwark of 
fundamental rights” for “all... minorities” “disfavored” in the “will of the majority.”220  A small 
but significant portion of George’s opinion in the earlier case is devoted to holding that the 
denial of the right to marry through the designation denial does not discriminate “on the basis of” 
sex or gender, because the statutes in force prior to Proposition 8 did not forbid men from 
marrying men because they are men, or women from marrying women because they are 
women.221  Rather, those statutes discriminated on the basis of what George argues is the 
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separate category of “discrimination on the basis sexual orientation”222—a category not included 
in the forms of discrimination disallowed under Article I of the state Constitution either before or 
after Proposition 8. 223   When placed in juxtaposition, George’s two opinions offer a 
contradictory view of the relationship between marriage and “marriage.”  When read together, as 
two components of a meta-argument about the nature and content of the “right to marry,” those 
portions of each opinion that frame the relationship between the term and the substantive content 
of the right work together to naturalize the normativity of monogamous, dyadic life-relationships, 
a normativity that precedes the constitution of law in the founding document of the state.  It is 
dyad-kinship, and not marriage itself, that Marriage Cases and Strauss together defend through 
the tautological formalism of natural rights.  
If George’s two opinions are read together, as documents expressing a cohesive doctrinal 
logic, they function to separate those gay and lesbian Californians who would marry from 
minority status.  The rhetoric of these opinions creates an implicit majoritarian queer legal 
identity—an identity that serves as the warrant for George’s rejection of the idea that Proposition 
8 might have the “sweeping constitutional effect” described by Moreno—whose worst 
experience of discrimination will by constitutional definition be denial of access to the marriage 
designation on the basis of their sexual orientation, an identity form the Court recognizes––in a 
fascinating but implicitly analogically separated parallel to Roberts’ post-racial framing equal 
protection––as shared by both gays and lesbians, and straight Californians.224  Proposition 8 thus 
becomes little more than a regrettable detour from the post-sexual difference politics the Court 
attempts to embrace in Marriage Cases.  Through Strauss, Proposition 8 has the dual effect of 
reinforcing the anti-progressive, queer liberal225 politics of George’s Marriage Cases rhetoric, 
while at the same time inflecting those politics with an explicit division between majoritarian 
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straight, and majoritarian queer subjects before California constitutional law.  Bridging this 
divide once again represents the progressive political limit of the current iteration of the case that 
is now before the Supreme Court as Hollingsworth v. Perry. 
The pre-Lockyer “marriage ceremonies,” representing what Justice Kennard in Marriage 
Cases called the “public validation that only marriage can give,”226 will “remain ‘empty and 
meaningless in the eyes of the law.’”227  Those currently recognized through or eligible for 
registered domestic partner status in California (who were not issued marriage licenses between 
Marriage Cases and Proposition 8)228 must wait for this “public validation” until such time as 
this or a future United States Supreme Court finds for the respondents in Hollingsworth, or the 
people of California choose once more to amend their Constitution.  But—following George’s 
ontological slippage in Marriage Cases—these couples remain eligible for the constitutional 
validation of their voluntarily constructed relationships as valued components of civil and 
economic society, and the state.  This is in sharp contrast to other relationships of beloveds 
(and/or economic and other kinships of convenience or necessity!), including: polyamorous 
relationships; single-parent families; 229  multiple member, extra-legal and counter-
heteronormative arrangements of kinship;230 and other particularly queer of color relation- and 
kinship forms already abjected in the overwhelming dominance of the dyadic metaphor as the 
mode of signifying non-blood kin relationship.  All of these are foundationally excluded from 
constitutional validation in all but the most inconceivably liberal outcomes of the present 
marriage cases before the Court.  
From a radical queer and queer of color perspective, the risk in ignoring calls from 
commentators like Kim and Spade and Willse to set aside the chance for either a legislative or 
judicial mulligan on California marriage equality (in favor of more productive foci of efforts for 
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progressive politics) was not that a world exists in which the Supreme Court could rule for the 
current intervenor-petitioners by elevating Baxter-esque arguments to the level of Fourteenth 
Amendment law, thereby placing the entire “gay marriage movement” at risk of a multi-year 
setback.  There is also the converse world wherein the Court recognizes same-sex couples’ 
inclusion in the fundamental rite/ght of marriage.  This recognition would define queer 
subjectivity under U.S. constitutional law in far more restrictively racialized, classed, and 
sexualized terms of committed dyadic coupling than did Kennedy’s substantive “right to privacy” 
due process arguments in Lawrence.  There will be no good outcome on the Court for a radical 
queer and/or queer of color politics of kinship recognition, but there is one less bad possibility—
a possibility implicit in Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt’s choice to frame his judgment on 
California’s marriage cases in terms of Anthony Kennedy’s Fourteenth Amendment.   
IV.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger  
 In May 2009––the same time as Strauss—Kristin Perry, Sandra Stier, Paul Katami and 
Jeffrey Zarillo (“two same-sex couples” “denied marriage licenses” in California’s Alameda and 
Los Angeles Counties) challenged Proposition 8 in federal court, “alleging” in Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger (hereafter Schwarzenegger 231 ) that the initiative “violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”232  The official representatives of California, 
including Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, “refused to argue in favor of Proposition 8’s 
constitutionality,” and so the District Court allowed 233  Hak-Shing William Tam, Dennis 
Hollingsworth (now the named plaintiff before the Supreme bench), Gail J. Knight, Martin F. 
Gutierrez, Mark A. Jansson, and Protectmarriage.com to act as intervening defendants in their 
roles as supporters and sponsors of the original ballot initiative.234  As I discuss in Chapter One, 
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District Court Chief Judge Vaughn R. Walker held Proposition 8 “unconstitutional under both 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses” of the Fourteenth Amendment.235   
Walker held a bench trial before rendering his decision; his findings of fact with respect 
to marriage are largely parallel to George’s dissociative arguments in Marriage Cases.  Walker 
first enumerates the benefits of marriage in terms of its non-terminological content.  As a feature 
of both the fact of their official/legal status, and their monogamous, long-term, dyadic structure, 
marriages are: beneficial to society; confer substantial economic, legal, and political benefit and 
protection to their members; and are pre-requisites for the ability to fully live a happy and 
satisfying life.236  The reason that Californian couples in nearly identical domestic partnerships 
do not enjoy these benefits is not only because of the fact of federal discrimination and lack of 
consistent extra-California recognition of these unions,237 but also because the status of marriage 
attains “benefits” unique to the “cultural meaning of marriage” itself.238   
Walker’s trial findings thus underscore what is particularly rhetorically interesting about 
the George-Corrigan argumentative exchange in Marriage Cases.  Trial testimony included a 
specific examination of the (Corrigan-esque) “just a word” claim,239 but the question presented in 
the trial was about the substantive content of the status of marriage itself, rather than the question 
of whether terminology is per se an appropriate point of comparison between two forms of state-
recognized relationships.240  From various testimonies, Walker found that, as a matter of 
“adjudicative fact,”241 couples achieve full happiness and respect from society and their family 
only if they are married.242  In contrast to the rhetorical situation created by Corrigan and the 
Attorney General’s specific arguments in Marriage Cases, Walker did not arrive at this finding 
in the context of the possibility that the state might conceivably do away with the marriage 
designation altogether.243 His decision accordingly goes perhaps a step further than George’s 
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Marriage Cases opinion in collapsing the distinction between the status of marriage, and not 
only the legal but also the socio-cultural definition of a beneficial family.  The testimony the 
Chief Judge cites in the “fact” portion of Schwarzenegger does not clarify whether the unique 
qualities of marriage result more from societal perceptions about the status, or from something 
intrinsic to the status itself.  I think the most accurate interpretation of the testimony cited is that 
the unique qualifies of marriage result from something intrinsic to the status itself as inevitably 
derivative of its perceived value in society (see Appendix 1).244   
While George in Marriage Cases found that the “designation” marriage is indissociable 
from the “right to marry,” Walker—like George in Strauss—suggests through his framing of the 
trial testimony that there is a “right to marry” which holds some additional ineffable quality apart 
from the factual lack of equal access in federal and other jurisdictions to the various “substantive 
rights” enjoyed by all Californians in state-recognized dyadic relationships.245  This comes in 
part through the indicated intent and electoral framing of the ballot-proposition itself.246  In other 
words, Walker in Schwarzenegger responded to a situation that did not exist in Marriage Cases.  
Part of the function of Proposition 8 was to more clearly indicate a right to “marry 
[terminologically]” (separate from the broader non-terminological “right to marry” articulated by 
Corrigan in early 2008), for the express purpose of denying lesbian and gay individuals access to 
that newly clarified right.247   
This shift in doctrinal exigence from Marriage Cases to Perry—created by the particular 
circumstance of an initiative constitutional amendment designed to nullify a California Supreme 
Court ruling—would form the basis for Reinhardt’s unusual ruling in Perry v. Brown.  As 
Moreno argues presciently in his Strauss dissent, the particular oddity of Proposition 8 is that it 
is not (contrary to George’s argument for the Strauss majority) the popular repeal of a right that 
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had only found its original expression in the popular will.  Rather, Prop 8 represents a repeal by 
the electorate of a right “lately...recognized” by the judiciary, which unlike the majoritarian 
public-at-large, has the “special constitutional role [of] protector of minority rights.”  For 
Moreno, Proposition 8 is a popular majoritarian usurpation of the judiciary’s original 
“countermajoritarian” ruling.  As such, the decision to allow § 7.5 to remain valid is a decision 
contrary to the particular ethos248 of Californian and U.S. constitutional republicanism.249  
Reinhardt does not cite Moreno’s dissent in Brown—perhaps because he is obliged defer to the 
California Court’s official position in Strauss on “Proposition 8’s precise effect on California 
law.”250  Nonetheless, Reinhardt’s opinion on the initiative’s U.S. constitutionality does much to 
validate what I imagine was Moreno’s deep frustration at finding himself alone in the Strauss 
minority.   
V.  Conclusion: Perry v. Brown  
Instead of deciding, as Walker did, the “‘broader issue’”251 of whether the Constitution 
would “ever” permit laws denying same-sex couples “the right to marry,” Reinhardt confined his 
opinion to the narrow holding that, following the precedent of Kennedy’s Romer v. Evans 
opinion, Proposition 8 represented an unconstitutional repeal of a previously existing right for no 
“purpose” or “effect” “other than to lessen the status and human dignity of gays and lesbians in 
California.”252  As Kennedy declared in his 1996, “the Constitution simply does not allow for 
‘laws of this sort.’”253  Reinhardt’s framework for decision—which inscribes the importance of 
the state-constitutional debate in Marriage Cases at the level of U.S. constitutional doctrine—has 
the effect of reinforcing the significance of the “official designation of ‘marriage’” over the 
“incidents” of the institution,254 while also underwriting the terminology/substance dissociation 
that forms the core of Justice Corrigan’s doctrinal logic in Marriage Cases.  
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Prop 8 came to Reinhardt in the context of some contentious judicial politics: the Circuit 
Judge had recently been overturned by the Supreme Court via a particularly scathing opinion 
written by Justice Kennedy (whom the popular media is prone to framing as Reinhardt’s 
particular intended interlocutor in Brown255); and the “left-leaning” judge had to refuse a request 
from the Perry defendant/proponents to “recuse himself from hearing the appeal” because of a 
position his spouse had formerly held at the American Civil Liberties Union (a friend of the court 
in the pending case). 256   This context may have informed some popular and academic 
commentary that framed Reinhardt’s narrow opinion as an attempt to shield the “broader issue” 
from Supreme Court review, while also crafting an anti-Prop 8 opinion specifically designed to 
“play to Justice Anthony Kennedy’s gut,” by grounding the Ninth Circuit’s legal conclusions 
primarily through a parallel case argument connecting California’s constitutional amendment to 
Kennedy’s Romer v. Evans opinion striking down Colorado’s “Amendment II.”257  These 
questions of Reinhardt’s intent—pandering to Kennedy or taking the responsible course of 
deciding a case only on the grounds “necessary to” its resolution—obscure the significance of 
Reinhardt’s doctrinal argumentative choice to queer relational politics.   
Brown is certainly a surprisingly conservative decision by the “most liberal judge on the 
country’s most liberal appeals court.”258  Reinhardt passes on the opportunity to affirm a 
Fourteenth Amendment “right to marry” that is inclusive of same-sex couples.259  But I argue 
that Reinhardt’s decision, whatever his motives, leaves open certain more radical possibilities for 
future law.  The Circuit Judge’s Romer-inspired decisional framework makes thinkable a 
doctrinal future wherein the Fourteenth Amendment can be a basis for petitions for official state-
recognition of and protection for kinship forms foundationally excluded from the sign of 
marriage. 
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 It is difficult to read Brown as a politically cautious decision, given Reinhardt’s own 
public statements on the importance of the case.  Reinhardt chose to write a concurring 
explanation of the Ninth Circuit’s certified question to the California Supreme Court as to 
whether the intervening defendants in Perry had standing,260 given that the Governor refused to 
defend Proposition 8, and that it was unclear whether “backers of ballot propositions can step in 
to defend voter-approved measures in court when state officials refuse to do so.”261  In this 
concurring explanation, Reinhardt frames his decision to “set forth a few explanatory remarks” 
about the certified question as a matter of public duty: a duty engendered in the “substantial” 
importance of the question at hand in the Prop 8 appeal; an importance evidenced by the fact that 
“oral argument before the [Ninth Circuit in Perry on the question of standing] was viewed on 
television and the Internet by more people than have ever watched an appellate court proceeding 
in the history of the Nation.”262  Given the importance of the question at hand, Reinhardt 
acknowledges that these viewers “may wonder why [the issue of standing] is of such great 
importance,” and he goes on to suggest that standing is a “problem” rendered necessary only by 
legislative actions that function generally to hinder the judiciary’s ability to address important 
questions of constitutional “merit.”263   
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling is certainly, as Reinhardt acknowledges, an example of strict 
avoidance of any gratis dicta.264  It is thus by definition a doctrinally conservative opinion.  But 
Reinhardt went out of his way (in a document that he must know almost none of this viewing 
public will ever read) to remind the public audience of his eventual opinion of not only how 
important the “merits” of Perry are to the “tens of thousands of same-sex couples who wish to 
marry” in California, 265  but also of his annoyance 266  over the procedural circumstances 
preventing the Ninth Circuit from immediately considering these merits.  It is unlikely that the 
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Circuit Judge chose to avoid answering the “broader questions in this case” because he wished to 
avoid the issue of same-sex marriage, or because he wanted to play some procedural game with 
Kennedy.  A far more tenable critical perspective is to take Reinhardt at face value when he says 
that the “unique and strictly limited effect of Proposition 8 allows us to address the amendment’s 
constitutionality on narrow grounds,”267 grounds that I argue help the Ninth Circuit to avoid the 
California Supreme Court’s interpellation of a queer familial abject subject of California law.      
Reinhardt’s opinion—written, perhaps, in a style designed to appeal to that same public 
that watched the initial appellate proceedings in record numbers—offers the most explicit 
description out of all the texts I take up in this chapter of the rhetorically substantive value of the 
term “marriage.”  “‘Marriage,’” Reinhardt declares, “is the name that society gives to the 
relationship that matters most between two adults.”268  The Circuit Judge takes great care to 
establish the “singular” and substantive import269 of the word in quotidian American cultural life, 
using a jumble of (conspicuously White and Anglo) literary and pop cultural references to 
echo—without referencing—Walker’s inclusion of plaintiff Paul Katami’s statement in the 
Northern District’s findings of fact that “none of our friends have ever said—‘hey, this is my 
domestic partner.’”270  From the daily newspaper, to Groucho Marx, to Shakespeare, to How to 
Marry a Millionaire, Reinhardt offers various examples of how “marriage” is overwhelmingly 
and assumptively presented as the most important non-blood kin relationship that can be possible 
in the United States.271   
The difference between the testimony included by Walker in Schwarzenegger and 
Reinhardt’s apparent précis is that while the latter assumes the necessity of describing from 
whence the importance of the designation comes, the Perry plaintiffs (as Walker records them) 
speak as if there is something more intrinsic to “marriage” that gives it a unique relationship to 
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committed love.  While the plaintiffs describe the different social capital attached to other 
designations, I read Walker’s presentation of their testimony also as an argument for a 
naturalistic quality to marriage that should not have to be explained.  For example (the 
statements not in quotes are Walker’s paraphrase of witness statements):    
Stier: To [plaintiff Sandra B.] Stier...nothing about domestic partnership indicates the 
love and commitment that are inherent in marriage, and for Stier and [plaintiff Kristin 
M.] Perry, “[domestic partnership] doesn’t have anything to do...with the nature of our 
relationship and the type of enduring relationship we want it to be”...Stier: Marriage 
is...the way to tell [your family, parents, society, and community]...and each other that 
this is a lifetime commitment.  “And I have to say...it’s different.  It’s not the same.  I 
want—I don’t want to have to explain myself.”272    
This is a powerful argument (as I read it, the heterosexual defendant/proponents would not find it 
necessary to defend the validity of their own claims to marriage, and so prove both their bigotry 
and the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s equality claims in demanding such an explanation only 
from homosexual persons in same-sex relationships) that also excludes the possibility of a queer 
transformation of the marriage institution via its forced opening to same-sex couples.  
Contrastingly, even though Walker’s findings of fact as to the “meaning” of domestic 
partnerships are taken as a given by the Ninth Circuit,273 Reinhardt seems to find it necessary to 
offer his own explanation of why (in what is an actual sentence from a legal document presented 
by its author as one of the most important in the history of U.S. appellate public address) “a rose 
by any other name may smell as sweet, but to the couple desiring to enter into a committed 
lifelong relationship, a marriage by the name of ‘registered domestic partnership’ does not.”274   
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   As I note in the Introduction, in the peculiarly “sovereign” realm of judicial argument, 
“the decision of a case is deemed to be correct, and the parties must abide by the court’s 
conclusions.”  Perelman accordingly reminds the critic of judicial argument that “more often 
than not it is these conclusions that matter to the parties, far more than the facts themselves, 
which are little more than a basis from which legal consequences flow.”275  In the Perry cases, it 
is not the “facts themselves,” but the manner in which they are presented as evidence that I argue 
has political effect beyond a narrow view of the “legal consequences” of each judge’s 
conclusions of law.276   
Because Walker grounds his conclusions in his factual findings from a bench trial, his 
sovereign conclusions about the substantive distinction between domestic partnership and 
marriage derive from the experiential arguments of the testifying plaintiffs, which function as 
data for Walker’s claims through the implicit warrant that naturalizes the plaintiffs’ as the given 
experience of marriage and not-marriage for all gay and lesbian persons.277  Walker finds both 
that “domestic partnerships lack the social meaning associated with marriage” (finding No. 52) 
and that “the availability of domestic partnership does not provide gays and lesbians with a status 
equivalent to marriage because the cultural meaning of marriage and its associated benefits are 
intentionally withheld from same-sex couples in domestic partnerships” (finding No. 54).  The 
presented data for the first claim is primarily the testimony of academic experts, while the latter 
is primarily the testimony of the plaintiffs.278  When considering the specifically cultural 
meaning of the status of marriage itself, and thus the nature of the harm of withholding that 
status, Walker (in keeping with the individualist demands of U.S. constitutional jurisprudence) 
appears primarily interested in the nature of that harm as it is experienced by the plaintiffs—but 
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this does not alter his (and subsequently Reinhardt’s) framing of that harm in terms of persons 
excluded from marriage, generally, in California.     
One of Reinhardt’s judicial responsibilities in Brown is to adjudicate a dispute as to 
whether the Northern District’s findings are “‘adjudicative [instead of legislative] facts’...capable 
of being ‘found’ by a court through a clash of proofs presented in adjudication.”279  Because the 
finding (No. 52) that “‘[d]omestic partnerships lack the social meaning associated with 
marriage’—that [as Reinhardt describes it] the difference between the designation of ‘marriage’ 
and the designation of ‘domestic partnership’ is meaningful” was “conceded by Proponents,” the 
Ninth Circuit can proceed as if this finding were a given.280  In fact, Reinhardt’s citation includes 
No. 52 as the “only [apart from Proponents’ public statements about the intent and meaning of 
Proposition 8] fact found by the district court that matters to our analysis,” functionally 
excluding the plaintiff testimony (that provides the evidence for the claim in No. 54 about the 
“cultural meaning of marriage”) from the Ninth Circuit’s precedent.  Rather than extend this 
testimony into the appellate level, Reinhardt chooses to provide his own evidence as to the 
cultural meaning of the status of marriage, and the harm of being excluded from that meaning.  
Reinhardt’s presentation of this evidence—drawn from what appears to be his own experience of 
U.S. popular culture and everyday life, supplemented by doctrinal precedent—also works to 
universalize as natural particularly white and heterosexual experiences of marriage in relation to 
other ways in which people in the United States mark dyadic kinship commitments.  But 
Reinhardt, unlike Walker or the plaintiff testimony in No. 54, insistently separates the experience 
of designated-marriage from those kinship forms.  The two are obviously related, but not the 
same; denial of access to the former generates harm independent from the later.      
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Both Reinhardt and Walker erase the difference of gay and lesbian dyadic kinship pairs 
(thus abjecting queer kinship).  But while Walker moves from the particular to the universal––
naturalizing the experience of particular same-sex couples’ experience with marriage—Reinhardt 
does the converse, assuming that every person must experience implicit cultural arguments about 
the meaning of “marriage” in the same way, and therefore so must gays and lesbians:  
We see tropes like “marrying for love” versus “marrying for money” played out...in 
our...literature because of the recognized importance and permanence of the marriage 
relationship.  Had Marilyn Monroe’s film been called How to Register a Domestic 
Partnership with a Millionaire, it would not have conveyed the same meaning as did her 
famous movie, even though the underlying drama for same-sex couples is no different.  
The name ‘marriage’ signifies the unique recognition that society gives to harmonious, 
loyal, enduring, and intimate relationships.  See Knight v. Super. Ct., 128 Cal. App. 4th 14, 
31 (2005) (“[M]arriage is considered a more substantial relationship and is accorded a 
greater stature than a domestic partnership.”); cf. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.281   
Both George and Walker naturalize marriage as an intrinsic component of queer identity.  As I 
note in Chapter One, Walker’s equal protection analysis posits the desire to marry someone of 
the same sex as fundamental to gay and lesbian identity.  While Strauss does some work to sever 
the “marriage” component, Marriage Cases and Schwarzenegger taken together perform a 
sovereign interpellation of a normative gay legal subject defined specifically in terms of 
“marriage,” rather than even marriage-like kinship forms.   
Reinhardt does not do this.  He quite literally separates the signifier from signified, the 
“name” from the “incidents.”  In Strauss, George separates the right to the designation of 
marriage from the right to marry in order to subordinate it as one (and by implication the least 
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important) among many incidents of the broader right.  Reinhardt contrastingly takes the 
separation as far as it can reasonably go in the context of a marriage case on the appellate bench, 
constructing a framework for his eventual decision via literary and film references designed to 
both draw a bright line between the “recognition” and the “institution” of marriage, and to 
subordinate the “incidents of marriage” to both: the “status of ‘marriage’ is distinct from the 
incidents of marriage...[which are] both elements of the institution and manifestations of the 
recognition that the State affords to those who are in stable and committed lifelong 
relationships.”282  In the doctrinal world of Perry v. Brown, “the designation of ‘marriage’” is not 
itself the “highest form of a committed relationship,” but rather, as a matter of present and 
inescapable fact, the most significant “manner in which the State attaches respect and dignity” to 
that relationship form.  Reinhardt’s “framing of the question”283 is thus: 
Did the People of California have legitimate reasons for enacting a constitutional 
amendment that serves only to take away from same-sex couples the right to have their 
life-long relationships dignified by the official status of ‘marriage,’ and to compel the 
state and its officials and all others authorized to perform marriage ceremonies to 
substitute the label of ‘domestic partnership’ for their relationships?284   
This frame allows the Circuit Judge to make a direct comparison between Proposition 8 
and Colorado’s Amendment 2, which Kennedy found in violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
in his opinion for the Court in Romer v. Evans.  Reinhardt finds the Proposition and the 
Amendment “remarkably similar.”285  Just as Kennedy found that Amendment 2 “has the 
‘peculiar property’ of ‘withdraw[ing] from homosexuals, but no others,’ an existing legal right,” 
so also does Proposition 8.  Just as Kennedy found that Amendment 2 “‘by state decree...put[s] 
[homosexuals] in a solitary class with respect to’ an important aspect of human relations,” so 
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also does Proposition 8.286  George argues in Strauss that Proposition 8 is not a substantial 
revision to California’s whole system of law, because it merely “carves out a narrow and limited 
exception” to the “state constitutional rights” of equal protection and so does not “fundamentally 
alter the meaning substance” of those rights.287  In Brown, Reinhardt uses this statement as 
conclusive evidence for his argument that it is precisely because Proposition 8 only withholds a 
designation—one granted certain gay and lesbian couples for only a short period of time288—that, 
as Kennedy said in Romer of Amendment 2, the California initiative “denies ‘equal protection of 
laws in the most literal sense.’”289  The difference between Prop 8 and Amendment 2 is 
significant in terms of the relative size of their effect on various “substantive rights.”290  But for 
Reinhardt, even this difference only serves to amplify the applicability of Romer to Proposition 
8—the latter, as a “surgical” excision of “one specific right: the right to use the designation 
‘marriage’ to describe a couple’s officially recognized relationship,” is not so much distinct from 
the Romer precedent as it is even more exemplary of it than the original Colorado policy that 
inspired Kennedy’s argument in the first place.291 
Deciding Perry entirely through Romer has two important doctrinal implications.  First, 
as Kennedy determined with respect to Amendment 2, any law that works only to deprive a 
suspect class of certain “privilege, benefit, or protection” or right 292  is “constitutionally 
illegitimate” if the only basis for the law is “‘animus toward the class it affects,’”293 regardless of 
whether the right taken away is not or even should not be protected as a “federal constitutional 
right.”294  The Ninth Circuit’s refusal to “consider whether...states that fail to afford the right to 
marry to gays and lesbians must do so” should thus be read not as an excess of judicial caution, 
but rather as part and parcel of the opportunity to deploy the very specific Romer precedent as a 
powerful shield against actions like that taken by the “People of California” (a shield secure, for 
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example, against the possibility that the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Baker v. Nelson might 
give the Court a convenient way to decline to issue a ruling requiring states to conform their own 
marriage policies to a federal judicial decree).295   
Reinhardt’s rather odd discussion of the great weight and importance of the “name” 
marriage could certainly be used in support of a broader finding about the federal 
constitutionality of marriage bans, but instead the Circuit Judge uses this discussion as evidence 
for his ability to approach the case through the narrow Romer frame.  Romer helps make a case 
that is wholly and inescapably about the normative and inevitable centrality of marriage in the 
United States not really about marriage at all, but rather about whether the Constitution permits 
the exemplary use of an already exclusionary legal designation to rhetorically mark a set of 
persons as different for no reason other than hate––to, as Reinhardt concludes his opinion, 
“dishonor a  disfavored group by taking away the official designation of approval of their 
committed relationships and the accompanying societal status, and nothing more.”296      
Second, the Romer frame requires that Proposition 8 must pass only the rational basis 
test.297  This means that Reinhardt need not issue any pronouncement on the fundamental 
relationship between marriage and “same-sex” identity.  Instead, the Ninth Circuit “must 
consider only whether the change in the law [that Proposition 8 effected]—eliminating...the 
[Marriage Cases granted] right of” only “same-sex couples to have the official designation and 
status of ‘marriage’ bestowed on their relationships...was justified by a legitimate reason.”298  
This means that Reinhardt’s opinion, in stark contrast to other “pro marriage” decisions, assumes 
the normative value of the marriage institution, but does not need to cite and so affirmatively re-
articulate that value as a reason for extending marriage to same-sex couples.  Brown’s 
statements about the relationship between same-sex coupling and the value of marriage instead 
  244 
consist of a series of defense arguments against defendant objections—holding that Marriage 
Cases, in effect, did nothing to harm or contradict anything that was already considered valuable 
about marriage in the pre-Marriage Cases status quo.299   
George and Walker’s opinions in Marriage Cases and Schwarzenegger can be read as  
enacting what might be a particular nightmare for radical queer of color political interaction with 
the judiciary––the merging of the “pictorialist ‘like race’”300 argument that “gay men and 
lesbians are like racial minorities because they share an ‘immutable characteristic,’” with the 
marriage as “natural right” argument, through the performative constitution of the desire to 
marry someone of the same sex as a new “immutable characteristic” of “gay men and lesbians”–
–a new immutable characteristic that can now function as an “indicia of suspectness” in equal 
protection jurisprudence about marriage. 301   Reinhardt’s peculiar doctrinal argumentative 
approach to the marriage cases does not participate in this constitution––but not because 
Reinhardt does not reproduce the normative ideology of marriage as the ideal form of kinship.  
Rather, Reinhardt constructs a decision about marriage based not in this ideology itself, but 
rather on the fact of that produced ideology in our current society, as it applies to a situation 
where the production of marriage as normative ideal is used against a group of people for no 
good reason.   
In a world where Corrigan had written the majority opinion in Strauss to strike down 
Proposition 8, I imagine that her decision would have looked very similar to Reinhardt’s in 
Brown.  Given the overwhelming (as Reinhardt himself argues) normative centrality of marriage 
in U.S. public culture, it is not presently conceivable that a federal judicial marriage case would 
include a critique of marriage itself—except that in the California judiciary, such a critique is in 
fact not only conceivable, but has already been advanced, by Corrigan in her dissent and the 
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Attorney General in his brief in Marriage Cases.  Both of these examples of legal and judicial 
argument, however, would have aided policies that are, even in the context of a progressive 
critique of marriage, deeply oppressive.  It is important that Reinhardt’s particular decisional 
framework in Perry v. Brown, of course, allows a more liberatory end.  Precisely by 
distinguishing the “name” marriage as an independent and significant component of the state—
by breaking open the sign into the signifier “marriage,” and the separate signified institution to 
which the governmental speech act currently points, so as to be able to respond to the peculiar 
politics of Proposition 8 with the equally peculiar doctrinal politics of Romer––Reinhardt’s 
opinion creates a trajectory of rhetorical possibility for future practical attempts to engage 
constitutional law in the service of queer kinship forms.   
While Halley is “uncertain whether Romer’s nominalism will appear in other equal 
protection decisions,”302 I argue in Chapter One that it appears instead in Kennedy’s opinion in 
Lawrence, for a decision that eschews equal protection in favor of due process.  Nearly ten years 
later—and seventeen years after Romer—Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt once again brought 
“Romer’s nominalism” into an “equal protection decision,” one surrounded, no less, by 
precedent that generally insists on talking about marriage in terms of a fundamental, due process 
and equal protection derived right enjoyed by an essential and immutable subject position whose 
nature accrues partially and tautologically from that right of marriage itself.  As I argue in 
Chapter Two, however, Kennedy seems to have validated Halley’s concern that the “queer shift 
toward nominalism” begun in Romer might aid in the doctrinal erasure of race as an ongoing and 
structural social and political reality in the United States303—and so the radical potential of the 
possible queer subject constituted in Kennedy’s meta-Fourteenth Amendment rhetoric may be 
dependent for its radicalism on that subject’s constitution as post-racially queer.  
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The queer nominalist doctrinal possibility suggested by Reinhardt’s opinion may offer a 
slightly more hopeful story—even if for no other reason that, given the argumentative framework 
through which Reinhardt arrives at his particular and surprising304 conclusion of law, the 
miscegenation analogy barely makes an appearance in the Circuit Judge’s arguments about 
marriage.  The Supreme Court may yet, in Windsor, strike down the Defense of Marriage Act 
with a narrow equal protection finding that requires the federal government to recognize same-
sex marriages performed in states that will allow them, but that does not go so far as to require 
states to do so.  If such an immediate Supreme Court future also included a fairly straightforward 
affirmation of Reinhardt’s application of Romer to Proposition 8, the question of marriage would 
turn once more to social and legislative movement.   
It is therefore possible that the judicial argumentative dissociation of “marriage” from 
marriage that Corrigan begins in Marriage Cases may yet prove a resource for future attempts 
not to demand state recognition for queer kinship forms as marriages, but rather to demand that 
the judiciary intervene against regressive and hateful efforts to ban, criminalize, and persecute 
the results of sexually and racially progressive politics that are, and have been, constructing 
queer of color kinship forms in contradiction to the heterosexual, “domestinormative” family. 
The potential judicial intervention that I speak of would necessarily be a negative intervention.  
Kennedy’s meta-argumentative Fourteenth Amendment, extended by Reinhardt into the marriage 
debates, is “hands off.”  It contains no possibility for sovereign actions in support of, for example, 
radical queer of color contra-marriage kinship communities.  But if it did, a petition to the Court 
for such support would, as discussed in the introduction, rhetorically constitute a performative 
affirmation of U.S. legal sovereignty over those forms of queer of color being and relation it was 
brought in to help protect.  The limit of the politics I advance in this project is the inevitability of 
  247 
state-violence directed at the efforts, proponents, and constituents of radical queer of color 
politics.  Given that inevitability, a queer of color legal praxis should include a consideration of 
what limited, often latent, and highly constrained possible “openings”305 exist in present U.S. 
judicial rhetoric, openings that may be exploited in the service of queer of color political goals.  
Reinhardt and Corrigan’s judicial performative distinctions between “marriage” and marriage 
may represent some of those openings.   
There may yet be an answer to Judith Butler’s question about kinship—is it “always 
already heterosexual?”306  The answer may lie in the radical possibility of an “appeal to the state” 
that will “finally” render radical queer and queer of color kinship forms publicly coherent, as a 
nominalist307 contestation rather than normative reproduction of the “ideological account of 
kinship” that is currently an intrinsic component of any desire for “recognizability” as a 
relational (coupled) subject of U.S. constitutional law.308  The desirability of that legal/public 
coherence will be one of the questions I take up in the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION––QUEER PHRONĒSIS 
 
“The right to read credibility is not a controversial component of the immigration judicial system, 
as all major court processes in the United States provide similar power to judges.  However, 
some asylum claimants have less ground to cover in performing credibly before court officials.  
These are individuals whose experiences of persecution fit into the more concrete categories of 
race, religion, and nationality.”   
 
––Sara L. McKinnon, “Citizenship and the Performance of Credibility”1    
 
In Isocrates’ Antidosis, the rhetorician warns against a group of philosophers in Athens2 
who lead their students astray from true forms of virtue by teaching a form of phronēsis––the 
“practical understanding” of “what is best for the most part”3––that is limited to their squabbling 
council (rather than reflective of prevailing common sense), and deployed not in the service of 
the good of the polity, but rather in the interest of increasing the popularity of their particular 
intellectual clique.4  For Isocrates, phronesis (also5 “prudence,”6 “practical wisdom,”7 “practical 
reason”8) is truly virtuous only9 if it is informed by and directed toward the polity’s collective 
understanding of its own good ends.  Many years later, the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer 
offers the potential for mediation between Isocrates and his professional competition (as 
Isocrates presents them).  The worth of phronesis, Gadamer argues, is in its recognition that 
while human judgment is informed by the telos of “identification with the communal,” political 
and ethical decisions are necessarily contingent, responding in each instance to situations that 
could not be predicted by our collective understanding of what has come before.10  Gadamer 
orients the rhetorical process of identification toward a communal whose boundaries are defined 
through constant situational challenge and fluctuation.      
Identification, or more precisely the constitution of subjectivity, is central to this project, 
insofar as I perform a “queering” of judicial argument.  I posit this “queering” as a form of 
exercising 11  “queer politics”; 12  that is, as a practical exploration of possibilities for the 
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exploitation of potentials for the articulation of radical subjectivities in relation to sovereign 
judicial rhetoric, exploitation intended for the service of anti-establishmentarian, “radical” queer 
of color political agendas.  I seek out these possibilities for radical exploitation in: substantive 
due process rhetoric grounded in liberal, heteronormative theories of racialized kinship; post-
racial confluences of radically nominalist due process and equal protection arguments; and 
ostensibly conservative judicial arguments against the legalization or total constitutional 
protection the right to marry a person of the same sex. 
In this way, as I argue in the Introduction, rhetorical criticism as the practice of 
evaluating discursive responses to political contingencies can be a significant component of a 
radical queer praxis.  This chapter considers one possible theoretical basis for such a praxis.  Any 
such possibility is difficult to conceive, as it entails holding together establishment and 
disestablishment, subject and abject.  I offer the Aristotelian virtue of phronēsis as a tempting 
ground for such a hermeneutic. Its classical articulation and contemporary uptake in rhetorical 
and legal theory suggests the possibility of a middle ground—a means of bridging 
contradiction—that retains a kind of radicalism not despite, but because of, its avowedly 
conservative nature. 
Phronesis is fundamental to the realization of the critical rhetorical ideal of law in 
culture.13   It is not so much a useful but necessary and inescapable hermeneutic for a critical 
response to Western and U.S. jurisprudence that is committed (as I am) to a reading of examples 
of judicial opinion in part on the terms of their own internal doctrinal logic.  As I will 
demonstrate, the theoretical basis I propose for a radical or “critical”14 queer of color rhetorical 
praxis of judicial criticism cannot be phronesis itself, but this particular political synthesis 
nonetheless requires that phronesis be implicated and taken up.  Insofar as phronesis is conflated 
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with reason, Gadamer is interested not in reason as ideological “rationality,” but rather in 
“reasonableness” (Vernünftigkeit), 15  or “the practical knowledge of practical reason” that 
“teaches us the conditions under which reason becomes practical.”16   
A radical queer of color “practical knowledge of practical reason” will not “teach us” 
such conditions as they are currently taken to be extant in racialized, heteronormative discursive 
structures of institutional and state power.  Rather, a radical queer of color Vernünftigkeit can 
productively destabilize the assumptive nature of such conditions as it provides the basis for 
asking the question “those conditions under which reason becomes practical” to whom.  In other 
words, I hope to articulate a radical queer of color epistemology17 of the phronetic processes of 
judicial rhetoric.  Such an epistemology can be the basis for a kind of queering, or provisional 
queer identification with judicial rhetorical choices that matter differently to (even as they 
participate collectively in the differential abjection of) possibilities for the sovereign constitution 
of queer subject positions in U.S. law. 
I.  Phronesis and Law  
 Aristotelian phronēsis —in this way, rather like “queer”—is hard to grasp.18  In Book 1, 
Chapter 9 of the Rhetoric, Aristotle lists “the parts…of virtue,”19 or the “ability for doing good.”  
The virtue phronēsis is central to the rest.  Because the “greatest virtues are necessarily those 
most useful to others,” those who are virtuous in a manner that is most useful to the most people 
are “most” honored,20 and phronesis is that “virtue of intelligence whereby people are able to 
plan well for happiness in regard to the good and bad things that are mentioned earlier” (that is, 
each of the other parts of virtue and their opposites).21  But unlike some of the other virtues, 
Aristotle does not define phronesis in specific terms of action.  If a person consistently makes 
decisions that result in “the good” and not the “bad things” that define the other virtues and their 
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opposites, that person might be said to have phronesis, but this does not tell us how she came by 
it, or how we might emulate her virtuous quality.  Phronesis is, as James Jasinski argues, thus 
“frequently…defined by negation.”  It is “a way of guiding action” that is “most often” described 
by post-Aristotelian critics not affirmatively but in terms of its difference from other frameworks 
through which individuals might make decisions.22   
The slipperiness of phronesis is exemplified in the difficulty of establishing a definitional 
relationship between the word, and the quality it and its “roughly synonymous terms”23 signify.24  
For example, the conflation of phronesis and “prudence” is part of the reason for the latter term’s 
frequent association with an ethic of “moderation and compromise,”25 but it would not be an 
accurate reading of Aristotle to conflate phronesis with the virtue of moderation, per se.  As 
Aristotle defines the term specifically in the Rhetoric, phronesis is the virtue of making virtuous 
decisions, the status of which as such is determined not in their production of one particular 
form of good, but rather any number of “good” and not “bad things.”  The second clause of 
Aristotle’s definition, as George A. Kennedy renders it, with my emphasis–– “people are able to 
plan well for happiness in regard to the good and bad things that are mentioned earlier”––can 
also be read as “people are able to plan well for happiness” in the specific and varied contexts of 
the other parts of virtue. 
 In “Speculation and Judgment,” the philosopher Jacques Taminiaux does associate 
phronesis with the middle ground, but not in the sense of absolute definition, where phronesis is 
the virtue of moderation itself.  For Taminiaux, “what is at stake” in phronesis as a “type of 
knowledge specifically adjusted to human affairs” (in the context of Taminiaux’ argumentative 
characterization26 of Athenian civil society27) is the means of arriving at sound decisions “by 
searching again and again for a mean between extremes.”28  Taminiaux’ diction does appear at 
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first to underwrite Jasinski’s frustration, qua Eugene Garver, with the citation of Aristotle toward 
the valorization of “moderation and compromise as the essence of prudence.”29  His description 
also appears inconsistent with Aristotle’s manner of including phronesis in his list of the virtues 
(parts of virtue) as I describe in the previous paragraph.  Taminiaux, however, locates 
Aristotelian phronesis in the context of a particular Athenian political praxis grounded in “the 
ambiguities of human affairs,” where the “mean” sought by phronesis is not compromise per se 
in the policy sense, but the temporary stability sought by negotiation between the rules that 
govern civil society, and the necessary fact of their instability and transience in the context of a 
government by “plurality” carried out through constant debate.30   
Taminiaux grounds his definition specifically in the context of debates over the nature of 
politics among Athenian civic theorists, but as Jasinski argues in a modern context, phronesis 
(“practical wisdom”) can be broadly or even universally descriptive of the process by which 
“communities [attempt] to negotiate contingency and indeterminacy.”31  “Able to plan well...in 
regard to” is thus a key phrase in Aristotle’s Chapter 9 definition of phronesis.  For example, it 
may be “agreed by all that”32  “justice is a virtue by which all, individually, have what is due to 
them and as the law requires; and injustice [is a vice] by which they have what belongs to others 
and not as the law requires.”33  But, in order to make decisions consistent with justice in the 
context of a legal system that necessitates the specific and contextual persuasion of an audience 
consisting of members of the broader plurality, there can be no universal application of “what the 
law requires” in every case.  Each person charged with responsibility for making a decision 
according to and consistent with the general value of justice must have some means of doing so 
well despite the ambiguity of the principle.   
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The “capacity”34 for such means is a quality of the phronetically virtuous, but here of 
course we return to the question of what are those means, and what constitutes this capacity?  For 
the moment, I will address the latter question only.  For Garver, it is the articulation of a “middle 
ground” of policy “‘halfway between an ethics of principles, in which those principles univocally 
dictate action…and an ethics of consequences, in which the successful result is all.’”35  For 
Taminiaux, it is the location of decisionmaking in light of virtues “not at all in terms of the strict 
observation of a clear rule.”36  This manner of approach to decisions requires a framework for 
judgment inclusive of both what appears “to be agreed by all [to be wisdom]”37 and “what 
appears to each individual, that is, to doxa, individual opinion.”38  Taminiaux’s version of 
Garver’s “ethics of consequences” is the relationship between phronesis and the futurity of latent 
potential; phronesis “is an effort to link particulars to universals that are forever potential and 
never fully given beforehand.”  Judgment consistent with phronesis must be “[planned] well” in 
regards to virtue—this means that the judgment must occur with the decisionmaker’s full 
cognizance of both the specific and non-generalizable consequential import of her actions, and 
the judgment’s immediate and future implications for goodness, generally.39  In terms of the 
relationship between the virtue of phronesis and the virtue of justice, a specific legal decision 
planned well must simultaneously accord justice to the relevant parties (it must ensure that each 
has their due as the law requires, and if not, make it so) and be directed toward a telos of justice 
that is generally consistent with preserving and reproducing conditions of possibility for the 
“good and beautiful life”40 in the polity as a whole.     
Given Taminiaux’s interpretation, Aristotle’s diction in Chapter 9 (as Kennedy renders it) 
embeds phronesis into justice.  While the capacity for phronesis is not only a pre-requisite for the 
realization of the virtues,41 the virtue of justice goes so far as to be inclusive of phronesis as a 
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necessary part.  The grammatical structure of the sentence “justice is a virtue by which all, 
individually, have what is due to them and as the law requires” renders the relationship between 
“what is due” and what “the law requires” productively ambiguous.  The phrasing suggests both 
that justice is realized when a person has “what is due” to her according to the requirements of 
the law, and that “justice is…as the law requires.”  The conjunction “and” means that both are 
necessary components of justice; neither realizes justice without the other.  The determination of: 
what, in a given case a person is due; what a person is due according to the requirements of the 
law; and of whatever else the law may require; are necessarily contingent decisions that must be 
(“as the law requires”) made together.  They must be made in light of the relationship between 
individual claims and the (inherently contested and realized through contestation) 42 
understanding of both the specific case and the broader issues that inform it.  Phronetic virtue is 
the primary condition of possibility for virtuous law.  
II.  Phronesis and Legal Rhetorical Criticism 
While contemporary critics use phronesis and its “roughly synonymous terms” largely 
interchangeably, Aristotle and Plato used the term to mean rather different things.  “Prudence” is 
a dominant term in uptakes43 of phronesis in rhetorical criticism and theory.  Robert Hariman 
defines Aristotelian phronesis under prudence, distinguishing the “more democratic” Isocratic 
and Aristotelian concept of prudence as a “distinctive mode of intelligence” “practiced through” 
the operations of deliberative democracy against Plato’s earlier “codification” of prudence as an 
elite/techno(ē)cratic virtue of the “ideal ruler.”44  I use “phronesis” instead of the “prudence” 
preferred by Jasinski and Hariman because of my specific interest in Vernünftigkeit, which is 
inclusive both of “prudence” and Platonic phronesis as Hariman describes it.  Gadamer argues 
that the difference in how Aristotle and Plato use phronesis is illustrative of the critique of 
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Plato’s antidemocratic ethos that Hariman argues is implicit in Aristotelian prudence.  According 
to Gadamer, Aristotle consistently 45  uses phronēsis to “explicitly [distinguish] practical 
knowledge from both theoretical and technical knowledge,” a meaning-in-context that, as 
Taminiaux also suggests,46 reflects the “customary usage” of the time.47  Plato expands48 the 
meaning of the term to both refer specifically to its original/customary meaning of “practical 
reasonableness,” and to be “synonymous with both technē and episteme.”   
This highlights a relationship in Platonic theory between “practical reason and technical 
know-how” that belies the important differences between the two.  Reasoning is obviously 
common to both “practical” exigencies and those (the examples in Aristotle are primarily 
scientific) “requiring the recourse to general knowledge that characterizes technē and epistēmē.”  
The “exercise of practical reason,” however, involves the difficult task of arriving at a reasoned 
(“well-advised,” or as Kennedy translates, “plan[ned] well”) judgment without “recourse” to this 
“previously acquired general knowledge,” because it necessarily occurs in response to situations 
characterized by the uncertain contingency fundamental to human relations.49  The implication 
for Gadamer is that the virtue of phronesis in Aristotle might be described as the capacity to 
arrive at good decisions supported not through the anti-democratic, elite Platonic ethos of what 
might be called technē-cratic wisdom, but rather through “nothing other than good reasons”—or 
to put it more colloquially, good arguments that, to a reasonable person, simply make sense.50  
The clash between Aristotelian and Platonic phronēsis is central to critical rhetorical uptakes of 
judicial argument. It is not only that phronesis qua Gadamer is informative of the critical 
rhetorical ideal of the law in culture, but also that phronesis works as a summary of what is 
claimed as the good in prominent critical legal rhetorical scholarship.     
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In the “The Rhetorical Boundaries of ‘the Law’,” Hasian, Condit, and Lucaites offer a 
rhetorical perspective as a corrective to what they see as the anti-structuralist tendency of critical 
legal studies and related scholarship to treat the law as a obfuscatory “tool”51 in the service of 
hegemony rather than an “active and protean component of…rhetorical culture.”52  As Roger 
Stahl argues in Rhetoric & Public Affairs in 2002, the courts are “in the business of definition 
and argumentation, crafting meaning within the culturally determined realms of probability, 
acceptability, subjectivity, [and] hegemony.”53  Hasian, Condit, and Lucaites seek to build a 
bridge between “professionalist” and “critical” legal theory; in critical legal rhetorical studies, 
legal rhetors and institutions are participants in a “rhetorical culture,” where legal discourse 
should be understood in terms of the judiciary’s struggle to not only make sound legal decisions 
from a technical/rationalist perspective but to legitimate those decisions in public.54  While 
Hasian, Condit, and Lucaites frame their position as opposed to critical approaches to legal 
analysis, I believe, as I argue in the introduction, that a rhetorical critical practice understanding 
of the role that judicial rhetors play in public culture should be a site of mutually informative 
inquiry with, rather than an opposition to, poststructural critique that understands this role as the 
oppressive (re)legitimation of legal sovereignty.     
Phronesis is the virtue implicit in Hasian, Condit, and Lucaites’ response to both critical 
legal theory and positivist law.  Gadamer cautions against taking Aristotle’s critique of Platonic 
good to be directed against an “ideal of an objective theory, neutral in regard to all the interests 
at stake in any practical application of it, and consequently capable of any application one might 
wish to make,” as this ideal is inconsistent not only with Aristotelian phronesis, but with all of 
the virtues as they are described and espoused in both Plato and Aristotle.55  A critic could 
certainly make the case that what Anthony T. Kronman calls the “ideal of scientific law 
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reform”—exemplified in Richard A. Posner’s “Law and Economics” movement56––gestures 
toward this “ideal of an objective theory,” and Hasian, Condit, Lucaites offer similar objections 
to Critical Legal Studies, framing the latter in some ways as the radical leftist converse to legal 
positivism. Aristotelian phronesis is complementary to their affirmative articulation of the 
alternative mode represented by critical legal rhetoric.  While Gadamer claims a “fundamental 
distinction” in Aristotelian theory “between theoretical and practical knowledge,” it importantly 
does not follow that the two are mutually exclusive.57  In the “question of the good in…social 
life” each person must have their own concept of good that they are able to work out in relation 
to others, but here “there can be no specialized knowing and no specialists.”  As in Plato’s (also 
phronetic) “true dialectical art of giving justification,” the question of what is good cannot be 
deferred to the ethos of elite subjectivity, nor to a body of theoretical knowledge that exists prior 
to justificatory dialogue.58  Gadamer’s identification of the “art of giving justification” as 
phronetic underwrites his argument that the impossibility of such a deferral to the elite does not 
fundamentally disconnect the practical knowledge of phronesis from the theoretical knowledge 
of techne and episteme.   
The question of “practical reason” is the question of “right thing to do,” and the answer to 
the question is necessarily specific to the case, rather than one present in some kind of “universal 
teleology.”59  The “reasonable, practical deliberation” through which a decisionmaker arrives at 
“the right thing to do” cannot be—as in Posner’s law—the correct scientific examination of a 
predetermined set of rules laid out for specific application to particular cases.  But just as with 
the early Critical Race Theory objection to the totalizing theoretical methods of Critical Legal 
Studies,60 the phronetic critique of theory does not entail “subordination of theory to practice.”  
Rather, theory derives from practice in a relationship continued in terms of mutual constitution.  
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The “highest awareness” that can be attributed to phronesis, “which in each instance is conscious 
of the rightness of its choice and decision,” is both productive of “sophia (wisdom),” that 
“theoretical knowing which has attained complete self-fulfillment,”61 and that thing itself.62  In 
Gadamer’s synthetic reading of Aristotelian and Platonic virtue, phronesis as virtue is 
reasonableness—a concept in many ways descriptive of the Athenian notion of the empirical 
contingency inherent to the polis63—elevated to prescriptive ideal.64   
A specific example in the law might be the relationship between doctrine and stare 
decisis.  Here phronesis can shed some light on the tension between the ability of judges to 
rhetorically invent and frame the genealogies of precedent underlying an opinion, and the 
situational constraints imposed by those same genealogies on the possible range of judicial 
arguments that can be articulated in a given opinion.  Each person charged with responsibility for 
making a decision according to and consistent with the general value of justice must have some 
means of doing this well despite the ambiguity of the principle.  Each decision that is made 
(whether it is made well or not—whether or not it is virtuous) will thus alter and inform the 
collective understanding of “what is due to them” and what “the law requires” in a given case, so 
further participating in the process of the constant making and unmaking of the specific content 
(phronesis) and general knowledge (episteme) of judicial virtue.  Because for Aristotle the right 
thing to do is the end suggested by the practical response to the case, the virtue of phronesis lies 
partially in that, as Gadamer argues, “one ought to be aware of what one is actually doing when 
one does what is right.”65  The lack of virtue in anti-prudential jurisprudence is thus not (or not 
only) that any mode of jurisprudential argument is actually anti-prudential, but rather that the 
manner in which some modes of judicial argument productively frame66 the precedential 
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genealogies controlling in a given case obscure the play of hegemonic ideology in the 
reproduction of doctrine ostensibly for its own sake. 
Here then is a critical rhetorical idea of law in culture.  Judicial rhetoric must, as a 
component of its situational requirements, make use of doctrinal theory—a body that could be 
read as the codification of collective wisdom concerning the law—but always in a manner 
specific to the contingency of the case, and with the recognition that the application of doctrine is 
not and should not be framed in terms of a set of rules for how to apply the law.  Phronesis is 
negotiation between extremes, but this is not the application of a rule “to be the mean between 
two extremes,” but rather a theoretical conception of extremes as on the one hand, 
theoretical/general, and on the other, the constantly renewed practical knowledge of experienced 
situation.67  
As Francis J. Mootz argues in his exploration of critical legal rhetoric, the contingency of 
legal judgment is phronetic, rather than a radical,68 where phronesis in a legal context is: “the 
capacity to converse with another and to make practical-moral judgments on the basis of a 
common, historically transmitted tradition, despite the lack of any firm rules guiding these 
judgments.”69  Critical legal rhetoric is thus underwritten by Gadamer’s uptake of Aristotle’s 
negotiated synthesis of practical and epistemic knowledge and their relationship to the good.70  
For Gadamer,  “the definitive juxtaposition of theoretical and practical knowing, and hence of 
the theoretical and practical virtues of knowing, in no way infringes upon the unity of reason, 
which governs us in both these directions [in which our reasoning might move].”71  The law as a 
rhetorical process constitutes a practical engagement with theory, of “practical encounters that 
have critical dimensions,”72 suggesting that legal critique which treats the law as an overly 
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determined ideological construct ignores the inevitable range of material possibilities called into 
being by every specific operation of the law, rhetorically, in culture.   
Taminiaux parallels Gadamer in arguing that while “technē deliberates only about the 
adequate means for predefined ends, phronēsis deliberates about well-doing in general.”  This 
deliberation is not terms of a “science of the good in general,” or “what we find to be good in the 
theoretical realm,”73 but rather what is good to be done “in relation to kairos,” or the “opportune 
moment”74  for a decision in context. 75   Taminiaux agrees with Gadamer that Aristotle’s 
insistence contra Plato that “phronēsis is a doxastic virtue” does not mean that it is a virtue mired 
always in the “particular perspectives of individuals” and thus incapable of articulating what is 
Ideal; rather, “phronēsis is the aptitude of pondering doxa…for the ever-potential universal that 
is the good and beautiful life.”76  Here again, it is the capacity for practical knowledge that gives 
rise to the capacity for wise theory, and in this way, phronesis again underwrites the contribution 
that knowledge of rhetoric can bring to a critical understanding of the law.   
The law is an “activity” and not a “resource;” legal decisions are the rhetorical exercise 
of “framing disputes and then making judgments:”77  “framing the question at issue is not a 
matter of demarcating the perspicacious features of the world-in-itself that can later be 
investigated, but rather is the activity of rhetorical engagement that provides us with a world in 
the first instance.”78  Aristotle makes it difficult to parse the relationship between the ethics of 
the framework for action and the action itself.  This difficulty, in the context of a phronetic 
rhetorical legal criticism, highlights the specific importance of judicial argument.  The 
argumentative framework through which a judicial rhetor frames her opinion has material effects 
independent from the decision itself.  The argumentative frames that influence and constrain a 
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conclusion of law—the statement of policy in an opinion—both influence future policy, and, in 
the context of particular legal situations, are policy itself. 
III.  A Practical Hermeneutic of Radical Engagement    
 The mode of legal rhetorical criticism I practice throughout this dissertation suggests that 
a critical rhetorical engagement with the processes of legal decisionmaking—processes that are 
inevitably and inescapably derivative of Aristotelian thought79––must be an engagement with the 
virtue of phronesis, and the question of the capacity for phronesis in contemporary jurisprudence.  
This is a disciplinary requirement in the sense of rhetoric’s extant canonical attachment to 
classical rhetorical notions of the negotiation of contingency,80 but also in the sense of the 
inescapable relationship between classical rhetorical valuations of reason, and norms of 
operation in contemporary legal institutions.81   Phronesis, once again, is thus a tempting ground 
for a hermeneutic of radical queer of color rhetorical legal criticism.  A radical queer of color 
engagement with legal rhetoric can provide some basis to normatively distinguish among 
different judicial arguments that have materially different implications for the coercive 
regulation, oppression, and abjection of racialized queer subjectivities performatively constituted 
in U.S. judicial rhetorics of constitutional interpretation.  But for such a hermeneutic to succeed, 
there must first be some possibility for a radical queer valuation of the different potentials for 
phronetic capacity among varied examples of judicial rhetoric.    
Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner stipulate the need for an institutional focus in queer 
theory and politics, a call echoed in queer rhetorical criticism by Charles E. Morris III.  For 
Morris, Berlant, and Warner, while the benefits of queer theory’s deconstructive analytical 
potential are clear—that is, to expose the workings and origins of heternormative ideology, to 
identify and strip the ‘normative’ from ‘hetero’—the need for institutional and constructive 
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politics is also apparent, as the status quo demands an answer to “questions of political utility.”82  
I argue that these “questions of political utility” are necessarily bound up in the law,83 especially 
given a nation-state that depends in part on the official marginalization of “sexual underclasses” 
for its “national symbolic and political coherence.”84  The law matters, rhetorically.   
Here I turn again to Charles Morris’s study of the famous and highly public “Trial of 
Leopold and Loeb,” where the queer rhetorical critic takes as his text for rhetorical criticism the 
mis-en-scène of a major court trial because of his recognition of the “muscle and materiality” 
that “jurisprudence” provides toward heteronormativity.85  While “the most important site of 
legal change may not be in the courtroom,”86 courts, and I argue the Court in particular, retain 
centrally important roles in determining the particular manner in which discursive and material 
relations of domination will be reinforced against attempts at change.  On the one hand, even 
credulous, practically intended, radically exploitative petitions to legal sovereignty can at best 
gain freedom for some at the expense of providing the rhetorical opportunity for judicial rhetors 
to legitimate their sovereign power over others; on the other hand, failure to so engage risks 
leaving unchecked the “muscle” of heteronormativity that renders the queer citizenship theorist 
Shane Phelan decidedly pessimistic87 about the immediate possibilities for her project of 
“wholesale rethinking” of law and citizenship along queer lines.                
Here is where, optimistically, I posit phronesis as a vehicle for queer rhetorical legal 
criticism, aimed at producing radical perspectives on the operations of judicial argument, as one 
component of a radical queer of color praxis.  Given the risk of, as Judith Butler argues, the 
validation of the sovereign performatives of judicial rhetoric, phronesis can be one way of 
describing the potential in rhetorical practice for articulating the critical valuation of some 
judicial arguments over others, without risking the suggestion that either choice should be 
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endorsed as a good.88  The virtue of phronesis vis-à-vis the community or public is in the ability 
to resolve the contradiction89 between the determinacy of the local and present situation and the 
imperative of the future ideal. Phronesis, as I note above, is an epistemological virtue containing 
the capacity for resolving the contradiction of individual and community:    
Aristotle says that phronēsis is a doxastic virtue.  This does not mean that phronēsis is 
trapped in the appearances and strictly attaches to the particular perspectives of 
individuals.  On the contrary, phronēsis is the aptitude of pondering doxa, which means 
the attitude of searching—while pondering the specifics of a particular situation—for the 
ever-potential universal that is the good and beautiful life.90 
Further, phronesis holds the radically particular and the radically universal as dual and mutually 
productive representations of the highest forms of human achievement and virtue.  
Simultaneously, a phronetic moral economy maintains the subordination of the radically 
universal to the radically particular, where the latter is both the pre-requisite to and the only 
ultimately virtuous expression of the former.91   
In this way, phronesis as the ground of virtuous law suggests the possibility for one kind 
of queering—for the articulation and normative evaluation of latent radical queer of color 
possibilities in foundationally anti-radical jurisprudence.  Conceiving of this version of queering 
in the context of legal rhetorical action as the enactment of a queer phronesis suggests the 
possibility of holding together: on one hand, the need to engage the present “muscle and 
materiality” of jurisprudence in its own spaces and on its own terms; with on the other, the 
absolutely contradictory imperative to reject inscriptions of the performative power of law as a 
foundation of radical politics.  In phronetic terms, these possibilities are first: the demands of the 
moment engendered in the inevitable action of law-as-sovereign on persons rhetorically as they 
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are constituted through the derealizing fields of legal subjectivity; and second, radical extra-
institutional and anti-establishmentarian efforts to realize queer of color counter-publicity against 
the racialized heteronormative nation-state and its dominant institutions.92   
I call this an optimistic possibility because it is overly so.  Gadamer reminds us that 
because for Aristotle, the capacity for phronesis is the pre-requisite to the practical realization of 
the other virtues (including justice), it is only in the “realm of practice” that “moral decisions” 
are possible.93  In phronetic decisionmaking, “holding to a principle…is not merely a logical act,” 
meaning that “practical reasonableness is displayed not only in knowing how to find the right 
means but also in holding to the right ends.”94  While the “means” of action in phronesis can be 
understood in ways that are consistent with radical politics as I define them, an attempt to 
articulate a radical queer of color phronesis can nonetheless not escape the telos of phronesis 
itself, which is decidedly and inherently contrary to radicalism.  This is apparent in at least two 
ways.   
First, as Jansinski suggests, the prudential capacity that “communities deploy in an effort 
to negotiate contingency and indeterminacy” is not toward the valuation of radicalism, but rather 
toward an attempt to articulate stability in response to the contingent realities of politics.   
Similarly, in critical legal rhetoric, Hasian, Condit, and Lucaites illustrate the telos of 
normativity implicit in phronesis through their argument that the “impermanent” “feeling” 
resulting from understanding the law as part and parcel of “rhetorical culture” “has the advantage 
of allowing openness to needed change; and in point of fact, assumes that publicly warranted 
changes will be made.”95  As with Jasinski’s “practical wisdom” of the community, this is not an 
argument for the radical democratic potential of uncertainty,96 but rather the phronetic claim that 
it is through response to contingency that civic ideals can be re-articulated in the communal––a 
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position that functions as a kind of philosophical modality of judicial arguments about the 
relationship between morality, popular sensibility, public policy, and the nature of the state.  The 
telos of phronesis is thus a part of, rather than an opposition to, the judicial rhetorical practice of 
constantly re-affirming the sovereignty of law in the practice of providing argumentative 
justification for judicial decisions.  The relationship between critical legal rhetoric and phronesis 
suggests that part of the advantage of understanding the law in terms of rhetorical culture is the 
ability to see legal decisions as productive of “a modicum of stability and predictability” through 
“‘compromise,’ ‘stand-off,’ or ‘concordance’ among social actors motivated by competing 
interests.”97  The insight of radical queer of color critique of the relationship between politics and 
political/legal/cultural institutions is that this “modicum of stability and predictability” will be 
constantly reproduced in terms of racialized, heteronormative oppression.98                 
Second, both the method and telos of Aristotelian phronesis—particularly as it is taken up 
in contemporary rhetorical theory—has a particular relationship to the assumed univeralism of 
the democratic political community that is hard to parse with radical queer of color politics.  This 
is apparent in my earlier uptake of Hariman’s study of “bureaucratic style” vis-à-vis my critical 
race theory informed critique of Butler’s theory of the rhetorical legitimation of legal sovereignty.  
Hariman’s call for a practical knowledge of “how” (qua Constable) bureaucratic style functions 
to govern everyday life so as to better “survive” it presumes, as I noted, a universal subject of 
bureaucracy that in so presuming participates in (and does nothing for) the abjection of 
bureaucratic style’s abject.   
In section one, I raised the two questions of first, what constitutes the capacity to realize 
the virtue of phronesis, and second, what are the means to realize that capacity, but attempted to 
answer only the former.  In his treatise Norms of Rhetorical Culture, Thomas B. Farrell asks the 
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same question: if, as he argues, “virtue in the Rhetoric…[is] a powerful capacity awaiting 
propitious realization,” then “how is” that capacity “implemented?”99  The answer is in “the 
adjudication of a reasoning, competent audience that confirms, qualifies, or denies the allegation 
of virtuous qualities on behalf of some other person, action, or project—thereby ensuring virtue’s 
enactment for itself.”100  Farrell arrives at this answer through his argument for the “collective 
character of practical reasoning in rhetoric.”101  For all but the most “stalwart moral agent[s],” 
phronesis is “imaginable only where premises of thought are permeable to the interests of others 
in an atmosphere of civic friendship and public exposure.”102   
Here the relationship between contingency and phronetic virtue is situated squarely in 
human relation-in-community, which begs the question of a community of and for whom and on 
the basis of what kinds of relationships?  This question implies an objection to the real 
oppressions of Aristotle’s Athens—but in the sense of an inescapable relationship between 
phronetic virtue and abjection, rather than a claim of poisoned well.  Farrell argues, “Aristotle’s 
advice is incomplete, as is the art, the worldview it presents, and the world in which it thrives.”  
But the problematic telos of phronesis is not only ancient Athens, but also the problem of 
exclusion and abjection that inheres in any rhetoric of an inclusive public.  Gadamer argues that 
Aristotle’s methodological attempt at consistency in his arguments concerning universality and 
particularity underwrite an inherently conservative aspect of phronesis.  The realization of 
phronetic virtue is unlikely to engender, even in the way that theory can derive from the radical 
embrace of the particular, broad ethical objections to evils like slavery that are generally 
accepted by the given popular context.103  Farrell’s response is to locate Aristotelian particularity 
and “partisanship” as a “universal feature of human being.”  As Farrell reads The Rhetoric, the 
manner in which “larger civic obligations”—the telos of the polity—can derive from partisanship 
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is in the productive ability to move from “partialist” to “our complicity in the interests of others” 
because of our universal membership in certain partialist human concerns.104  
Farrell’s position reminds me of Butler’s warning against Aristotelian projects that take 
community as it is currently theorized and seek to expand it in the particular: “it may…seem that 
I am simply calling for a more concrete and internally diverse ‘universality’…but…such a 
totalizing notion could only be achieved at the cost of producing new and further exclusions.”105  
If phronesis, understood rhetorically, is a virtue defined through “collective character,” than in 
the context of the queer phronesis I attempt above, the wonderful phronetic gesture from the 
particularity of judgment about queer subjects before the law, toward a theoretical relationship 
between that judgment and imagined community will be unable to break from the feedback loop 
of state- and institutional-heteronormative reinscription.  In Michael Warner’s terms, a queer 
phronesis could only be part of queer publicity and not counter-publicity.  A counterpublic must 
not only retain some “awareness of its subordinate status” to the “dominant public” but also 
articulate ways of imagining publicity—“stranger sociability and reflexivity”—that are explicitly 
contrary to and disavowed by existing dominant public epistemologies. 106   While “an 
understanding of queerness has been developing that is suited to just this necessity,” Warner 
offers this optimistic statement with—echoing Jasbir K. Puar’s theory of “homonormativity”—
the caveat that of course, a corollary “lesbian and gay public has been reshaped so as to ignore or 
refuse the counterpublic character that has marked its history.”107  This latter is not counter to 
heteronormativity but is rather contained within and productive of the legible space of dominant 
publicity.     
If a truly radical queer of color political public is to be realized, it would “need to inhabit 
a culture with a different language ideology, a different social imaginary.”  This culture is hard to 
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conceive—like Phelan, Warner suggests that it would “need to be one with a different role for 
state-based thinking, because it might be only through its imaginary coupling with the state that a 
public acts.”108  It other words, it might need to be a public that is foundationally opposed to, 
rather than necessarily dependent on, appeals to the protection of law-as-sovereign that form the 
basis of both coercive power and protection from domination in a democratic state.   
Absent this prior queer reconceptualization of the state institution (inclusive of the law), a 
queer public would not be a public at all, but a social movement akin to our present “queer 
liberalism” that may be specifically contrary109 to the radical queer “hope of transforming not 
just policy but the space of public life itself.”110  If Farrell is right that the capacity for phronetic 
virtue is realized through the deliberative interaction between decisionmaker and public, a 
radical queer of color (counterpublic) phronesis is not only unlikely, but conceptually impossible.  
The individual particularity of phronesis is dual with the productive dream of an imagined 
community.  Gadamer’s insight is that this community is unlikely to genuinely evolve through 
phronetic judgment (judgment about particular situations) in ways that are contrary to pre-
existing, overwhelmingly agreed upon social norms.  The more likely outcome is that, as 
Aristotle himself implicitly suggests in his list of virtues in Book 1, Chapter 9, phronetic 
judgment will more often underwrite the prior normative assumptions of the community—
regardless of the ostensibly progressive form that judgment might take.   
But here, at least, is a form of description, grounded partly in the “classical” rhetorical 
theories that inform our present judicial rhetorics, of precisely how the judicial sovereign 
performatively operates.  It is the potential of this kind of description that I believe makes 
phronesis useful as a component of a queer of color rhetorical praxis.   
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IV.  Queer Political Knowledge of Phronesis 
The difficulties of a queer phronesis are particularly evident in the context of the 
“sideways” intersectional queer of color mode111 of reading doctrine that I employ in this project.  
Radical queer of color politics is mutually exclusive not only with “assimilationist political 
drives,” but with what the queer of color theorist Roderick A. Ferguson identifies as the “will to 
institutionality” that is part and parcel of the oppressively subjectifying politics of mainstream 
struggles for gay and lesbian recognition.112  To repeat the question of the Introduction: how then, 
can there be any basis for a radical queer of color politics of judicial rhetorical choice?   How can 
this be not a simple articulation of the “will to institutionality” through a reinscription of the 
foundationalist matter of institutional power?        
One answer is in Cathy J. Cohen’s recent call for queer scholars responding to proposed 
legislation and other state-institutional action concerning sexuality to consider the value of 
“practical” alongside “radical queer politics,” and to not regard the two as mutually exclusive.113 
I read the link that Cohen posits between “practical” and “radical” queer politics is a rhetorical 
one.  Given the present inevitability of a United States legislative and judicial system organized 
through the queerly racialized subordination of marginalized populations, it is for Cohen 
incumbent upon queer scholars to adopt a “practical”—in phronetic terms, cognizant of the 
demands of judgment inherent in a particular case—queer of color politics that insistently 
promotes radical queer ways of framing, repurposing, and responding to non-queer, anti-radical 
mainstream official state actions concerning sexuality.114   
Here “practical” is not a repudiation, but rather knowledge-in-service of, radical politics 
that assume the discursively constructed nature of the power of the state.  Richard Rorty uses his 
reading of “Baudrillard’s account of America as Disneyland” as the bugaboo basis of his attack 
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on the naïve “cultural left” view that “the nation-state is obsolete”—the lesson being that any 
actually progressive politics will need to start from the position that America is real and that we 
need to operate in it as such in order to work effectively against oppressive institutions.115  The 
politics I propose, following Chandan Reddy’s call for “projects of social transformation” that 
seek simultaneously to counter-legitimize and effectively confront the “ideal image” of the 
“modern state,” which despite being “reduced” to “little more than security functions” dressed up 
through self-legitimizing rhetorics, of course retains the significant functional ability to injure 
and set back those projects invested in constructing forms beyond the state.116  To reverse Rorty, 
it is precisely an understanding of both how American functions as Disneyland, and also (and 
importantly to my reading of judicial rhetoric), how its functioning as Disneyland continues to 
underwrite the notion of “America,” that provides the practical knowledge necessary to achieve 
transformation both inside and outside the rhetorically simulated sovereign, but always against it.  
  As one rhetorical theoretical basis for such analysis-as-praxis, I offer the possibility not 
of a queer phronesis, but of a radical queer engagement with the law that is strategically 
informed by phronesis, read through the radical assumptions of queer of color political 
philosophy.  Here Berlant and Warner’s notion of a “queer commentary” is useful.  In their essay 
“What Does Queer Theory Teach Us About X?” Berlant and Warner discuss the possibility for a 
queer political perspective by calling for a conceptual shift from “queer theory” to “queer 
commentary” as an intellectual and political practice.117  Queer commentary “aspires to create 
[queer] publics,” and these publics are—as Warner will later argue—defined not in terms of their 
identarian membership, but rather through their existence as political and geographic space for 
the realization and enablement of particular, subjective, and embodied ways of being and 
knowing.  “Queer commentary” is interested in queering not in the sense of describing an 
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existing thing as always-already queer.118  Instead, the queering of queer commentary is the 
practice of creating, through varied and often contradictory practice, queer possibilities for being 
and knowing: practical and conceptual queer futures.  Conceiving of queer theory as the political 
practice of queer commentary thus enables at once the articulation of specific radical queer 
political goals, the refusal or deferral of that articulation in order to offer a contextual and 
practically constrained perspective on some aspect of culture, and various combinations thereof.  
Cohen and Berlant and Warner each offer a particularist response to the higher theorizing 
tendencies of queer theory that is clearly and explicitly derivative of core theoretical concepts in 
queer theory—concepts that are in turn committed to their derivation from mutable and 
contingent particular experiences of queer and queered subjectivity in culture.   
The particularist queer and queer of color theory of Berlant, Warner, and Cohen is not so 
much parallel to as it is a radical queer commentary on the relationship between the particular 
and the universal—phronesis and episteme/techne—present in Aristotelian phronesis qua 
Taminiaux and Gadamer.  Jasbir K. Puar’s articulation of queer of color futurity works in the 
same way.  A queer futurist telos for Puar at once: is necessitated by the exigencies of judgments 
made locally in response to subjective and communal experiences of racist and heteronormative 
oppression; explicitly disavows the particular as a mode of judgment or action; and engages in 
that disavowal precisely and paradoxically to leave open the vector of possibilities for specific 
and particular queer futures.119  As in Aristotle, the particular and the universal are paradoxically 
held together as both opposed and in some sense the same.  In phronesis, the universal is 
subsumed by the particular, which is elevated to the status of divine ideal.  Contrastingly, Cohen 
and Puar’s articulation of radical queer of color particularity assumes the subordination of the 
particular to the theoretical, which is itself understood as an indefinable and productively 
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uncertain general articulation of the specific: as Butler says, the “ungrounded ground” of radical 
poststructural progressive politics.120   
What I propose is not a queer phronesis, but a critical queer of color commentary on or 
knowledge of phronesis.  If Vernünftigkeit is the “practical knowledge of practical reason” that 
“teaches us the conditions under which reason becomes practical,” a radical queer of color 
knowledge of these conditions-in-law underwrites a mode of critical action.  This mode of action 
does not relate to the practice and criticism of institutionalized legal judgment as itself a queer 
practice (a queer phronesis), but rather approaches the criticism and practice of legal judgment 
with a practical understanding of the implications of that judgment from a radical queer of color 
perspective. Rather than a paradoxical affirmation of the fundamentally universal and 
fundamentally particular, a practical/radical queer of color rhetorical critique of judicial rhetoric 
will involve the paradoxical affirmation of a specific telos of particularity—this form of judicial 
argument should be valued over this other form, given the present inevitability of one or the 
other—within the framework of a queer of color political perspective that rejects any valuation 
of the law’s claims to sovereign legitimacy reform as necessarily reproductive of oppression.   
  The United States is founded and still re-articulated121 through the c(C)onstitution of 
“whiteness as property,”122 or the formulation and re-formulation of a national society predicated 
on the valuation of greater and lesser abjections from the privileged norm.  In such a 
constitutional society, legal rhetoric, as Chandan Reddy argues, operates as both the “structure 
and archive” for the “differentiated social formation” of U.S. culture.123  Scholarship that 
operates entirely within the rhetorical framework of the law’s archive (as its jurisprudential 
archivists maintain it) will not only fail to discern, but also will participate in reproducing124 the 
racialized “hierarchies of value”125 part and parcel even of rhetorical moves toward queering the 
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law.  For Reddy, critical queer of color legal scholarship needs to mark forms of queer of color 
subjectivity which are subject to but not subjects of the law, which are not legible within the 
rhetorical formulations of judicial opinion.  These forms of subjectivity are subjected to the law 
while being denied legal subjectivity—as the “limit of the archive, the point at which the 
archive’s own [racialized] conditions for existence might be retraced.”126  In this light, the 
contribution of this dissertation is both basic and vital.  I posit (and here I cite as inspirational the 
work of Sara L. McKinnon127) the necessity of a close reading of judicial argumentative choice 
as a necessary and mostly overlooked component of this retracing.            
V.  Conclusion: Rhetorical Legal Subjects   
Shortly after the Court’s decision in Lawrence, Craig Willse and Dean Spade published 
“Freedom in a Regulatory State?: Lawrence, Marriage, and Biopolitics.”  Willse and Spade’s law 
note contests the “status granted” Kennedy’s opinion by contemporary “LGBT legal 
organizations and advocates”128 as “‘Our Biggest Victory Yet!’”129  Willse and Spade advocate 
instead a “more cautious reading,” wherein Kennedy’s decision represents a “shift” rather than a 
“challenge” to the “mechanics of discipline” that represent the biopolitical technology of the 
juridical disciplining of queer/of color bodies.130  This juridical disciplining of queer bodies 
occurs through what I would call, rhetorically, a process of the judicial rhetorical and racialized 
constitution of legitimate queer subjects before the law.   
Specifically, the “rearticulation” of sodomy into an “act constitutive of a sympathetic 
identity group” that is at the heart of Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence is constitutive of particular 
forms of homosexual identity as newly legitimated members of the U.S. polity.131  Lawrence’s 
judicial rhetorical move—Kennedy’s “rearticulation”—marks a “regrouping” of U.S. legal 
“punitive and violent” coercive power in and through the newly recognized legitimate 
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homosexual subject to “not only address the queer as a disciplined subject, but ensure the 
[biopolitical] domination of some queers nonetheless.”132 
 Willse and Spade read Kennedy’s inevitable and generically predictable “rhetorical 
positioning of the case” as a position derivative of, rather than confrontational to, “existing legal” 
doctrinal commitments to state-institutional investments in particular forms of family structure, 
sexual being, and relation.  What is interesting about Lawrence, they argue, is not that Kennedy 
framed his opinion in such “centrist” and “non-controversial” terms—terms that made the 
opinion’s status as a marker of rather than a challenge to the biopolitical state-regulation of queer 
bodies both predictable and inevitable.  Rather, Lawrence is interesting because those “[LGBT] 
movements that were, at their inception, opposed to such coercion” adopted in their response to 
the decision such an enthusiastic embrace of “state regulatory power regarding sexuality and 
family structure.”133   
The conditions of possibility for the doctrinal argumentative construction of Kennedy’s 
opinion itself were latent in and indeed inherent to the limited space of U.S. judicial rhetorical 
culture.  But the successful operation of Lawrence as a mechanism of biopolitical state power in 
U.S. queer publics (an operation that Willse and Spade presciently predicted would become 
central to the project of the marriage equality movement, as an expansion of the biopolitical 
regulation of some marked as legitimately queer and the domination of others marked as not134) 
is made possible not by Kennedy’s arguments that (in Willse and Spade’s reading) say it should 
be so.  Rather, Lawrence’s success as a mechanism of racialized and heteronormative biopower 
is enabled by “the incomplete conception of the operations of power”135—or indeed complicity 
in those operations—of an increasingly dominant queer public that has come to embrace as a 
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central component of queer culture a “technology of power that organizes all parts of a 
population in terms of access to resources necessary for survival”—that is, marriage.136 
 In this chapter, I have focused primarily on the political operation of what Willse and 
Spade address as an aside to their major claim: the argumentative mode of reasonable judicial 
argument in response to highly controversial and divisive issues.  In their introduction to 
Contemporary Rhetorical Theory, Lucaites and Condit argue that this mode of argument is 
central to the ideal process of rhetorical decisionmaking in “classical” theory that continues to be 
cited and deployed in contemporary times.  Rhetoric is the “legitimation of decisions made in 
situations defined by ‘contingency,’ where actions must be taken but ‘decisionmakers are forced 
to rely on probabilities rather than certainties.’”137  There is no better example of this form of 
rhetorical operation than in judicial culture.138  As I note above, judicial rhetoric, understood in 
these terms, is definitionally phronetic—it is the application of “practical wisdom” by public 
rhetors central to the process by which “communities attempt to negotiate contingency and 
indeterminacy.”139  And as James Jasinski has argued recently, there may be no better example 
of phronetic judicial rhetoric than the recent opinions of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.140  Thus 
Willse and Spade observe that “the rhetorical positioning of the majority [in Lawrence] is no 
surprise.”  A phronetic understanding of judicial rhetoric is simply another way of describing the 
adaptability of state power as it evolves through different modes of regulation—including the 
present and ongoing evolution represented in the continuing shift from the disciplinary to the 
biopolitical.141   
Foucault argues that while the law in the extant state retains the final and “absolute” 
disciplinary “menace” of death, the increasingly normalizing function of law as a technology of 
“bio-power” means that the “judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of 
  287 
apparatuses…whose functions are for the most part regulatory.”142  Foucault cautions against an 
over-valuation of the significance of juridical power on the basis of Constitution, as 
“Constitutions [including the United States’]…were” simply “the forms that made an essentially 
normalizing power acceptable.”143  This position, echoed partly in Black Legal Studies and queer 
of color legal critique, supports an approach to legal texts that is more discursive than rhetorical, 
moving away from what Foucault might argue (what Butler does argue, through Foucault) is a 
legal scholarly tendency toward a false re-inscription of judicial rhetoric’s sovereign 
illocutionary power.144   
This is similar to Willse and Spade’s contention that what is most interesting about 
Lawrence is not the argumentative choices made by Kennedy in his decision, but rather the 
political effects of “well-resourced” “LGBT legal” movements’145 embrace and articulation of 
those choices as a victory for the dream of a future liberated queer culture.  If part of the 
advantage of understanding the law in terms of rhetorical culture is the ability to see legal 
decisions as productive of “a modicum of stability and predictability” through “‘compromise,’ 
‘stand-off,’ or ‘concordance’ among social actors motivated by competing interests,”146 Willse, 
Spade, and other practitioners and theorists of radical queer and queer of color politics suggest 
that this “modicum of stability and predictability” is no more than the marker of the juridical 
function in the statist control over and systemic elimination of queerly racialized bodies on the 
margins.   
Conversely, Butler argues in 1992 that the risk and benefit of radical, anti-structural and 
disestablishmentarian democratic politics are one and the same:  
That [normative] foundations [of identity] exist only to be put into question is…the 
permanent risk of the process of democratization. To refuse that contest is to sacrifice the 
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radical democratic impetus of…politics. That the category is unconstrained, even that it 
comes to serve [oppressive] purposes, will be part of the risk of this procedure.147 
Following Butler, the contingent aspect of radical queer of color politics has less to do with the 
inevitably probabilistic nature of situations that demand attempts at change, than with the 
political choice to embrace uncertainty itself as the basis and desired end result of politics of 
resistance to ever shifting boundaries of oppression.  Here critical legal rhetorical and radical 
queer of color analysis differ in their conclusions about the ethical value of legal culture 
grounded in and understood through the practical negotiation of inevitable contingency.  For the 
one, the temporary articulation of normative certainty in the face of contingent rhetorical 
situations is politically productive;148 for the other, the value of contingent politics is the ability 
to constantly reject strategies of normative foundationalism.   
I see judicial rhetoric as much more of a two-way street.  The law has no effect—indeed 
no meaningful existence—apart from the historical-cultural conditions of possibility from 
whence it came, conditions that work to continuously reproduce, alter, and re-legitimize the role 
of law in society.  This process is not linear or precisely rhetorical, but rather dialogic.  On the 
one hand, judicial rhetoric evolves and circulates under the constraints of conditions of rhetorical 
possibility latent in the culturally produced realm of law.  The Constitution did not create the 
United States, and it does not, after all, precisely constitute it.  Rather, the shifting set of 
possibilities for the effectivity of constitutional discourse in the U.S. polity illuminate the text 
itself as a living exemplar of the set of hierarchical relationships of identity and capital that form 
what the United States is as a polity.149  Constitutional rhetoric—in particular the judicial 
rhetoric of constitutional law—is not only enabled by and granted certain limited effective power 
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by culture, but is also simultaneously constitutive of the limited realm of rhetorical possibility for 
a person’s articulation of self as a subject before the law of the United States. 
As Halley says, “lawyers,” presenting arguments on behalf of persons who may or may 
not self-express as legible legal subjects, “can do things that alter the social definition of [a] 
group itself.  They can ‘make up people’ in ways that weak constructivist views of group 
formation ignore.”150  Those with the power to publicly represent the interests of a social group 
construct people in a variety of institutional and extra-institutional discursive locations; Halley’s 
nod, described in Chapter One, to the particular exigence of arguing to a judge highlights the 
specific politics of identity construction in the context of U.S. judicially produced subjectivity.  
The affirmative “construction” of identity through the process of legal argument—the creation of 
forms of subjectivity before U.S. law—is a dialogically creative and destructive material 
rhetorical act.   
The prevailing theory of identity in U.S. law works, again, according to a “single-axis” 
model—legal subjects are recognized by judicial rhetors literally in terms of only one identity 
per claim upon the law.151  This theory is hegemonic; it is part of the ideological fabric of U.S. 
jurisprudential practice, and so is specifically spoken and defended only when necessary to reject 
or constrain attempts to approach the U.S. judiciary through a multiple-axis framework.  Those 
who would approach the bench face, as a condition of that approach, a judicial rhetorical version 
of Althusser’s coercive hail.152  All constructions of identity vis-à-vis U.S. judicial law are 
therefore coercively normative.  Just as any subject-less declaration of “I” within 
heteronormative social matrixes is founded upon the abjection of the queer anti-subject,153 so are 
all constructions of identity before U.S. judicial law simultaneously constructions of abject, 
legally subject-less identities at the violent margins of institutional legal culture.    
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Constitutional rhetoric is thus constitutive of possibilities for people in everyday contexts 
to participate in constructing the structures of what remains effectively a constitutional 
society.154  The relationship between bodies and law is not quite one in which the law constitutes 
the bodied/material subject; nor is it (quite) one in which the subjective identity of pre-discursive 
materiality is given intelligibility through legal inscription.155  Given the instrumentality of the 
law, Butler argues for legal analysis that is more concerned with the fact of relation between 
bodies and the law as an inscriptive force, and less with the specific content of subjective identity 
produced through the “force of that inscription.”156  The implication is that the normatively 
subjectified body is not—even as it is faced with the overwhelming structural and constitutive 
determinacy of institutional legal language—wholly demarcated by the particular cultural 
intelligibilities conferred through the “active archive”157 of judicial and other legal rhetoric.158   
My argument is that the judicial rhetorical delimitation of realms of possibility for a 
person’s articulation of self as legal subject, have material implications for the lives and 
existence of marginalized populations in the United States—an argument for which I offer the 
case studies in this dissertation as empirical proof.  If this is the case, then the rhetorical analysis 
of the differential impacts of argumentative choices made by judicial rhetors need neither be a 
repudiation of, nor a middle ground negotiation of, anti-structuralist and normative rhetorical 
praxis.  Critical rhetorical attention to the specific argumentative construction of legal discourse 
can thus be a disestablishmentarian political praxis grounded in a radical epistemology of legal 
rhetorical action via judicial argument.  In the case of judicial rhetoric specifically, such a critical 
praxis can be productively understood as a radical queer political epistemology of the material 
operation of phronetic virtue in constitutional law.   
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